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Abstract
In this thesis I take up the topic of our understanding of questions in a detailed case study 
of non-utility measures of health-related quality of life. I argue that efforts to standardize 
these measures lead to limitations in our ability to understand and measure quality of life.
In the first half o f this thesis I describe two types of bias that affect quality of life measures 
despite efforts to validate them. On the one hand, quality of life measures can perpetuate 
ethnocentric understandings of quality of life. On the other hand, respondents often 
understand the questions in these measures very differently than researchers imagined.
I argue that the residual bias found in quality of life measures is the result of two 
assumptions built into the use of construct validity: 1) when a measure’s outcomes confirm 
our hypotheses, we are warranted in having greater confidence in the accuracy of our 
theory 2) respondents understand the questions and answers in our measures in the same 
way as researchers imagined they would.
In the second half of this thesis I argue that the limitations of construct validity stem from 
the logic of asking questions, a logic which precludes standardization. I propose that 
quality of life measures ought to be understood differently—they are not independent 
instruments capable of unambiguous claims, but rather one element in a dialogic 
framework whose questions and outcomes serve as the starting point for further inquiry.
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Finally, I examine what might have motivated the misguided use of construct validity. I 
suggest that the motivation lies in an erroneous picture of the human subject. I argue for an 
alternative picture that allows me to introduce an ethical dimension to our questions about 
quality of life.
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Introduction
What, is the highest of all the goods achievable in action?...both the many 
and the cultivated call it happiness, and they suppose that living well and 
doing well are the same as being happy. But they disagree about what 
happiness is, and the many do not give the same answer as the wise. For 
many think it is something obvious and evident— for instance, pleasure, 
wealth, or honor. Some take it to be one thing, others another. Indeed, the 
same person often changes his mind; for when he has fallen ill, he thinks 
happiness is health, and when he has fallen into poverty, he thinks it is 
wealth.1
It is not uncommon for essays on health-related quality of life or “quality of 
life” as I will refer to it in this thesis to begin with this quote by Aristotle. As I will 
explore in Chapter 1 for some quality of life researchers this passage signifies the 
idiosyncratic nature of quality of life; it reinforces the idea that what makes for a 
happy or good quality life is different for everyone. For others this passage is used 
to emphasize the difficulty as well as the importance of coming to grips with a 
concept of quality of life that is applicable to whole populations of people. In both 
cases, however, this reference serves as a point of departure for the development of 
different measures designed to determine accurately an individual or a population’s 
quality of life.
In this thesis I take a critical look at these instruments— both those that 
consider quality of life to be idiosyncratic and those that take it to have a global 
meaning—from a philosophical point of view. Specifically I question the validity 
of our quality of life measures because, as I argue, they involve endemic problems 
with regard to how we are to understand the meaning of the questions and answers
1 Aristotle (1999) (2nd ed) Nicomachean Ethics, trans by Terence Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 15-20.
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that make up the content of these measures. My aim here is not to solve this
problem by implementing a new and better methodology. Rather I want to dissolve
the problem by changing how we think about quality of life measures and how we
understand the kind of information they provide.
Traditionally quality of life measures are understood along the lines of a
sphigmometer or stethoscope: the measures’ outcomes—the reading of my blood
pressure or heartbeat— are understood to be independent from the theoretical
orientation which one approaches a particular person’s illness or medicine
more generally. Moreover, the meanings of the measure’s outcomes are
meant to be clear to anyone educated in how to read them—that is they are
not inherently vague o r am biguous. In fact as one researcher puts it,
The measurement science behind quality of life assessment can ensure the 
collection of reproducible, substantive data that can be analyzed with as 
much confidence as a blood chemical value.2
In this thesis, however, I argue that the analysis of “quality of life” is
perhaps not like the analysis of a blood chemical value. On the one hand, quality of
life outcomes are significantly influenced by the theoretical orientation with which
we bring to bear on them; on the other hand, quality of life outcomes are inherently
vague and ambiguous— even to those educated to interpret them. I began this
introduction with the excerpt from the Nicomachean Ethics not only to introduce
two different ways of thinking about quality of life and to emphasize their
philosophical roots, but also to remind us that for Aristotle happiness or quality of
2 Celia, D.F. (1992) ‘Quality o f Life: The Concept’, in Journal o f Palliative Care, 8: 10.
life is an ethical question. In this thesis I will argue that when we measure quality 
of life we are best understood as making a contribution to an ethical dialogue—not 
measuring a scientific construct.
Health-related Quality o f Life Measures: Its Influences and Uses
Typically when we think of ethical questions we think of questions 
regarding what it is to live a good life and how we might go about achieving a good 
life for ourselves and others. These kinds of questions first began to impinge 
significantly on the practice of medicine in the years following World War II. As I 
will discuss in Chapter 2 these questions were precipitated in part by the growing 
awareness of the experimental research that was conducted on human subjects 
during the war. In part, however, the questions were the results of advances in 
technology which increased the kinds and numbers of diseases that medics were 
expected to treat.
Before the Second World War most of our medical endeavors dealt with 
acute infectious diseases; diseases like tuberculosis or polio from which individuals 
either recovered or died. But after the war, at least in the northern hemisphere, the 
majority of medical practice began to shift to the management and care of chronic 
disease.3 This trend continues today: diseases like AIDS which 20 years ago killed 
most of the individuals that contracted it are now manageable with the appropriate 
cocktail of drugs; the same is true for tuberculosis, many forms of cancer, diseases 
that cause renal failure and others. As a result of this shift in medicine individuals
3 Ibid, p. 8.
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can live longer with a variety of illnesses. But many of the interventions 
responsible for this change are either temporarily or permanently toxic and 
debilitating. Thus questions regarding the relative quality of one’s life have become 
a significant factor not only in decisions regarding whether or not to accept certain 
treatments, but also in the characterization of successful treatments.
The notion of quality of life research was bom in 1947 when the World 
Health Organization (WHO) redefined “health” as, ‘a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity’.4 
Two years later Kamofsky and Burchenal included mood, well-being and functional 
status for the first time as criteria by which new drugs ought to be evaluated.5 
Quality of life research has since progressed into a major research program and 
quality of life measures are used in a variety of contexts. In what follows I look at 
some of the areas in which quality of life measures are frequently used.
The most common use of quality of life measures is in the evaluation of 
successful or effective treatments.6 In these cases quality of life outcomes from 
different treatments are compared— alongside biomedical outcomes— to determine 
which intervention(s) best serves patients’ interests. For instance, the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) routinely uses quality of life measures or 
what they refer to as patient-reported outcomes as effectiveness endpoints in clinical
4 World Health Organization Constitution (1947) WHO Chronicle, 1:16.
5 Browne, J. (1997) Individual Quality o f  Life in Older People, Conceptual and Methodological Challenges, 
PhD Thesis in Psychology, Dublin University p. 3.
6 Ibid, p. 12.
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trials.7 Anticancer agents can obtain FDA approval even without an advantage in 
survival compared to the standard therapy as long as the new drug demonstrates an
O
improvement in quality of life.
In addition to its use in evaluating the success of different drugs, the 
comparison of quality of life outcomes is also used to determine the relative success 
of different surgical procedures. For example, there are at least two different 
procedures which aim to reduce the chances of a sub-arachnoid hemorrhage in a 
weak artery. One procedure requires a surgeon to enter the body through the skull 
and clamp the weakened artery; the other procedure uses a coil threaded through the 
nose to brace the walls of the artery. For the purposes of funding or guideline 
development we may wish to determine which intervention constitutes best practice. 
In this case both surgeries are effective, but because one surgery is more invasive 
and the other more experimental quality of life is a relevant concern. A third use for 
the comparison of quality of life outcomes concerns the effectiveness of elective 
surgeries like knee replacements and cochlear implants. Since elective surgeries are 
essentially a quality improvement issue these measures are allegedly suited to 
evaluate their success.
In addition to the evaluation of drugs and surgical interventions quality of 
life measures are also used in routine clinical practice to help individuals make
7 Office o f New Drugs and the Office of Medical Policy in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research in 
cooperation with the Center for Biologies Evaluation and Research and the Center for devices and 
Radiological Health at the Food and Drug Administration (2005) Guidance fo r  Industry Patient-Reported 
Outcome Measures: Use in Medical Product Development to Support Labeling Claims, p. 1.
8 Celia, D.F. (1992) ‘Quality o f Life: The Concept’, in Journal o f Palliative Care, 8: 8.
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decisions about their treatment and to enhance doctor patient communication.9 Here 
quality of life measures provide information to doctors about how their patients are 
doing and offer patients tools to help them articulate their concerns. This use of 
quality of life measures is in part a result of concerns individuals have raised about 
the quality of their lives given the side-effects their treatments can have. In part it is 
a result of changes in medical practice and decision-making which aim to give 
patients a voice in their own health care.
These two reasons for the growth of quality of life measures are not 
unrelated. As medicine increasingly focuses on the management of chronic 
illnesses, on one hand, and offers more and more elective interventions, on the 
other, ethical questions like those I discussed earlier become relevant to treatment 
decisions. In fact one may argue that issues of self-determination and patient 
autonomy are the motivating forces of quality of life measurement. I discuss this 
topic in more detail in Chapter 2.
A final use of quality of life measures is in the allocation of healthcare 
resources. The reasons for the need to ration healthcare resources are multiple: the 
organs required for transplantation are in short supply; only a few people in a local 
area may be trained in a relevant procedure; tertiary or intensive care beds in a 
nearby hospital may be limited; insurance coverage may be prohibited; 
experimental drug programs may allow only a fixed number of participants; hospital
9 Browne, J. (1997) Individual Quality o f  Life in Older People, Conceptual and Methodological Challenges, 
PhD Thesis in Psychology, Dublin University p. 6.
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budgets may require the elimination of certain services.10 In many of these cases 
the need to ration healthcare resources is related to limited financial resources and 
the rising costs of healthcare. For instance, in May of 2001 a workshop on 
healthcare costs held by the United States Federal Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) found that Medicare costs in California would rise from $252 
billion in 2002 to $456 billion in 2010. Factors accounting for these rising costs 
included growth in pharmaceutical expenses, expensive new technologies, aging of 
the population and increased consumer demand.11
In light of limited financial and healthcare resources questions of resource 
allocation have mainly focused on deriving Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) 
for different medical interventions. Here medical outcomes are assessed according 
to the number of years and the relative quality a given intervention adds to a 
particular life. One year lived in perfect health is worth one QALY unit and various 
methods are used to give percentage units to years in various states of less than 
perfect health. Once these percentages are calculated the cost of any medical 
intervention can be divided by its expected QALY increase to yield a cost per 
QALY.12 In this way, different medical procedures are compared according to their 
cost-effectiveness.
10 University o f Washington School of Medicine (1998) ‘Ethics in Medicine: Resource Allocation’ at 
http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/resa11.html
11 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2001) ‘Healthcare Costs: Why Do They Increase? What can 
We Do?’, United States Department for Health and Human Services, at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/news/u1p/costs/ulpcosts 1 .htm
12 Edgar, A. et al., (1998) The Ethical QALY Ethical Issues in Healthcare Resource Allocations, Haslemere: 
Euromed Communications, pp. 35-39.
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But not all questions of resource allocation focus on QALYs. For instance, 
the assessment of rehabilitation needs is often achieved via quality of life 
inventories that help patients itemize their likely problems in coping with everyday 
tasks. This itemization can help clinicians with limited resources to promote the 
best quality of care for their patients while giving them the skills to participate in 
their daily activities.13
Quality o f Life and the Importance o f Philosophical Reflection
Although quality of life measures are used in a variety of contexts and for a 
variety of reasons each measure faces the same criteria for determining their relative 
ability to measure quality of life. As I will discuss further in Chapter 1 quality of 
life measures are usually evaluated in terms of what are called their psychometric 
properties, namely their reliability and validity. These criteria are taken from 
classical test theory and are a measure’s two most important evaluative properties.
The quality of life literature currently overflows with examinations of the 
degree to which quality of life measures achieve these standards. Researchers 
investigate different reliability coefficients and different strategies for achieving 
validity. They also offer advice on constructing a measure in terms of the choice of 
questions as well as in terms of their format and their weighting. Nevertheless, 
there is a little of what we might refer to as philosophical reflection on the way 
standards of reliability and validity are applied. By a lack of “philosophical 
reflection” I mean that the methodological portion of the quality of life literature is
13 Celia, D.F. (1992) ‘Quality o f Life: The Concept’, in Journal o f Palliative Care, 8: 12.
almost entirely concerned with how to construct measures whose psychometric 
properties conform to the standards of classical test theory. Nevertheless, there is 
very little discussion regarding the application of these standards with regard to the 
purposes for which we measure quality of life. Nor is there sufficient discussion of 
the different meanings of reliability and validity in different areas of investigation.
It is understandable that a discipline whose function is to gather and 
disseminate information about quality of life would focus, methodologically 
speaking, on questions of how to engineer valid and reliable measures rather than on 
questions regarding the standards of reliability and validity themselves. As a result, 
however, engineering difficulties with the validity or reliability of a measure tend to 
be met with technical solutions which in turn simply assume the suitability of 
applying classical test theory standards.
I explain in Chapter 1 that the accuracy of a given quality of life measure is 
generally defined in terms of construct validity and that this definition is rarely 
questioned. Instead it is often assumed that if a measure achieves positive construct 
validity and it is reliable, then it is possible to analyze a measure’s outcomes as 
clearly as we do ‘a blood chemical value’. Just as a valid and reliable 
sphigmometer can answer the question, ‘What is her blood pressure?’ a valid and 
reliable quality of life measure is supposed to be able to answer the question, ‘What 
is an individual or population’s quality of life?’ To be sure, a lack of what I am 
calling philosophical reflection and its consequences are only problematic if our 
process for determining the psychometric worth of our measures is problematic; if, 
for instance, some of the assumptions embodied in construct validity are
inconsistent with the reality or purpose of quality of life measurement. In this thesis 
I make precisely this claim. I challenge some of the assumptions of construct 
validity with respect to quality of life measurement and thus I suggest that there is 
not only a role for philosophical reflection in quality of life research, but also a need 
for it.
The Limits o f Construct Validity
As I said at the beginning of this introduction I question whether we can 
analyze quality of life outcomes as we may analyze blood chemistry. I focus on 
construct validity because of its importance in the literature. Yet, if the results of 
blood chemistry are clear to anyone trained in reading them, then the analysis of 
quality of life outcomes is not. In making this argument I articulate and challenge 
some of the fundamental assumptions that motivate the use of construct validity in 
quality of life research. I use my criticisms of construct validity to identify endemic 
problems with appealing to classical test theory to determine validity, problems 
which occur whenever we use the format of questions and answers to gather 
information.
In this thesis I identify and critique three assumptions built into the use of 
construct validity with respect to quality of life measures: 1) when a measure’s 
outcomes confirm our hypotheses, we are warranted in having greater confidence in 
the accuracy of our theory and the validity of our measure; 2) respondents 
understand the questions and answers in our measures in the same way as
researchers imagined they would; 3) respondents are conceptualized on the model 
of weak evaluators.
I begin my discussion of these assumptions in Chapter 2 where I argue that 
quality of life measures may perpetuate ethnocentric or biased notions of quality of 
life. I suggest that the application of construct validity sometimes creates a context 
in which certain assumptions about quality of life may go unchallenged.
Construct validity assesses the extent to which a new measure is related to 
hypotheses derived from the theory that underpins the measure.14 For example, say 
we design a new measure to access the quality of life of cochlear implant recipients.
We might theorize that individuals without certain opportunities— for instance, the 
ability to communicate orally— have a poorer quality of life than individuals with 
these opportunities. Based on this theory we may hypothesize that cochlear implant 
recipients will experience an increase in quality of life within a year after their 
surgery due to a growth in their valuable opportunities. To determine the construct 
validity of this new measure we would compare the outcomes from our measure 
with our hypothesis. If there is an inconsistency between our hypothesis and the 
outcomes, then the logic of construct validity instructs us to investigate our theory 
or our measure or perhaps both to locate the problem— perhaps some part of our 
theory is wrong or our measure needs some fine tuning. If, however, the outcomes 
confirm our hypothesis, then we are supposed to be justified in having greater 
confidence in both our theory and our measure.
14 Albrecht, G.L. (1994) ‘Subjective Health Assessment’, Crispin Jenkinson ed, in Measuring Health and 
M edical Outcomes, London: London University Press, p. 21.
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But in Chapter 2 I argue that this assumption— confirmation warrants 
confidence— may lead to ethnocentric understandings of quality of life. Turning 
again to the quality of life of cochlear implant recipients, if our measure’s outcomes 
confirm our hypothesis, then the logic of construct validity warrants an increase in 
confidence that certain valuable opportunities such as the ability to communicate 
orally make for a better quality of life. Because oral communication presupposes 
the ability to hear our outcomes also support the view that hearing is a prerequisite 
for a good quality of life. Yet deaf advocates argue that the deaf life can be an 
equally good quality life and, moreover, that our measure’s outcomes reflect both a 
century of systematic discrimination and the lack of public resources available to 
teach the deaf.
The logic of construct validity may unintentionally lead us endorse 
ethnocentric understandings of quality of life, for instance the notion that hearing is 
a prerequisite to a good quality life. To be sure, deaf advocates could be wrong, but 
without further investigation— even when our outcomes confirm our hypothesis—  
quality of life measures and their outcomes may conceal more about quality of life 
than they reveal.
In Chapter 3 I turn from issues of ethnocentricity and how we understand 
respondent answers to respondent bias and how individuals understand questions. 
Respondent bias occurs when individuals answer questions inaccurately. These 
inaccuracies sometimes arise because respondents understand the questions in a 
measure differently than researchers imagined they would understand them. When 
individuals understand questions differently than researchers their answers are in
danger of biasing the measure. For instance, in the Nottingham Health Profile 
(NHP) one question asks respondents, ‘I find it hard to reach for things’; ‘yes/no’. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 3 this question is meant to be understood in terms of 
one’s health, but respondents sometimes understand the question in terms of their 
height. Thus, short people may answer ‘yes’ indicating morbidity which may not 
exist.
Valid measures of quality of life require that researchers and respondents 
understand a measure’s questions and answers in the same way. Indeed, the 
accuracy of our construct validity claims depends on it since differences in how 
respondents’ understand questions cannot always be detected by construct validity: 
respondent bias can happen when respondents answer in line with established 
hypotheses, but in response to alternatively interpreted questions. To ensure the 
validity of our measures researchers strive to create questions that constrain how 
respondents will understand them.
Although valid measurement does require that researchers and respondents 
understand questions and answers in the same way I will look at research that 
suggests that even our most trusted measures do not achieve this mutual 
understanding. Moreover, I argue that attempting to constrain how respondents 
understand the questions in a measure is not the appropriate solution to this 
problem. It is not the appropriate solution because as I argue we cannot know in 
advance of applying a quality of life measure to a particular context just what the 
questions in the measure ought to mean; how researchers imagine questions is not 
necessarily the best way to understand them.
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But if we cannot know in advance of administering a measure how to best 
understand the questions therein, then the validity of our measures cannot depend 
on conveying the meaning researchers imagined to respondents. Nonetheless, 
construct validity does depend on this conveyance of meaning. For if we rely on 
construct validity in spite of our inability to determine the meaning of questions in 
advance, then answers which appear to bias a measure may in fact be the result of 
alternatively interpreted questions which shed light on our understanding of the 
construct; answers which appear to confirm our hypotheses may, however, be the 
result of questions understood in such a way as to undermine our them.
Drawing on the work of Bas van Fraassen and Hans-Georg Gadamer in 
Chapter 4 I situate some of my concerns regarding quality of life research within 
well-known debates in the philosophy of science and social science. Here I 
characterize the futility and damage that follows from attempts to limit how 
respondents understand questions as a limitation that affects all investigations which 
rely on the structure of questions and answers. To do this I defend van Fraassen’s 
position that we cannot limit the kinds of questions we ask from criticisms made by 
Wesley Salmon & Phillip Kitcher. Salmon & Kitcher worry that if we do not put a 
priori limits on the kinds of questions we might pose then we run the risk of 
adulterating scientific knowledge. I argue, however, that if we attempt to limit in 
advance the questions we ask— whether in quality of life research or science— then 
we unduly limit what we might come to know about our subject matter.
Turning to Gadamer I suggest that we can be critical of the questions we ask 
without limiting certain questions out of hand. To avail ourselves of Gadamer’s
insight I suggest that we think of that which we are questioning— a measure; an 
MRI— in terms of a text that we are trying to understand. For Gadamer we 
approach a text or text-analogue within a dialogic framework in which other texts 
on the subject matter— other measures or prior experiences with MRIs— gives us a 
starting point for understanding, thus we approach a text with certain assumptions 
about what it might mean. Our assumptions about what it might mean, however, 
are challenged when discrepancies arise between our assumptions and the text. 
These challenges take the form of questions, for instance, questions about an 
unusual marking on an MRI or uncommon answers to the questions in our quality 
of life measures. For Gadamer valid interpretations of a text are those that construe 
the text as coherent and possibly true, therefore good questions are those whose 
answers provide a coherent and truth-sensitive understanding of the text and poor 
questions are those that do not.
In Chapter 5 I return to my discussion of construct validity and here I 
develop one of the expectations which might buttress its use despite the difficulties I 
have raised with regard to it. To make my argument I discuss Charles Taylor’s 
distinction between weak and strong evaluations. The distinction between these two 
types of evaluation turns on whether or not desires or outcomes are distinguished as 
to their qualitative worth. Weak evaluations deem that something is good just 
insofar as it is desired; strong evaluations determine that something is good insofar 
as the desire itself is worthy.
For Taylor these two different kinds of evaluation mark two different 
understandings of the human subject. Taylor argues that the human subject who is
characterized by weak evaluations is unrealistic and ultimately untenable. I will 
suggest, however, that it is this conception of the human subject which lends 
support to the use of construct validity in quality of life research. Nonetheless, 
following Taylor, I too will argue for the inadequacy of this picture of persons and 
offer an alternative. My alternative is based on the human subject as characterized 
by strong evaluations. Strong evaluations characterize the self as dialogic; a self 
whose self-understanding and understanding of what counts as a good quality of life 
requires deliberation with others.
A R ecom m endation  f o r  Q uality o f  Life M easurem ent
If, as I suggest in this thesis, the meaning of the questions and answers in 
our measures are always to a certain extent indeterminate and if construct validity 
cannot appreciate or arbitrate among the different ways we might understand the 
questions and answers in quality of life measures, then we cannot analyze quality of 
life outcomes as we might analyze ‘a blood chemical value’. As a result I argue that 
we stop thinking of quality of life measures as independent and self-contained 
instruments whose outcomes ought to provide unambiguous answers to questions 
about quality of life. This is not to say that we should stop measuring quality of life 
or using quantitative measures, but rather when we do measure it we ought to 
understand what we are doing differently. We might conceptualize our measures 
not as a series of questions and answers which have but one correct meaning, but as 
contributions to a dialogue through which we can become clearer about what the 
questions and answers themselves mean; we might understand quality of life
measurement not as determinate assessments of quality of life, but rather as tools for 
enhancing communication about it.
As tools for enhancing communication quality of life measures are 
conceptualized as one element in a framework of quality of life research in which 
other elements in this framework, for instance, large qualitative studies; individual 
interviews with respondents; histories of medicine; clinical assessments of good 
health and so on contribute to our understanding of how the outcomes of quality of 
life measures might be understood. For example, on this account no longer are 
qualitative studies which indicate the different ways in which respondents 
understand certain questions taken as evidence of a certain measure’s invalidity. 
Rather this information is taken to supplement the information from the quantitative 
measure; to give us a better understanding of quality of life. To be sure, our 
quantitative measures of quality of life may change as a result of information from 
other studies— we may eliminate a question, add another—but these changes are not 
in the service of creating a measure whose outcomes are independently valid; whose 
outcomes can be clearly and accurately understood by anyone educated in how to 
read them.
My recommendation for quality of life research is that we understand 
measures of quality of life as in concert with other studies of quality of life; 
quantitative measurement is important, but these measures are not self-sufficient; 
we cannot understand the meaning of the outcomes from quantitative measures 
independent of a wider, dialogic context. This proposal is based on an argument 
that claims that our questions and answers about quality of life are inherently vague
and ambiguous, that a definitive understanding of these questions and answers is not 
forthcoming. But my solution— that we understand quality of life measures in 
terms of a continuously evolving dialogue among different areas of research— is not 
an exact science. As I will discuss in Chapter 4 it is possible to give better or worse 
interpretations of our measures, but they are nevertheless interpretations and as 
such we can always learn to understand their meaning and thus the meaning of 
quality of life differently and more clearly.
But if my solution to the methodological problems of quality of life 
measurement is not an exact science, quality of life research is still a science, even it 
is not exact. How to implement my recommendations efficiently and practically is 
an importance question, but it is not the focus of this thesis. In this thesis I 
concentrate instead on explaining and developing some of the problems with using 
the standards of classical test theory to validate quality of life measures and thus 
provide good reasons for why we ought to understand these measures differently. 
Moreover, while other social science concepts may face similar difficulties to the 
ones that I raise for quality of life my arguments apply specifically to quality of life 
measurement and should not be taken more generally.
Chapter 1
Measuring Quality of Life: The Standard Needs and Individualized Approaches
Introduction
Health-related quality of life measures or as they are sometimes called “subjective 
health assessments” or “patient-reported outcomes” became important to health evaluation 
in the mid-1980’s as a way to integrate patient perspectives into the decision-making 
process in a way that is both quantitative and efficient. The motivation for this was the 
recognition that clinical measures, based on physician or surgical assessment, or laboratory 
results, do not exhaust the ways in which one can or cannot be ill or unhealthy.15 In fact it 
is well-known that clinical or biometric measures of health or illness often do not correlate 
well with patient-based health assessments. Due to technological advances and the 
democratization of medicine these differences in assessment matter, for no longer are 
health and illness considered merely biological concepts, but they also have an experiential 
dimension.
Although the importance of ‘quality of life’ in health care and the use of the term 
‘quality of life measure’ are relatively new phenomena, measures which ask patients about 
their experience have been used in health care since at least 1949.16 As the concept of 
‘quality of life’ has gained currency, however, older measures, for example, measures 
previously known as ‘health status measures’ such as the Short-Form 36 (SF-36) and the 
Sickness Impact Profile (SIP) have been reconceptualized under the umbrella ‘quality of
15 Albrecht, G.L. (1994) ‘Subjective Health Assessment’ in Measuring Health and M edical Outcomes, 
Crispin Jenkinson ed, London; University College London Press, p. 15.
16 Browne, J., et al. (1997) ‘Conceptual Approaches to the Assessment o f Quality of Life’, in Psychology and 
Health, 12: 737.
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life measure’.17 Moreover, as the concept of quality of life has matured the variety of 
measures which fall under this category has grown. While on some accounts the sheer
1 ftvariety of quality of life measures speaks against the coherence of the concept , what 
quality of life measures do have in common is their attempt to measure subjective 
experience in the context of impairment, functional status, perceptions and social 
opportunities that are influenced by disease, injury, treatment or policy.19
But while quality of life measures aim to measure subjective experience, how they 
measure that experience differs. For this reason it is important to make a few preliminary 
distinctions. Firstly, quality of life measures are usually designed as utility or non-utility 
measures. Utility measures are always index measures; index measures reduce a patient’s 
quality of life score to a single number and in the context of a utility measure this score 
represents a health state’s utility. A score of 1 usually indicates perfect health and a score 
of 0 indicates a state equivalent to death. The utility values for each health state are derived 
by prior preference scoring from the general population using techniques such as the time 
trade-off and the standard gamble. The EuroQol (EQ-5D) is an example of a utility
90measure of quality of life which uses the time trade-off technique.
17 Hunt, S.M. ‘The Problem of Quality of Life’ in Quality o f Life Research, 6: 206.
18 Ibid.
19 Albrecht, G.L. (1994) ‘Subjective Health Assessment’, in Measuring Health and Medical Outcomes, 
Crispin Jenkinson ed, London: University College London Press, p. 13. Quality of life measures are 
occasionally taken to have a more narrow scope referring only to those measures whose construct explicitly 
aims to capture ‘quality o f life’. Throughout this thesis, however, I will follow the convention o f referring to 
any measure that aims to assess the impact o f health and disease on subjective experience as a ‘quality o f life 
measure’. This is the convention o f the International Society for Quality o f Life Research (ISOQoL) and 
others.
20 Brooks, R. et al. (1996) EuroQol: the Current State o f Play, in Health Policy, 37: 53-72. The values 
derived from the EuroQol can be used to create Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), but this requires an 
estimate of how long the status o f one’s health state as obtained from the EuroQol will last. If the EuroQol 
indicates an improvement of .10 after a surgical intervention and this improvement is thought to last for two 
years then the intervention provides .2 QALYs over two years.
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Secondly, non-utility measures can be either profile or index measures. Unlike 
index measures profile measures provide multiple scores with which to represent a 
measure’s construct. The construct of a measure represents whatever the instrument is 
designed to measure and in our context the construct broadly represents the impact of 
health and disease on subjective experience. In non-utility measures this construct is 
sometimes determined, through techniques like factor analysis, to consist of multiple 
independent dimensions or components. For example, if we are trying to measure anxiety 
we might take it to consist of a cognitive dimension, a behavioral dimension and a 
physiological dimension.21 When a construct is understood to consist of multiple 
dimensions, then its measure is a profile measure, which provides a separate score for each 
dimension. Index measures, as we saw above, give us just one score and in the context of 
non-utility measures this score represents the value of the measure’s construct under a 
single dimension or component.
Thirdly, non-utility measures have questions which are weighted, generally 
arbitrarily, according to researcher expertise and sometimes layperson input; they are not 
weighted according to techniques such as the time trade-off or the standard gamble listed 
above. For instance, researchers may determine weights based on their experience with a 
construct; individuals may be interviewed and their preferences for certain quality of life 
states averaged; or as is happening more and more questions may be given de facto
21 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their Development 
and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 267. The dimensions o f a construct are determined using 
procedures like factor analysis. See Ibid., pp. 265-9.
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weights. The scores from non-utility measures represent the severity of whatever 
dimension they are meant to measure, but unlike utility measures which reduce all 
constructs to a single metric of utility, non-utility measures have their own unique metrics.
Finally, utility measures of quality of life have typically preoccupied moral 
philosophers because of the role they often play in cost-effectiveness and the allocation of 
scare health resources. Utility measures tend to presuppose the theory of expected utility 
and begin their inquiry with the question, ‘How much utility is a particular health state 
worth?’ Non-utility measures, however, are less directly involved in resource allocation 
and more directly involved in giving us a picture of patient experience. Although non­
utility measures do aim to measure ‘quality o f life’ as I will discuss throughout this thesis, 
what ‘quality of life’ amounts to— how we should understand it— varies among these 
measures. Unlike utility measures we might say that non-utility measures lack a mature 
theory.
In this thesis I take up the issue of non-utility measures. I do this because they open 
up inquiry into fundamental questions such as ‘What is quality of life?’ and thus allow us to 
evaluate different answers to this question. In the first half of this chapter I begin to 
distinguish two different answers with respect to two different approaches to quality of life: 
the standard needs approach and the individualized approach. Although both aim to 
measure the impact of health and illness on subjective experience and both do this in virtue 
of a non-utility metric they differ in how they characterize quality of life. For proponents
22 Ibid, pp. 102-3; Browne, J., et al. (1997) ‘Conceptual Approaches to the Assessment of Quality o f Life’, in 
Psychology and Health, 12: 739; Jenkinson, C. (1991) ‘Why are we Weighting? A Critical Examination o f the 
Use of Item Weights in a Health Status Measure’, in Social Science Medicine, 32: 1413-16.
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of the individualized approach quality of life is whatever an individual says it is; for 
proponents of the standard needs approach quality of life is more uniform.
In the second half of this chapter I turn from these different approaches to quality of 
life to examine the processes by which we typically assess the extent to which non-utility 
measures of quality of life do give us a good answer to the question, ‘What is quality of 
life?’ To do this I look at the processes by which we determine the validity of our quality 
of life measures— do they measure what they purport to measure?
The validation process for quality of life measures, however, is not straightforward. 
Because quality of life measures aim to assess subjective experience the phenomena that 
they all attempt to capture is, broadly speaking, unobservable. This means that quality of 
life measures lack evidence independent of their measures with which to compare their 
results. Put differently, quality of life measures lack a gold standard. In lieu of a gold 
standard quality of life measures must be validated using other criteria. Typically this is 
done using criteria derived from classical test theory, namely content, criterion and 
construct validity. * In this chapter I will argue that the validity of quality of life measures 
stands or falls with positive construct validity. In the chapters to come the singular 
importance of construct validity will have important consequences for how we 
understand— or misunderstand— good quality of life.
23 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their Development 
and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 174.
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IDifferences between the Standard Needs and Individualized Approaches
A. The Standard Needs Approach to Quality of Life
The standard needs approach and the individualized approach are the two main 
orientations to quality of life assessment.24 But the standard needs approach is what we 
might call the primary approach to quality of life since it is more commonly used and more 
widely known. The standard needs approach represents an assortment of measurements 
which differ greatly in their content—the kinds of questions they ask— and their scaling—  
the format chosen for their questions and answers. In fact they differ so much that until the 
introduction of the individualized approach in the 1990’s there was no recognized term or 
theoretical orientation with which to summarize or unify the characteristics embodied by 
these measures. As one researcher put it in 1995, ‘...the theoretical status of the QOL 
[quality of life] concept remains ambiguous.’ Even now the term ‘standard needs’ is the 
name given by proponents of the individualized approach to mark a contrast with their own. 
Nonetheless the term is useful not only because it identifies an important contrast, but also 
because it classifies a heterogeneous group of measures.
The term ‘standard needs’ refers to the fact that these measures are standardized.
All quality of life measures following the standard needs model are written as 
questionnaires and share a similar form: they all have pre-determined, pre-weighted 
questions with a limited selection of potential answers. To be sure, as I said above these
24 Browne, J.P. e ta l. (1997) ‘Conceptual Approaches to the Assessment o f Quality of Life’, in Psychology 
and Health, 12: 737.
25 Rosenberg, R. (1995) ‘Health-Related Quality o f Life between Naturalism and Hermeneutics’, in Social 
Science Medicine, 41: 1411.
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measures do vary in terms of content and scaling. For example, one measure may have 
questions that try to elicit information on physical health, mental health, and social well­
being, while another measure may only focus on mental health or emotional well-being. 
Some measures like the Sickness Impact Profile (SIP), which I discuss in the next chapter, 
may ask mainly functional questions about one’s ability to perform certain tasks while 
measures like the Short-Form 36 may include functional questions as well as questions 
regarding one’s personal satisfaction or overall happiness.
Moreover, when trying to illicit information on the same aspect of quality of life 
measures may also differ in their scaling or format. For instance, one measure may ask 
respondents whether or not they can walk up one flight of stairs without shortness of breath 
and the available answers for this question may be yes/no. Another measure may be 
interested in the same topic, namely shortness of breath with respect to exertion, but instead 
of a yes/no format this measure might provide respondents with a vertical line on which to 
plot the ease with which they can walk up stairs.
There are hundreds of different standardized quality of life measures varying in 
content and scaling each purporting to measure different aspects of health and disease. 
Nonetheless, these measures are grouped into two basic categories: generic measures and 
specific measures. Some measures like the Nottingham Health Profile (NHP), which I 
discuss in Chapter 3 & 5 claim to measure general health across disease states; measures 
such as the NHP are generic measures applicable to anyone. Other quality of life measures, 
however, are specifically calibrated for a particular disease or population. One example of 
a disease-specific measure is the Patient Quality of Life Form (PQLF), which aims to 
assess the difficulties thought to affect deaf people. Some of the questions in this measure
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include how communication and hearing affects life, issues of isolation and one’s 
dependence on others.
Because there are so many ways that we can be ill and because there are so many 
ways that ill-health can affect our quality of life it may not be surprising that there are a 
substantial and growing number of standardized quality of life measures each of which 
attempt to capture a unique facet of this phenomenon. The sheer number o f standardized 
measures is usually explained by the multidimensionality of the quality of life construct—  
there are many potential components that affect quality of life. But because as I said earlier 
these measures traditionally lack an explicit theoretical orientation critics have sometimes 
suggested that standardized quality of life measures represent an ‘anything goes’ 
approach.27 In what follows, however, the contrast with the individualized approach 
suggests that standardized measures of quality of life do share certain features which mark 
out the standard needs concept of quality of life from just any concept of quality of life. 
Moreover, in the next chapter I will examine a philosophical analysis of standardized 
measures, which suggests that these measures also share a robust theoretical orientation.
Despite the variety of standardized measures these measures nonetheless share the 
paradigm of standardization. Put differently, each of these measures is designed to deal 
with a particular cohort o f people and within this cohort standardized measures assume that 
the same questions and weightings are relevant. Thus the standard needs model, to a 
certain extent, conceptualizes quality of life as a universal construct: respondents from a 
particular cohort answer the same questions and each receives a quality of life score
26 Birger, M. et al. (2005) ‘Cochlear Implants and Quality o f Life: A Prospective Study’, in Ear & Hearing, 
26: 189.
27 Hunt, S.M. (1997) ‘The Problem of Quality o f Life’, in Quality o f Life Research, 6: 206.
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independent of their individual understanding regarding the worth of their lives. As one 
proponent of the individualized approach puts it,
‘The central assumption is that a standard set of life circumstances are
required for optimal functioning: quality of life does not, therefore, depend
on a subjective viewpoint but is an objective characteristic of the person
28concerned.’
For this author standardized measures take quality of life to be objective because 
these measures do not take seriously idiosyncratic understandings regarding the worth of 
individual lives. On this view objective contrasts with subjective as universal contrasts 
with individual. Nonetheless, we might still understand standardized measures as 
subjective assessments if we expand our notion of subjectivity. On the standard needs 
model of quality of life subjectivity is understood in terms of what I will call ‘embodiment’ 
and not in terms of individual, idiosyncratic experience. On this view objective contrasts 
with subjective as observable contrasts with phenomenal.
The idea of subjectivity as embodiment is that we are all in similar bodies and 
measuring quality of life consists in measuring the similar experiences that result from our 
being in similar bodies. To explain, we might say that it is in virtue of being in a body that 
we have certain unobservable experiences like pain and well-being. Moreover, because we 
are all in similar bodies we all have these same kinds of similar unobservable experiences. 
When we experience the phenomena under investigation the only variables are meant to be 
how intensely we experience it. Thus quality of life measures can be standardized; we can 
use the same questions, the same scaling and response options for the same cohort of 
people. This particular understanding of quality of life differs from the individualized
28 Browne, J.P. et al. (1997) ‘Conceptual Approaches to the Assessment o f Quality of Life’, in Psychology 
and Health, 12: 737.
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approach which takes quality of life to be purely idiosyncratic; nevertheless we can still 
understand standardized measures as subjective assessments.
As I will further explore in Chapter 3 standardized quality o f life measures are 
explicitly designed to avoid idiosyncratic responses to individual questions. Idiosyncratic 
responses are problematic for standardized measures because when respondents answer in 
ways unintended by the construction of the question researchers may misunderstand their 
answers and as we will see in Chapter 3 this threatens the validity of a measure’s outcomes. 
The standardization of quality of life measures— the understanding of subjectivity as 
embodiment— requires that respondents falling within the measure’s cohort understand the 
questions in the same way.
B. The Individualized Approach to Quality of Life
Unlike proponents of the standard needs approach who design their measures in 
order to evade idiosyncrasy, proponents of the individualized approach embrace 
idiosyncratic responses. Because the individualized approach conceptualizes quality of life 
as purely idiosyncratic the validity of these measures requires that individuals provide 
personalized responses to questions about quality of life. I will have more to say about the 
validity of the individualized approach in Chapter 2, but it is important to note that on this 
view subjectivity and idiosyncrasy are synonymous. Their respective characterization of 
subjectivity is the fundamental difference between the individual and standard needs 
approaches to quality of life.
Unlike the standard needs model with its myriad of measures and its uncertain 
theoretical foundation the individualized approach is represented by relatively few
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measures and a relatively explicit theory. The individualized approach to quality of life
begins from the perspective that quality of life is whatever an individual says it is.29 This
position is justified with reference to topics within phenomenology whereby
phenomenology is taken to be the philosophy of individualism.30 As one proponent puts it,
‘Taken from a phenomenological perspective, every person is indeed an 
“island” and quality of life is inherently individual. Who else can 
experience the n-of- 1 trial that life represents but the individual herself or 
himself? Who else can report the deepest aspirations and fears, the fondest 
goals and fulfillment, the meaning of the winnings and losings? These 
personal definitions and reports are individual quality of life, and they 
remain relentlessly personal and individual’31
According to the individualized approach we can only understand what counts as a good
quality of life insofar as we understand what a good quality of life is for a particular person.
To achieve this understanding and to evaluate quality of life we must develop measures
which provide the maximum amount of latitude for individuals to describe and assess what
is important to them.
Although proponents of the individualized approach claim phenomenology as their 
philosophical foundation they take their position to reflect the appropriate way to show 
respect for individual self-determination and the sacredness of human life. On this view 
the only way to show regard for different ways of life and different understandings of the
29 Hickey, A., et al. (1999) ‘The Schedule for the Evaluation of Individual Quality o f Life’, in Individual 
Quality o f Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, C.R.B. Joyce, et al. eds., Australia:
Harwood Academic Publishers, p. 121.
30 Although phenomenology is taken, at least in part, to justify the individualized approach whether 
phenomenology does justify it is debatable. Phenomenology represents a large and diverse area o f philosophy 
including different authors and different types o f phenomenology. Proponents o f the individualized approach 
do not specify whose phenomenology they take to support their theory and in light o f  this it is difficult to 
evaluate their claim. What is clear, however, is that for some so-called phenomenologists their support o f the 
individualist position is questionable.
31 Joyce, C.B.R., et al. (1999) Forward, Quality o f  Life in Individual Quality o f Life Approaches to 
Conceptualisation and Assessment, Australia: Harwood Academic Publishers, pp. ix-x.
32 Ibid.
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‘good’ is to elicit the value system o f the respondent and to quantify quality of life using 
this system. This preoccupation with individual self-determination suggests that 
individualized quality of life not only rests on a particular understanding of 
phenomenology, but also a certain interpretation of liberal individualism.
Indeed individualized quality of life is an approach bom in light of what proponents 
consider to be systematic failures of the standard needs approach to accommodate different 
understandings of the good and thus the failure to value sufficiently self-determination. 
According to proponents of the individualized approach there are two problems with 
standardized measures both of which unduly influence what can count as a good quality 
life. First, the dimensions into which the quality of life construct is deconstructed and 
which represent the sub-categories under which questions are posed are pre-determined on 
the standard needs approach. For proponents of individualized quality of life these pre­
determined dimensions represent unwarranted assumptions as to the most important 
determinants of quality of life. They point out that these dimensions, dimensions such as 
dependence, family life and communication may not represent those areas of one’s life 
which are most important or in fact areas that are even applicable to everyone in the 
cohort.34 On this view measuring quality of life based on assumptions about what 
constitutes a good life bias standardized measures toward certain kinds of lives at the 
expense of others.
33 Browne, J.P. et al. (1997) ‘Conceptual Approaches to the Assessment o f Quality of Life’, in Psychology 
and Health, 12: 742.
34 Hickey, A., et al. (1999) ‘The Schedule for the Evaluation of Individual Quality of Life’, in C.R.B. Joyce, 
et al. eds., Individual Quality o f  Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, Australia: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, pp. 119-20.
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Secondly, proponents of the individualized approach criticize the scoring techniques 
of the standard needs approach arguing that pre-determined weightings are biased. For 
example, measures whose weightings come from averaging the preferences of sample 
populations ignore the inter-individual variability which exists if individuals are asked to 
weight these items themselves.35 For example, the Nottingham Health Profile (NHP) gives 
the weight of 39.2 to the question ‘I’m tired all the time’ if it is answered ‘yes’ whereas the 
question ‘I soon run out of energy’ contributes a weight of 24 if answered ‘yes’.36 These 
standard weightings contribute to the systematic bias for certain kinds of lives over others 
since someone answering yes to the above questions may not find these items significant 
contributors to poor quality of life. Moreover, even measures which carry de facto weights 
also indirectly affect quality of life scores because the number of questions contributing to
nn
the dimensions differ and thus indirectly weight phenomena differently.
In order to redress the bias for certain kinds of lives inherent in standardized 
measures proponents of the individualized approach have developed their own quality of 
life measures. One of these measures is The Schedule for the Evaluation of Individual 
Quality of Life (SEIQoL). The SEIQoL is the first practical consequence of the
10
individualized approach and is emblematic of these kinds of measures. It is administered 
during an interview between the researcher and the respondent and in the first step of the
35 Browne, J.P. et al. (1997) ‘Conceptual Approaches to the Assessment o f Quality of Life’, in Psychology 
and Health, 12: 739-40.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. As I will discuss in Chapter 5 standard weights do not increase the sensitivity o f quality o f life 
measures like the NHP to changes in health state. See Jenkinson, C, et al. (1991) International Journal o f  
Health Sciences, 2: 189-94.
38 Hickey, A. et al. (1999) T he Schedule for the Evaluation of Individual Quality of L ife’ in C.R.B. Joyce et 
al. eds., Individual Quality o f Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, Australia: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, pp. 120-21.
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interview the respondent is asked to nominate five dimensions or components of life central 
to their quality of life and explain what they mean by each area.39
The second step of the interview is to determine how well each nominated 
dimension fares with respect to the respondent’s current situation. For example, if 
socializing is one the nominated dimensions, but the respondent is currently bedridden this 
dimension’s ranking may reflect this condition. Status is determined by providing 
respondents with vertical lines labeled at one end ‘best possible’ and at the other end ‘worst 
possible’. Respondents are asked to imagine their best possible and their worst possible life 
with respect to each of their nominated dimensions. With these two mental anchors in 
place they then mark on the line where their current life falls with respect to each 
dimension. Respondents are also asked to mark on a horizontal line their current overall 
quality of life again imagining at one end the worst possible overall life and at the other end 
the best possible life. Researchers then transpose these ratings to a bar chart with a range of 
I-IOO.40
The third step of the interview is to weight each nominated dimension. This step is 
meant to quantify the relative contribution of each area to the judgment of the individual’s 
overall quality of life.41 One increasingly popular way to do this is through a direct 
weighting method known as the SEIQoL-DW. The SEIQoL-DW uses a rotating, five- 
sliced pie chart to weight each dimension. Respondents are asked to manipulate the slices 
until each slice represents the particular distribution of importance o f each dimension. On 
the back of the chart is an immovable disc which provides the increments by which each
39 Ibid, p. 122.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, p. 123.
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slice can be calculated.42 Finally, scores are determined by multiplying each area weight by 
the corresponding self-rating as represented by the bar chart. Each of the five products can 
be summed to obtain an index score between 1-100 43
The standard needs approach and the individualized approach to quality of life 
provide two distinct answers to the question, ‘What is quality of life?’ On the one view 
quality of life is characterized, at least in part, to consist of unobservable, but nonetheless 
objective dimensions which exist in virtue of our embodiment. Thus quality of life 
measures can be standardized. On the other view quality of life is whatever an individual 
says it is; quality of life is idiosyncratic; it consists of unobservable and wholly subjective 
dimensions which exist in virtue of our individuality.
In the next section I turn to the processes by which we typically evaluate the 
accuracy or validity of our quality of life measures. A valid measure is an instrument that 
measures what it purports to measure and quality of life measures all purport to measure 
subjective experience in the context of different health states. As I will discuss in what 
follows if validity tests are successful, then over time they ought to provide evidence in 
favor of an answer to the question, ‘What is quality of life?’ and thus a mature theory for 
non-utility measurement.
42 Browne, J. et al. (1997) ‘Development of a Direct Weighting Procedure for Quality of Life Domains’, in 
Quality o f Life Research, 6: 301-10.
43 The derivation of an index score allows us to compare SEIQoL results among respondents. But the real 
strength o f the SEIQoL is not the index score, but its individual nature. Although scores from different 
respondents can be compared using the index scoring method this comparison hides the different weights and 
priorities o f the participant. According to proponents o f the individualized approach the advantage o f  
individualized quality of life is not its comparability, but the ability to identify currently important areas o f  
life with their relative weights. See Hickey, A. et al. (1999) ‘The Schedule for the Evaluation o f Individual 
Quality o f Life’ in C.R.B. Joyce et al. eds., Individual Quality o f Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and 
Assessment, Australia: Harwood Academic Publishers, p. 128.
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II
Validating Quality o f Life Measures
As I discussed in the introduction to this chapter quality of life measures lack a gold 
standard; they lack an observable instance of their target construct. This predicament is in 
contrast to many clinical or biometric measures of health, for instance Magnetic Resonance 
Images (MRI) which at least in principle have observable occurrences against which we 
could test the accuracy of the MRI. In order to deal with the lack of a gold standard, 
quality of life researchers often use elements of classical test theory as a surrogate.
Classical test theory understood as reliability and validity testing make up the psychometric 
properties of a quality of life measure. Together these two properties are meant to 
determine whether or not a measure fulfills its purpose; whether or not it reliably measures 
what it claims to measure. They are thus the critical apparatus of quality of life 
measurement telling us when a measure is ‘good’; when we can reliably draw sound 
conclusions from the data. Although all quality of life measures are tested both for their 
reliability and validity, in this thesis I focus on the validity of quality of life measures.
Quality of life measures are typically tested in terms of what is sometimes referred 
to as internal and external validity. The former is comprised of both content and criterion 
validity and the latter consists of construct validity.44 Content and criterion validity 
ascertain a measure’s accuracy with respect to standards supposedly internal to the 
discipline at hand. For instance, content validity is an official peer-reviewed inspection to 
see if the measure in question is representative of its target construct. This involves a
44 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) (3rd ed.) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their 
Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 174.
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formal review of the questions in the measure to see if they cover all aspects of the item we 
are trying to measure. Criterion validity, on the other hand, compares a new measure to an 
already established measure with a similar construct. If  the new measure correlates 
appropriately with the established measure, than it is said to have good criterion validity.
Finally, construct validity assesses a measure’s accuracy with respect to how well a 
measure’s outcomes confirm hypotheses derived from the theory that underpins the 
measure. But as I will discuss below if the outcomes do not confirm the hypotheses, then 
the measure is not necessarily inaccurate for it might be the theory and not the measure 
which is wrong. In any case construct validity is important because theoretically it does not 
require a new measure to adhere to an already established internal standard, rather it tests to 
see if a new measure reacts as predicted and if it does not, then it is possible to learn 
something about our measure as well as our theory. Moreover, the hypotheses we make 
regarding the behavior of a measure can be drawn from multiple disciplines— from clinical 
diagnoses; economics; feminist theory and so on—thus construct validity is a test of how a 
measure relates to criteria external to the field in which it was created.
Although both standardized and individualized measures are tested for all three 
types of validity in some cases certain kinds of validity are taken to be more significant 
than the others. For example, content validity is usually understood as an inspection of the 
dimensions and questions in the measure to determine if they are representative of the 
target construct.45 Content validity is meant to increase the number of valid inferences we
45 Ibid, p. 119.
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can draw about a person responding to questions in the measure because it is supposed to 
ensure that we have accounted for all aspects of the construct under investigation.46
Because the individualized approach to quality of life starts from the perspective 
that quality of life is whatever an individual says it is, the content validity of these measures 
is taken by developers of the SEIQoL and others to be good by definition 47 Since no one 
but the respondent can tell us what quality of life amounts to the direct assessment of the 
content is thought to be unnecessary. To be sure respondents may misrepresent their view 
of quality of life, for instance moods, the accessibility of certain memories and information, 
as well as the time given to answer a question are all well-documented factors that can bias 
individual reports. To the extent that this happens the SEIQoL may be invalid. But given 
the idiosyncratic nature of quality of life proponents of the SEIQoL suggest that as long as 
individualized measures are reasonably reliable— individual respondents tend to nominate 
the same dimensions over time—we must trust the accuracy of what respondents report as
most important to them. As one proponent of individualized quality of life puts it, ‘ it
must be borne in mind that the individual still remains the person with best access to their 
own quality of life .. .’49
46 Ibid, p. 175.
47 Ruta, D.A. & Garratt, A.M. (1994) ‘Health Status to Quality o f Life Measurement’, in Crispin Jenkinson 
ed, Measuring Health and M edical Outcomes, London: University College Press, p. 147.
48 The stability o f domain elicitation in the SEIQoL was examined in a study o f quality of life following hip 
replacement. The mean number o f domain changes was 1.1 over 7.5 months and 1.3 over 24 months 
suggesting that the domains individuals take to be most important to their quality o f life remain fairly constant 
over at least a 2 year period. See O’Boyle et al. (1992) ‘Individual Quality of Life in Patients Undergoing 
Hip Replacement’, in Lancet, 339: 1088-1091.
49 Browne, J. (1997) Individual Quality o f  Life in Older People, Conceptual and Methodological Challenges, 
PhD Thesis in Psychology, Dublin University p. 242. Although proponents o f the SEIQoL recommend that 
we trust the accuracy o f individual reports regarding the content o f  the nominated dimensions the original 
version of the SEIQoL employed judgment analysis in order to ascertain respondents’ implicit weights and 
compare these to the ones they actually reported. To determine a respondent’s implicit weights a series o f 30 
cases representing variable health states are presented to the respondent and she is asked to rate the overall
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The assessment of content validity, however, is central for the development of 
standardized measures. If, for instance, we intend to measure the quality of life of 
prelingually deafened individuals using pre-determined dimensions and questions, then we 
need to be sure that the dimensions we select and the questions we ask are indeed relevant 
and, moreover, that we have not overlooked anything.
The process of evaluating content validity typically includes three steps. The first is 
to elucidate the theory that underpins the measure’s construct in order to verify which 
dimensions of the construct are important to the measure’s purpose and which are 
irrelevant. This first step is accomplished by gathering knowledge of research previously 
executed within the relevant area of interest and completing an inventory o f previous 
instruments designed to measure similar constructs. This review of the literature 
constitutes the second step in the process of content validity. Finally in the third step a 
preliminary instrument is presented to a variety of people for peer-review. These people 
might include individuals from the measure’s target cohort, for example prelingually 
deafened individuals, as well as doctors, surgeons and other professionals such as 
epidemiologists and psychologists.50
quality of life for each case on a horizontal visual analogue scale. The relative weight assigned by the 
individual to different aspects of health embodied in the cases is calculated using a multiple regression 
analysis designed specifically for the SEIQoL. Nonetheless, this version o f the SEIQoL which employs 
judgment analysis has gradually been replaced by the SEIQoL-DW which, as I discussed earlier, does not 
seek to determine implicit weights and rather uses the direct weightings that respondents report. See Hickey, 
A. et al. (1999) T h e Schedule for the Evaluation of Individual Quality o f Life’ in C.R.B. Joyce et al. eds., 
Individual Quality o f Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, Australia: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, pp. 121-4; Browne, J. et al. (1997) ‘Development of a Direct Weighting Procedure for Quality of  
Life Domains’, in Quality o f  Life Research, 6: 301-10.
50 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) (3rd ed.) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their 
Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21.
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Content validity, unlike criterion and construct validity, is often executed as part of 
the initial construction of a quality of life measure.51 Researchers designing standardized 
measures look to maximize the content validity of their measures before they test it on 
sample populations. Even with respect to individualized measures the nomination of 
dimensions is part of the attempt to construct a respondent’s value system and not part of 
the assessment of one’s quality of life. Criterion and construct validity, on the other hand, 
require for their purposes the information from the outcomes data of sample populations. 
Thus these two kinds of validity are implemented only after a measure’s construction is 
complete and they test whether the construction of the measure was successful.
Criterion validity is the validity of the gold standard.52 In areas of measurement 
where a gold standard is available criterion validity tests the accuracy of the measure’s 
outcomes against criteria external to the measure. For example, the criterion test of an MRI 
showing, say a tom Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) would be the actual tom ACL. As I 
have said, however, quality of life measures lack a gold standard; in this context criterion 
validity requires the use of proxy standards. Proxy standards are usually other well-
c'y
established quality of life or clinical measures. Proxy standards act as gold standards in 
that if the new measure does not correlate with the established measure as expected, then 
the validity of the new measure is put into doubt.
51 See Ibid, pp. 19-22.
52 Ibid, p. 176.
53 Ibid, p. 178.
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One type of criterion validity is called concurrent criterion validity.54 Concurrent 
criterion validity is used to correlate a new measure with an established measure whose 
construct is identical to the instrument under investigation.55 For example, occasionally 
lengthy quality of life measures are developed which are not practical to administer to 
populations of people because they are time-consuming to complete. One example is the 
original Sickness Impact Profile (SIP) which had 149 questions.56 In cases like the original 
SIP it is desirable to create a measure that provides the same essential information, but in a 
shorter and more practical version. To create the shorter version we can edit the longer 
version until it reaches a more convenient length. In doing this, however, it is important 
that questions essential to the measure’s construct are not removed; it is important that the 
measure’s content validity remains high. Using criterion validity we can test the content 
validity of the shorter measure by treating the longer measure as the criterion or gold 
standard. To achieve this validation both questionnaires are given to the same cohort of 
people at similar times. If the data from the shorter version correlates highly with the 
longer one, then we can feel confident that the shorter version measures the same thing as 
the longer version.
54 Albrecht, G.L. (1994) ‘Subjective Health Assessment’, in Crispin Jenkinson ed, Measuring Health and 
Medical Outcomes, London: UCL Press, p. 21. There is another type of criterion validity which I will not 
discuss. It is called predictive validity. This type o f criterion validity is most useful for the validation of 
intelligence tests. For example, tests meant to predict intelligence may be administered to students leaving 
secondary school. The results o f these tests may then be compared to the students’ actual achievements on 
leaving university four years later. Their achievements on leaving university act as the standard against which 
the validity o f the original test is determined. See Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) (3rd ed.) Health 
Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
176.
55 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) (3rd ed.) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their 
Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 176.
56 Wright, L. (1994) ‘The Long and the Short o f it: the Development of the SF-36 General Health Survey’, in 
Crispin Jenkinson ed, Measuring Health and M edical Outcomes, London: University College London Press, 
p. 91.
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But in the majority of cases when researchers create new measures they are not 
merely shortening already existing instruments, but developing genuinely new ones. In 
these latter cases a perfect criterion measure is unavailable. In this context it is possible, 
however, to test the new measure against established measures that are similar to it in terms 
of the construct or dimensions under investigation. What counts as a similar measure is at 
the discretion of those validating the new measure; sometimes, however, the relevant 
similarity is located in clinical or physician-based assessments as opposed to established
cn c o
quality of life measures. This kind of validity is sometimes called convergent validity.
Because a new measure is never identical to an established measure and because the 
relevant similarity between two such measures will vary, the extent to which the measures 
are expected to correlate will also vary. Thus to test a genuinely new measure for criterion 
validity researchers must develop hypotheses about how a new measure and its criterion 
measure will relate. In this context the assessment of good criterion validity requires that 
the correlation between the new measure and the established measure correspond to the 
hypothesis made about how the two measures should relate.59 As I will discuss shortly 
there is good reason to think that this aspect of criterion validity is an extension of construct 
validity.
Construct validity unlike criterion validity does not require a gold standard or a 
proxy standard against which to compare the accuracy of a new measure. It does, however,
57 Bowling, A. (1991) Measuring Health A Review o f Quality o f Life Measurement Scales, Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, p. 172.
58 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) (3rd ed.) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their 
Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 183.
59 Albrecht, G.L. (1994) ‘Subjective Health Assessment’, in Crispin Jenkinson ed, Measuring Health and 
M edical Outcomes, London: University College London Press, p. 21.
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require a theory from which to draw hypotheses regarding the measure’s outcomes.60 For 
example, such a hypothesis might anticipate that individuals scoring high on a certain 
measure will have certain attributes and also differ from those with low scores in 
characteristic ways. Construct validity uses hypotheses like this to assess the extent to 
which a new measure is related to criteria derived from the theory that underpins a measure. 
To make this assessment it compares a new measure’s outcomes data to the predictions or 
hypotheses made on behalf of the new measure and its guiding theoretical orientation.61 If 
a measure has good reliability and if the predictions are confirmed in its outcomes, then
fi,0greater confidence in the validity of the measure and the validity of the theory is justified.
It is now possible to see how determining the criterion validity of a new measure 
with respect to its similarity to an established measure is a form of construct validity. As I 
discussed previously the criterion validity of genuinely new measures requires the 
development of hypotheses which indicate the way that certain established measures are 
similar to a new measure. And as I discussed with respect to content validity the 
identification of a new measure as similar to another is due to the theory which shapes how 
we understand the new measure’s construct. Thus the hypotheses used to indicate criterion 
validity are derived from the theoretical orientation of the measure: if the correlation 
between the two measures bears out the hypothesis then greater confidence in the new 
measure’s validity is warranted.
60 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) (3rd ed.) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their 
Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 181.
61 Ibid, pp. 179-80.
62 Ibid, p. 181.
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But in fact it is not just criterion validity which manifests as a form of construct 
validity; content validity too depends on it. For as I also discussed earlier content validity 
requires an understanding of a new measure’s theoretical orientation before one can verify 
which dimensions and questions ought to be included in the measure. When developing a 
new measure the decisions over what to include and what to exclude are, to a certain extent, 
based on hypotheses about what affects the quality of life of individuals within a certain 
cohort. Whether these hypotheses are accurate— whether a measure has good content 
validity— is determined with respect to positive criterion and construct validity. But as we 
have seen criterion validity of genuinely new measures is a form of construct validity.
Thus to quote one researcher, ‘All validity is at its base some form of construct validity...It 
is the basic meaning of validity’63
Construct validity is important not only because it supports claims regarding the 
validity of measures which lack a gold standard, but also because it is seen as substantiating 
a theory of quality of life; it is seen as providing an answer to the question ‘What is quality 
of life?’ It is important to emphasize, however, that no single confirming instance of one’s 
hypothesis can prove a theoretical orientation and even one unconfirmed instance can put 
the theory into doubt. Construct validity, we might say, is an on-going process in which we 
continuously learn more about our theory, make new predictions and then test them.64
But because construct validity allows us to test at the same time both the validity of 
the theory and the validity of the new measure the source of trouble resulting from 
unconfirmed hypotheses is ambiguous. If our hypotheses are not confirmed in the
63 Guion, R.M. (1977) ‘Content Validity: Three Years o f Talk— What’s the Action?, in Public Personnel 
Management, 6: 407-414.
64 Ibid. p. 180.
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outcomes of the new measure, then one of three things is possible: the theory may be 
flawed; the measure may be wrong; or both could be inaccurate.65 Although there is no 
way of knowing what is wrong without conducting further studies66 once the problem is 
determined either the theory or the measure or both must be reconstructed.
As we saw in Section 1 of this chapter different measures of quality of life draw on 
different theoretical orientations and thus provide different answers to the question ‘What is 
quality of life?’: the standard needs approach characterizes quality of life in terms of what I 
have called ‘embodiment’; the individualized approach understands it as idiosyncratic. If 
construct validity worked in the way that classical test theory describes it— we reject or 
reconstruct theories or measures or both when we fail to get confirming instances of our 
hypotheses— then it might be possible to capitalize on the work going on within these 
different orientations and eventually converge on a theory that accurately describes quality 
of life as well as a set of measures that quantify it.
But the logic of construct validity whereby unconfirmed predictions require the 
rejection or reconstruction of the measure or the theory or both is not always practiced. In 
fact when reviewing the psychometric properties of quality of life measures poor construct 
validity appears to be extremely rare. Instead almost every measure— both measures 
within the standard needs and individualized approaches— report good construct validity. 
But significantly these reports of good validity are not always the result of confirming 
instances of hypothetical claims; rather hypotheses not bom out in the outcomes are still
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 See Bowling, A. (1991) Measuring Health A Review o f  Quality o f Life Measurement Scales, Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press.
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understood to support the measure’s validity. This is usually due to auxiliary hypotheses 
that are brought in to explain the deviation between the original hypothesis and the 
outcomes data. For instance, when Spitzer’s Quality of Life Index (QL), a standardized 
measure, did not correlate as highly as expected with the Kamofsky Performance Scale, 
another standardized measure, it was suggested that the QL’s highly multidimensional 
nature, as opposed to Kamofsky’s focus on physical functioning, was the reason.68
Moreover, one hypothesis based in the individualized approach claims that 
individualized measures will report low discriminative ability.69 Put differently, the scores 
from individualized measures are unlikely to discriminate between, for example, 
individuals with different kinds or severity of disease. One reason for this hypothesis is 
founded on the idea that when individuals choose the dimensions of their life that represent 
areas of importance different people will choose different things and these choices may not 
be related to their illness. Furthermore, even if individuals do choose dimensions which 
vary with a particular illness the weighting and status of the items may be similar thus
70resulting in comparable index scores for the two illnesses.
But in fact the SEIQoL does report the ability to discriminate between patients 
suffering from Peptic Ulcer Disease (PUD) and those suffering from Irritable Bowel 
Syndrome (IBS): in one study a group of IBS patients had significantly lower quality o f life 
according to their index scores than did the PUD patient group. These results correspond 
not only to clinical perceptions that IBS disrupts quality of life to a greater degree than
68 Ibid, pp. 86-87.
69 Lacasse, Y., et al. (1999) ‘Individualising Questionnaires’, in C.R.B. Joyce, et al. eds., Individual Quality 
o f  Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, Australia: Harwood Academic Publishers, pp. 98-
99.
70
52
PUD, but also correlates significantly with the NHP’s findings within two of their 
dimensions.71 These results perhaps suggest that at least in this case quality of life is not as 
idiosyncratic as proponents of the individualized approach suggest.
But proponents of individualized quality of life do not take this data to question 
their theory or their measure. Instead, on the one hand, they emphasize the individual 
differences that the SEIQoL does illuminate within the PUD and IBS patient groups—  
differences which clinical observations and the NHP cannot detect. For instance, the 
research team emphasize that the dimension of ‘Health’ was nominated less frequently by 
the PUD group than the IBS group. This is taken to suggest that the standard assumption 
that health is the most important component in a patient’s quality of life may not be 
warranted.72 On the other hand, proponents of individualized quality of life propose that 
the apparent similarities between individuals who do nominate the same dimensions— the 
IBS and PUD patient groups both nominated ‘Family’ as the most important life area— are 
irrelevant to general statements about quality of life since on their view what individuals 
understand family to mean is idiosyncratic.
Rather than capitalizing on the work within different orientations to quality of life 
and thus building support for a mature theory and corresponding measures the validation of 
quality of life measures seems to support two different theoretical orientations— two 
different answers to the question ‘What is quality of life?’— and hundreds of putatively 
valid measures. In Chapters 2 and 3 I continue to examine some of the practical
71 Hickey, A., et al (1999) ‘The Schedule for the Evaluation o f Individual Quality o f Life’ in C.R.B. Joyce, et 
al. eds., Individual Quality o f  Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, Australia: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, p. 125
72 Ibid, p. 125.
73 Personal correspondence.
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consequences that come with the reliance on construct validity as the primary validation 
technique of quality of life measures.
As I indicated in the introduction to this thesis I will argue that construct validity 
and thus quantitative measures of question of life cannot provide us with independently 
valid outcomes; outcomes that can be understood clearly outside of a larger dialogic 
context. Rather we ought to conceptualize quality of life measures as one piece of a larger 
puzzle; as an important contribution to an ethical dialogue. In this chapter I identify one of 
the main questions which the on-going process of validation should be able to answer and 
which I will argue it cannot answer sufficiently, namely, ‘What is quality of life?’ In the 
next chapter I continue this argument and in doing so I focus on the theoretical orientation 
of the standard needs approach and explore some of the ways that this orientation as well as 
the individualized approach might negatively influence our understanding of quality of life.
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Chapter 2 
Construct Validity and Ethnocentricity
Introduction
As we saw in Chapter 1 construct validity is an important component to the 
validation process of health-related quality of life measures. In fact I argued in the previous 
chapter that it is the most important element. One of the reasons for its prominence is that 
it enables us to build up a theory while at the same time testing for the validity of our 
measure: if our hypotheses are bom out in a measure’s outcomes, then we can take this as 
evidence in favor of our theory and the validity of our measure. Thus construct validity 
requires a tentative theory— explicit or implicit— from which we can ground hypotheses 
and test the validity of our measures; our theory becomes less tentative as our hypotheses 
are better able to predict the outcomes of our measures.
Construct validity enables us to build a robust theory and test for the validity of our 
measures in part because it presupposes that the error in our theory or the inaccuracies in 
our measure will come to light as we make hypotheses and compare them to our outcomes. 
Inconsistencies between our hypotheses and our outcomes signal a problem with our 
theory, our measure or perhaps both. By investigating the origin and nature of such an 
inconsistency we further develop our theory and the ability of our measure to account for 
its construct. In the previous chapter, however, I discussed a couple of examples which 
suggest that the investigation into these inconsistencies is sometimes usurped by the use of 
auxiliary hypotheses. If this activity is widespread, then the validity of our measures as 
well as the strength of our theories is put into doubt.
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In the present chapter, however, I turn to a more subversive problem with construct 
validity, a problem that is particularly significant when we apply construct validity to 
questions of quality of life. The logic of construct validity instructs us to question our 
theory or our measure only when inconsistencies between the two arise, on the other hand, 
when a measure’s outcomes confirm our hypotheses we take this confirmation as evidence 
that both our theory and our measure are good. I suggest in this chapter that this latter 
aspect of construct validity is too conservative.
This conservative aspect of construct validity is a problem, firstly because it opens 
the possibility for the perpetuation of ethnocentric or biased understandings of what makes 
for a good quality of life. To be sure much depends on the specific content of our theory 
and the construction of our measures. Nonetheless a single set of outcomes can be 
understood to confirm different hypotheses derived from different theories, but the logic of 
construct validity leads us to favor one theory at the expense of others. Secondly, this 
conservative tendency is a problem if it leads to ethnocentric understandings of quality of 
life because quality of life outcomes are often used as empirical evidence to support public 
policy. These recommendations are often made without attention to or deliberation of the 
specific theory of quality of life that underpins the outcomes.
In response to this problem I suggest that we ought to continue to question our 
theoretical orientation of quality of life as well as the structure of our measures even when 
our outcomes confirm our hypotheses. For instance, the very fact that quality of life 
improves after a particular medical intervention might give us pause over our theoretical 
orientation and provide the impetus for further questions. For instance, we might ask what 
this outcome says about us— what does it say about our understanding of quality of life and
56
the assumptions that this understanding embodies? Moreover, we might further ask if this 
understanding of quality of life is defensible?
In what follows I further develop some of the consequences that result from what I 
am calling the conservative quality of construct validity when it is applied to quality of life 
research. In the first half of this chapter I propose a theoretical orientation for the standard 
needs approach to quality of life. To begin this task I turn to Dan Brock’s analysis of 
standardized health-related quality of life measures. I then use Ron Amundson’s criticisms 
of Brock to argue that the standard needs model prioritizes certain biological functionings 
as the threshold for good quality of life. In the second half of this chapter I look at how at 
least in some cases construct validity works to maintain the theoretical assumptions built 
into the standard needs approach to quality of life. To illustrate this problem I turn to 
patient-reported outcomes of cochlear implant recipients and contrast them with Harlan 
Lane’s account of deaf culture in The Mask o f Benevolence. Finally in the last section I 
return to individualized quality of life measures and look at some of the difficulties and 
risks involved in assuming quality of life is individual, idiosyncratic and relative.
I
Theorizing abou t S tan dard ized  M easures o f  Q uality  o f  L ife: The Im portance o f  Self-determ ination
In his paper ‘Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics’ Dan 
Brock examines two aspects of clinical ethics— informed consent and standardized health- 
related quality of life measures— in order to draw from these concrete practices a broad 
account of quality of life or as he sometimes calls it the ‘good life’ which might motivate
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them. This task is important for my purposes because as we saw in the previous chapter 
unlike the individualized approach the standard needs approach does not itself provide us 
with an explicit theory that explains the logic of standardized measures, instead these 
measures are often complex and lack a firm theoretical basis.74 Moreover, unlike recent 
efforts to provide a theory on which we should model quality of life measures75 Brock’s 
project is descriptive not normative; he is concerned to identify an account of quality of life 
that these measures express in their present form and not with what they ought to express. 
Thus his work is helpful in providing an evaluative framework for current quality of life 
measures.
Although I am most interested in Brock’s analysis of standardized health-related 
quality of life measures in order to fully appreciate the picture of quality of life which he 
takes to motivate them it is important to attend briefly to some of his comments on ethical 
frameworks for medical decision-making. Brock takes the dominant model of medical 
decision-making to be one of shared decision-making between the patient and the 
physician, but where the patient is ultimately responsible for the decision to accept or reject 
treatment.76 This model of decision-making is usually referred to as the doctrine of 
informed consent. Informed consent reflects a relatively recent change in health care 
which Brock takes to be motivated by new developments in technology that provide for the
74 Cummins, R.A. (2005) ‘Moving from the Quality o f Life Concept to a Theory’, in Journal o f Intellectual 
Disability Research, 49: 701.
75 See Bramston, P. et al. (2005) ‘Conceptual Principles o f Quality o f Life: an Empirical Exploration’, in 
Journal o f Intellectual Disability Research, 49: 728:-33; Cummins, R.A. (2005) ‘Moving from the Quality of 
Life Concept to a Theory’, in Journal o f Intellectual D isability Research, 49: 699-706; Ferrans, C.E. et al. 
(2005) ‘Conceptual Model of Health-Related Quality of Life’, in Journal o f Nursing Scholarship, 37: 336-42; 
and Hajiran, H. (2006) ‘Toward a Quality of Life Theory: Net Domestic Product of Happiness’, in Social 
Indicators Research, 74: 31-43.
76 Brock, D. (1993) ‘Quality o f Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics’, in The Quality o f Life, 
Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 101.
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possibility of extending lives indefinitely, but with uncertain benefit.77 Informed consent 
reflects the view that what counts as “health” is no longer merely the purview of doctors—  
it is no longer simply a biological fact. New technologies which blur the line between 
health and mere existence mean that patients have a right to shape their treatment in line 
with particular goals, values and life plans.
But what grounds the right to informed consent? Even if health is no longer 
understood as simply a biological fact we still might see medics as our best guide to 
therapeutic practice. Why must we involve individuals and their broad concerns to bear on 
what are still essentially medical decisions? If we turn to the literature in bioethics 
informed consent is typically justified on the basis of two values: the protection from harm 
and the protection of individual autonomy.78 Historically informed consent became 
essential to medical practice following public outrage over cases of patient exploitation for 
the purposes of medical experimentation. For instance, the Nuremberg Code laid out 
guidelines for informed consent after the experimentation on non-consenting individuals in 
concentration camps during World War II.79 In this context voluntary informed consent 
was understood as indispensable to the protection of individual safety and well-being for it 
was thought unlikely that an individual would consent to procedures so contrary to her own 
self-interest. For those who understand protection from harm as the primary justification of 
informed consent an individual’s informed and uncoerced decision ought to promote her 
well-being.
77 Ibid.
78 Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J. F. (1983) (2nd ed) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 67.
79 Ibid, p. 66.
59
But it is sometimes the case— especially as technology increases our ability to
prolong life— that the informed and voluntary consent given by a patient is considered to be
contrary to their well-being, for instance in the case where a patient refuses treatment for a
potentially curable illness. Instances such as these have led to legal cases which tend to
justify informed consent on the basis of protection of individual autonomy. Take for
instance, the landmark 1960 case of Natanson v. Kline where the judge found that,
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing self- 
determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master o f his 
own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the 
performance of lifesaving surgery, or other medical treatment.80
Subsequent court cases and current medical practice reinforce the protection of
individual autonomy as the predominant justification of informed consent. Following Kant
supporters of this justification often understand respect for persons to be the same as a
respect for their choices and different life plans: to be a person is to develop a plan and
D I
choose a course of action. On this view informed consent is usually understood as a 
necessary condition for respecting patients as persons. To withhold information from a 
patient or to make decisions in a patient’s best interest is to treat them with something less 
than the respect owed to equals; it is to treat them patemalistically. Brock echoes this view 
when he writes that self-determination is what is required in order to recognize an
80 Ibid, p. 69.
81 Ibid, p. 59.
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individual as a person. Moreover, he writes in another paper that self-determination is, ‘a 
central source of human dignity’.83
Given that self-determination practically and legally grounds informed consent we 
must respect an individual’s decisions even though these decisions may or may not increase 
their well-being. But how should we understand the relationship between the value of self- 
determined choice and an individual’s well-being?84 According to Brock the typical view 
in medical ethics is that a patient’s well-being is generally thought to be the same as a
o r
patient’s good and self-determination is a value independent of one’s well-being or good. 
Sometimes in order to respect a patient as a person we must also respect decisions contrary 
to their good. On this account, a patient’s individual well-being or good is seen as separate 
from the value of treating her as an autonomous person; the importance o f the latter 
sometimes justifies the sacrifice of the former.
But for Brock if self-determination is a fundamental value necessary for treating 
patient’s as persons, then our conception of an individual’s good ought to be capable of 
encompassing this value instead of setting it off as a separate concern. Brock suggests 
that unlike the conventional view above we should make a distinction between well-being 
and a patient’s good. A patient’s good should incorporate self-determination and well­
being should be measured separately in terms of one’s state of consciousness, activities and
82 Brock, D. (1993) ‘Quality o f Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics’, in The Quality o f  Life, 
Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 109.
83 Brock, D. (2005) ‘Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities while Respecting Persons with 
Disabilities’, in Quality o f Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability, David 
Wasserman et al. eds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 70.
84 Brock, D. (1993) ‘Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics’, in The Quality o f  Life, 
Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 109.
85 Ibid.
86
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capacities for functioning.87 Moreover, Brock argues that the doctrine of informed consent 
implicitly accepts such a distinction: in acknowledging that we must respect choices like a 
patient’s refusal for treatment the doctrine of informed consent implies that a life of choice
QQ
is the best life even if those choices result in lower well-being.
In turning from informed consent to standardized measures of health-related quality 
of life Brock further develops his position that self-determined choice is part of a good 
quality life and not something valued independently of it.89 Brock begins to support this 
suggestion by directing our attention to the way standardized measures assess quality of 
life, namely with respect to what he calls primary functions.90 Primary functions refer to 
centrally important activities which when missing from one’s life significantly limit one’s 
choices or opportunities in creating and pursuing different life plans.91 These functions are 
represented by the different dimensions in a measure and the questions within the 
dimensions assess the impact of disease or illness on an individual’s life by gathering
07information about how well she is able to perform the requisite function.
To illustrate, the Sickness Impact Profile (SIP) asks respondents questions like, ‘I 
am going out for entertainment less’; T laugh or cry suddenly’; ‘I do not bath myself at all,
87 Brock gives the example of a parent who foregoes expensive lifesaving treatment to save money for her 
child’s education. See Ibid, p. 110.
88 Ibid. p. 110.
89 Brock’s analysis o f standardized measures of health-related quality of life has much in common with 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach to quality of life. See for instance Sen, A. (1999) 
‘Capability and Well-Being’ in Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds. The Quality o f Life, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 29-53. and Nussbaum, M.C. (1999) Sex and Social Justice, New York: Oxford Press, pp. 
29-54.
90 Brock, D. (1993) ‘Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics’, in The Quality o f Life, 
Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds, Clarendon Press: Oxford,, p. 117.
91 Ibid, p. 124.
92 Ibid, p. 119.
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but am bathed by someone else’. These questions relate to the dimensions or primary 
functions of ‘Recreation and Pastimes’, ‘Emotional Behavior’ and ‘Body Care and 
Movement’ respectively. Depending on respondents’ answers to the questions in the 
different dimensions they are each given a score which determines their functioning level 
within each dimension. One’s quality of life decreases as one’s functioning decreases. To 
be sure, as I mentioned in Chapter 1 some standardized measures of health-related quality 
of life combine these sorts of functional assessments with questions regarding personal 
satisfaction and health perception. But in standardized measures answers to the latter kinds 
of questions cannot wholly override the results of the former although they are often taken 
into account. The Short Form-36 (SF-36), for instance, gives questions regarding 
satisfaction and health perception the same priority as functional ones.
Recall from the discussion on informed consent that the value of self-determination 
itself is grounded in an account of persons whereby respect for persons is procured when 
we respect their decisions in accord with a self-determined life plan. The value of self- 
determination highlights the value of personal choice, but the integrity of this value requires 
that individuals have a certain minimal array of valuable choices or opportunities from 
which to choose for without such an array self-determination is at best an empty promise 
and at worst a tool for manipulation.94 For Brock the dimensions represented in 
standardized measures like the SIP capture the functionings which represent the minimal 
array of options one must have in order for self-determination to fulfill its promise of
93 Ibid, p. 118.
94 For instance, giving people the right to vote, but only placing one person or party on the ballot; giving 
women the right to make choices concerning their lives, but making it materially difficult for them to work 
outside the home.
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treating patients as persons. Thus following the methodology of standardized measures 
Brock takes these primary functions to be objective— individuals with a loss of primary 
functioning have a lower quality of life even in light o f individual accounts of satisfaction 
and happiness.
For Brock the objectivity of these judgments correctly redresses the danger of
adaptive preferences. As Brock puts it,
To be satisfied or happy with getting much less from life, because one has 
come to expect much less, is still to get less from life or to have a less good 
life.95
He formally justifies this position with reference to Norman Daniels’ notion of a “normal 
opportunity range”.96 Echoing the idea that self-determination requires a certain array of 
valuable choices Brock uses Daniels to argue that individuals whose disability or illness 
restricts the activities that they would otherwise be able to perform have a lower quality of 
life than individuals without such restrictions because certain basic choices or normal 
opportunities are curtailed.
In Brock’s analysis of standardized quality of life measures he emphasizes their 
focus on a person’s functionings as opposed to, what he calls, a person’s disability or 
illness, whereby he understands “disability or illness” to refer to a respondent’s physical or 
mental impairment. Thus quality of life measures do not ask respondents to disclose their 
physical or mental circumstances— what we might think of as their biological condition. 
Instead quality of life measures ask respondents about what they can and cannot do, in 
other words, they ask about respondents’ primary functions. It is the loss of primary
95 Brock, D. (1993) ‘Quality o f Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics’, in The Quality o f  Life, 
Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 125.
96 Ibid, p. 124.
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functions that is taken to reduce opportunity range and hence quality of life, not the 
presence of disability.
This emphasis on functions has the advantage that not all disabilities— physical or 
mental impairments— will affect functioning levels. Brock gives the example of a 60 
Minutes program from 1988 which interviewed individuals bom to women who had taken 
Thalidomide during their pregnancy. The individuals were bom with a variety of physical 
deformities, but they had so completely adjusted to their condition that they were able to 
perform all the primary functions albeit in unique and creative ways. In these cases quality 
of life may not be diminished and in fact Brock thinks we should question the use of 
“disability” as a correct representation of this situation.97 We might understand Brock’s 
suggestion to support the idea that term “disability” does not merely refer to physical or 
mental impairment, but impairment that results in a lack of functioning.
In a more recent paper Brock clarifies his position on this point: for a physical 
deformity or illness to have little or no impact on quality of life individuals must be able to 
perform the same primary functions as those without such problems. He gives the 
counterexample of deafness where in spite of claims that sign language and deaf culture 
allow individuals a rich and functional life he argues that there are valuable human 
activities like listening to music which they cannot chose to do. As a result their quality of
QO
life is objectively less than those who can hear. Nonetheless, notice that according to 
Brock’s analysis of standardized quality of life measures it is not the physical impairment
97 Ibid, p. 123.
98 Brock, D. (2005) ‘Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities while Respecting Persons with 
Disabilities’, in Quality of Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability, David 
Wasserman et al. eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 75.
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associated with being deaf—it is not their inability to hear—that makes their quality of life 
worse, rather it is their inability to participate in certain valuable functions.
If, as Brock suggested at the end of his discussion on informed consent, self- 
determined choice is a part of the good life and not merely independent of it, then 
significant limitations on an individual’s ability to choose how they will live their life or 
limitations on the opportunities they have, for instance limitations due to disability or 
illness, will make for a worse life. The objectivity embodied by standardized health-related 
quality of life measures appears to operationalize this point and thus meshes with Brock’s 
suggestion. On this account standardized measures of health-related quality of life aim to 
promote substantive choices and reflect negatively on disease or illness which limit these 
choices.
By looking at certain aspects of the practice of ethical medicine Dan Brock draws 
support for three conclusions about the account of a good quality life which undergirds 
standardized measures of health-related quality of life— what I referred to in the previous 
chapter as the standard needs approach. First, self-determination is central to quality of 
life, second, we need a sufficient number of valuable choices if we are to fulfill the goal of 
self-determination and third, an individual’s primary functions can give us information 
about their quality of life. In the next section I want to supplement this account of the 
standard needs approach and examine the type of primary functions which are treated as 
conditions for the possibility of self-determination. To do this I look at a criticism of 
Brock’s work on quality of life, which suggests that his approach— and by extension 
health-related quality of life measures— are biased to favor clinically or biologically sound 
bodies.
6 6
II
A P oten tia l B ias in S tan dard ized  M easures o f  Q uality  o f  Life
As we have seen on Dan Brock’s account of standardized quality of life measures 
disabled or ill individuals have an objectively lower quality of life if their disability or 
illness reduces their opportunity to partake in major life activities. In fact Brock uses the 
American Disabilities Act (ADA) to support this claim citing their definition of a disability 
as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits at least one major activity."
But although this is the definition of disability which the ADA uses Ron Amundson 
questions Brock’s interpretation of it in his paper ‘Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: 
A Bias in Biomedical Ethics’. He begins by questioning Brock’s judgment that if one has a 
limitation in a major activity, then one necessarily has a lower quality of life. Why, 
Amundson asks, must we assume that unlimited major life activities are necessary for a 
good quality of life?100
As we saw in the last section the link between unlimited major life activities and a 
good quality of life is due, at least in part, to the commitment to self-determination and the 
scope of valuable choices necessary to fulfill this value. Nonetheless, we might understand 
Amundson’s question to point in a different direction. We might understand his question to 
challenge the notion of self-determination that Brock reads into quality of life measures,
99 Brock, D. (2005) ‘Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities While Respecting Persons with 
Disabilities’, in Quality o f  Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care and Disability, David 
Wasserman et al., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 72.
100 Amundson, R. (2005) ‘Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in Biomedical Ethics’ in Quality 
o f  Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care and Disability, David Wasserman et al., New  
York: Cambridge University Press, p. 108.
67
namely that maximizing a set of valuable choices increases the scope for self-determination 
and thus quality of life.
Following this line of thought we might argue that in some cases restrictions on 
valuable opportunities enable certain kinds of life plans and identities which are otherwise 
unavailable and which also enhance quality of life. For instance, we may take oral 
communication to be a valuable functioning. But we might argue that it is only in virtue of 
the inability to communicate orally that the deaf community and the notion of a deaf 
identity exist. Moreover, we might argue that living a life as a member of the deaf 
community is a valuable life plan and it is so in virtue of the valuable opportunities open 
only to those who are deaf. For instance, deaf individuals have the opportunity to 
experience the world in a predominately visual and spatial framework; they have the 
opportunity to attend deaf schools and form friendships with other deaf individuals and be 
part of a community with a specific culture, history and political agenda.
Thus, we might say that the ability to communicate orally, to listen to music and so 
on— the ability to participate in certain valuable functionings—militate against a life lived 
as a member of the deaf community, a life which represents a different set o f valuable 
functions. To be sure, it is often the case that having choices is important to self- 
determination and thus a good quality of life, but in arguing for the value of certain 
limitations in primary functions proponents of deaf culture need not take themselves to be 
limiting our opportunities, but rather protecting the opportunities that only some of us have.
One of the assumptions built into standardized quality of life measures is that one’s 
quality of life is better if one has more valuable options from which to choose. But in light 
of what was said above regarding the incompatibility of some valuable choices we might
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think that the very idea of maximizing our valuable options is confused. Quality of life is 
not simply a matter of having more valuable options from which to choose, but first 
requires that we make decisions regarding what options are valuable.101 These decisions, 
however, depend on a vision of the good life in which an option or set of options is deemed 
valuable. For instance, oral communication may not be taken as valuable given certain 
understandings of community, friendship, culture and bodily integrity. Standardized 
quality of life measures, however, do not attend to the variable conditions in which 
different choices are considered valuable, instead they assume that certain primary 
functionings are equally valuable for everyone regardless of their vision of the good life; 
they assume that certain functionings act as a threshold below which quality of life can only 
be worse.
From the point of view of the deaf community this assumption can have adverse 
consequences for deaf individuals and how people perceive their quality of life. For 
example, one of the dimensions or primary functions found in the Sickness Impact Profile 
(SIP) is ‘Communication’. In this dimension respondents are asked questions regarding 
trouble writing or typing and whether they speak clearly when under stress. A yes answer 
to any of these questions is taken to reflect negatively on quality of life since difficulty 
writing, typing or speaking is taken to hinder communication and thus the ability to 
perform a primary function. But as I will examine in more detail in the next section deaf 
people may not be able to write or speak clearly— especially when stressed— and yet deaf 
advocates argue that their quality of life can be as good as hearing people’s.
101 Amaryta Sen has recognized this point with respect to the capabilities approach to quality o f life. For his 
discussion o f the topic see, for instance, Sen, A. (1999) ‘Capability and W ell-Being’ in Martha C. Nussbaum 
& Amartya Sen eds. The Quality o f Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 29-53.
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If we accept the point made by the deaf community and indeed other disability
activists that some life plans are valuable in spite of, or even because of restrictions to
certain valuable functions, then we might argue that standardized quality of life measures
embody a bias against certain kinds of valuable lives. Indeed Amundson does make this
argument and in doing so he argues that bioethics itself tends to embody a vision of the
good which favors the lives of biologically normal individuals.
In particular Amundson challenges Brock’s commitment to primary functions by
arguing that many of these functionings have biological prerequisites, for instance, being
able to hear, see, walk and so on. For instance, in the SIP above ‘Communication’ is taken
to be, in part, oral communication and oral communication almost always presupposes that
one can hear. Moreover, recall from the previous section that the SIP also takes ‘Body
Care and Movement’ to be a valuable functioning and asks respondents if they can bath
themselves. This question, however, presupposes at least partial use of one’s arms and
legs. Although Brock emphasizes the fact that quality of life measures focus on what
individuals are able to accomplish and not on their physical or mental impairment, if
primary functions require certain biological ‘normalities’, then for practical purposes a
good quality of life is only open to certain bodies. Indeed Brock comes close to endorsing
this view, at least for some conditions, when he writes,
...serious disabilities...remain significant disadvantages for common human 
pursuits even after the goal of achieving reasonable and just social
102 Amundson does not direct his argument specifically to quality o f life measures, but rather to bioethics in 
general and Brock’s theoretical work in particular. I will only attend to Amundson’s arguments insofar as 
they relate to Brock’s work and thus to quality o f life measures.
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accommodation to disabilities has been reached; they are not “mere” or
1 fttsolely social constructions or socially constructed disadvantages.
In this passage Brock’s use of the term “serious disabilities” refers to physical or 
mental impairments which limit a major life activity no matter what kind of social 
adjustments are made, for instance, wheelchair access, Braille translations, sign language 
interpreters and the like. For Brock some disabilities remain disabilities and no amount of 
social resources can change the fact that some individuals just cannot participate in all of 
life’s valuable functionings. Indeed, as I will discuss in the next section, no amount of 
resources will provide deaf individuals the level of oral communication which hearing 
people enjoy and I suspect that likewise there is very little we can do to enable the blind to 
watch a sunset. Moreover, it is because deaf people cannot hear and blind people cannot 
see that they are unable to do these things.
Nonetheless, we might argue that these “disabilities” are “socially constructed” for 
something can only count as a disadvantage given a certain view of a good life and we need 
not accept that a good quality life requires the ability to communicate orally or to view 
scenery. Put differently, we need not accept that a good quality of life requires certain 
biological prerequisites. To be sure, it is possible to define opportunity and thus a good 
quality life so narrowly that certain impairments by definition limit our opportunities. 
Amundson, however, calls this move a “trivialization”104— we can also say that men lack 
the opportunity to bear children due to their biology, but this fact is not typically taken to
103 Brock, D. (2005) ‘Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities While Respecting Persons with 
Disabilities’, in Quality o f Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care and Disability, David 
Wasserman et al., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 73.
104 Amundson, R. (2005) ‘Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in Biomedical Ethics’ in Quality 
o f Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care and Disability, David Wasserman et al., New  
York: Cambridge University Press, p. 108.
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objectively limit their quality of life.105 Men, we might say, have a different, but 
nonetheless valuable set of opportunities as opposed to women and these differences need 
not reduce either their self-determination or their quality of life. If this is the case with men 
and women’s different sets of opportunities, then why does the inability to communicate 
orally objectively decrease quality of life for the deaf?
This question is not merely rhetorical; I suggest that the answer to it is two-fold.
The inability to communicate orally theoretically limits quality of life when, for instance, 
quality of life measures embody a vision of the good life that requires the ability to hear. In 
this case individuals who cannot speak clearly are understood to have a worse quality of 
life than those who can. Disability activists sometimes target their arguments at this level 
of the debate contending that in principle the deaf and disabled can live lives of good 
quality. But practically the inability to communicate orally begins to limit quality of life 
when social and environmental circumstances are such that the inability to speak clearly 
limits any form of communication or community. At this level of the problem activists 
argue that while quality of life may not be good, this assessment has nothing to do with 
hearing per se. Rather it reflects inequality of opportunity and a biased management of 
social resources. For disability and deaf activists we ought to recognize that some 
individuals live different, but nonetheless valuable lives and provide resources to help them 
achieve their unique vision of the good.
The theoretical and practical issues that affect the quality of life of the deaf work 
hand in hand, for if we assume a picture of the good life that requires the ability to hear,
105 On the contrary, the inability to bear children is sometimes taken to improve men’s quality o f life and we 
could argue that this too is the result of certain notions of the good life that prioritize independence, 
detachment and individuality.
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then our efforts to provide deaf individuals with a good life often dismantle the conditions 
in which an inability to hear might thrive. For example, consider the following. Health- 
related quality of life measurement is meant to be part of a progressive approach to health 
care; a commitment to health-related quality of life suggests that we ought to improve one’s 
ability to function through the implementation of more effective medication, better 
hospitals and so on. But in the face of certain primary functions social reform cannot 
ameliorate all disabilities. Thus there are limitations to how much we can improve the lives 
of the deaf and disabled though social planning. From this perspective some individuals 
necessarily have fewer choices and thus they necessarily have a lower quality of life.
But there are other options besides social planning that can increase the quality of 
life of those lacking major life functions. These options involve medical or surgical 
interventions which aim to restore primary functions. For instance, surgical interventions 
like cochlear implants allow the deaf to hear and burgeoning genetic technology will soon 
make it possible to detect the presence of a variety of disabilities early in pregnancy and 
thus allow for selective abortions. Given a particular threshold of primary functions both 
interventions result in a population of fewer disabled people and therefore more people 
with more choices. It is not surprising perhaps that Brock supports the use of genetic 
technology and that outcome assessments based on standardized health-related quality of 
life measures indicate that cochlear implants indeed improve quality of life.106
106 See for instance, Brock, D. (2005) ‘Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities While Respecting 
Persons with Disabilities’, in Quality o f  Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care and 
Disability, David Wasserman et al., New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-100 and Harris, J.P. 
(1995) ‘An Outcomes Study of Cochlear Implants in D eaf Patients’, in Archives o f Otolaryngology Head 
Neck Surgery, 121: 398-404.
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Amundson’s criticisms of Brock are not meant to argue that all disabilities make for 
a good quality of life nor that just any vision of the good is legitimate. Rather Amundson’s 
criticism is directed at what he understands to be an unjustified assumption that the absence 
of certain biological norms necessarily reduces quality of life.107 Nonetheless, even this 
allegation is not entirely true for quality of life researchers may reasonably take themselves 
to be justified  in holding this assumption. As we saw in the previous chapter construct 
validity theoretically allows us to test both our measure and build up our theory. If our 
measures bear out our hypotheses, then greater confidence in our theory is justified. If the 
outcomes data from standardized measures of quality of life support the notion that 
valuable choices and hence quality of life improve as respondents gain the ability to hear, 
see, eat and so on, then according to the logic of construct validity we may be justified in 
assuming that certain biological differences reduce quality of life.
In the next section, however, I challenge the logic of construct validity and suggest 
that with respect to quality of life research even when— and sometimes especially 
because— our hypotheses are borne out in a measure’s outcomes we still need to question 
our theory and our measure. In what follows I look at some of the past and present research 
that has guided public policies and opinion on the deaf and argue that claims of construct 
validity do not further the debate over what makes for a good quality life.
107 Amundson, R. (2005) ‘Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in Biomedical Ethics’ in Quality 
o f Life and Human Difference Genetic Testing, Health Care and Disability, David Wasserman et al., New  
York: Cambridge University Press, p. 103.
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I ll
The Q uality  o f  Life o f  the D eaf: A  C ase S tudy
A . A  B rief History o f  R esearch on the D ea f
In Harlan Lane’s book The Mask o f Benevolence he argues that prelingually 
deafened individuals are part of an oppressed cultural minority. Moreover, like Amundson 
he argues that clinical assumptions about what makes for a healthy body has led medical 
professionals and educators to accept a pathological view of deafness whereby it is 
understood as something that needs to be cured. Confusing clinical criteria of health with 
ethical criteria for a good life he argues that the hearing establishment has for the last 
hundred years sought to give deaf individuals the “benefits” o f hearing, whether this was 
through oral education, mainstreaming or surgery. In what follows I lay out parts of Lane’s 
argument to provide the historical and cultural background against which the debate over 
the quality of life of the deaf has been, and continues to be, fought.
For Lane deaf individuals represent a cultural minority because they share a 
complex language replete with literature, jokes and customs; they share a common history 
and social structure.108 Although the National Association of the Deaf (NAD) recognizes 
that the diversity within the deaf community makes the deaf experience difficult to 
generalize we might nonetheless acknowledge certain shared values.109 For instance, the 
deaf community has traditionally identified deafness independent of decibel loss and in 
virtue of communication preference.110 Moreover, they have expressed pride in this
108 Lane, H. (1993) The Mask o f Benevolence, New York: Vintage Books, pp. 16-7, 18.
109 NAD Board o f Directors (2000) ‘Cochlear Implants NAD Position Statement’, www.nad.org/site retrieved 
5/7/2006.
110 Cohen, J. (1998) ‘The Deaf Identity Double-Bind: Culture Versus Disability’, in The A dvocate’s Forum, 5.
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identity: they have welcomed the arrival of deaf children111, valued and maintained the 
friendships of deaf schoolmates and espoused the belief that a hearing person can never 
acquire a deaf identity, even those who grow up with deaf parents and are fluent in 
American Sign Language (ASL).112
This latter belief is important because it partly explains the reluctance of some 
members of the deaf community to accept the cochlear implantation of young children as 
well as the occasional prejudice against deaf adults who attempt to assimilate into hearing
1 I ^culture by way of lip reading, attempting to speak or receiving an implant. But it also 
suggests that on this account “deaf identity” only refers to those who are prelingually 
deaf—those bom deaf or who become deaf shortly thereafter— and not to those becoming 
deaf in later life. Thus Lane’s account of the deaf does not necessarily apply to 
postlingually deafened individuals. This is different from Amundson’s argument which 
was meant to concern the value of disabled life generally. Nonetheless, Lane’s discussion 
reinforces Amundson’s and helps us to see how contrary to Brock’s account of quality of 
life giving people more choices by way of certain functionings may in fact illuminate bias 
and serve paternalistic interests.
‘Audism’ is the term that Lane and others use to describe the hearing-centered 
endeavor that attempts to help deaf people; audists are those who work to serve this
111 Lane, H. (1993) The Mask o f Benevolence, New York: Vintage Books, p. 18.
112 Ibid, p. 17.
113 Ibid, p. 6. Since 2000 NAD officially recognizes that one’s choice o f communication is personal and 
ought to be respected. With respect to cochlear implants see ‘Cochlear Implant NAD Position Statement’ at 
www.nad.org/site . Nonetheless, individuals receiving cochlear implants still report criticism from the deaf 
community. See Chee, G.H. et al. (2004) ‘Benefits o f Cochlear Implantation in Early-Deafened Adults: The 
Toronto Experience’, in The Journal o f  Otolaryngology, 33:30.
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cause.114 Deaf people need help on the audist view, not only because they cannot hear and 
thus appreciate music, but because correlated with the inability to hear are a host of social, 
cognitive, behavioral and emotional problems. Although now over 10 years old Lane 
provides a list of these characteristics based on a review of over 350 articles and books 
representing the psychometric research done on deaf people at the time. It is useful to look 
at some of the items on his list since it is part of the history that defines the current work on 
the quality of life of the prelingually deaf. Some of these traits include: asocial; egocentric; 
clannish; aggressive; moody; unclear thinking; unintelligent; submissive; immature; 
morally undeveloped and isolated.115 If these traits or characteristics came from reliable 
and valid studies, then this list purports to capture the ways that deaf individuals as a group 
differ from hearing individuals more than the ways these individuals differ amongst 
themselves. It is perhaps not surprising that children diagnosed as deaf or seriously hearing 
impaired were— and sometimes still are116— seen to be in danger of leading lives of poor 
quality.
B. The Controversy over Cochlear Implants
Cochlear implants are the latest development in biotechnology aimed to eliminate or
reduce deafness and its associated problems. Cochlear implants are prosthetic replacements
for a damaged ear and are surgically inserted into the inner ear through a depression in the
skull. The implant itself is a very small wire which directly stimulates the auditory nerve
114 Lane, H. (1993) The Mask o f Benevolence, New York: Vintage Books, p. 43.
1,5 Ibid, p. 36.
116 See Montgomery, C. (2002) ‘The Cochlear Implant Trial’, in The Ragged Edge Magazine, at 
http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/extra/deaftrail: McClellan, T.D.(2002) ‘Deaf Mom Fights to Keep Kids 
form Ear Implants’, in The Grand Rapids Press, at http://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/9-02/GRPress9-6- 
02.html
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with electrical current. A cochlear implant recipient must also wear an external earpiece 
which contains a microphone and a transmitter, and a speech processor which is connected 
to the earpiece by two thin cords. Sounds are picked up by the microphone and then carried 
via one of the cords to the processor which selects the sound waves most useful for speech 
and sends them to the transmitter via the other cord. The transmitter sends the coded signal 
as FM radio waves across the skin and the radio waves are picked up by the internal
117wire. Cochlear implants do not cure deafness and although they do enable an individual 
to hear sound when the earpiece is inserted the sound that one hears is much less refined 
than that heard by a hearing person.118
In the literature it is now routinely acknowledged that cochlear implantation in 
posdingually deafened adults has significant benefit both in terms of hearing and quality of 
life. As one research team puts it, ‘Cochlear implantation has become the method of choice 
for the treatment of postlingually deaf patients.’119 But until recently it was thought that 
cochlear implants had little to offer prelingually deafened adults. This is mainly because 
prelingually deafened adults who receive cochlear implants are unable to understand speech 
through the audition gained from the implant and the ability to understand speech was 
thought to be the main benefit from cochlear implants.120 The inability of prelingually 
deafened adults to understand speech based on the sounds derived from the implant is 
usually thought to be due to profound hearing loss during the years of language learning,
117 Washington University School o f Medicine in St. Louis, Department of Otolaryngology homepage, 
Cochlear Implant—What is it? Found at http://wuphvsicians.wustl.edu/dept
118 NAD Board o f Directors (2000) ‘Cochlear Implants NAD Position Statement’, www.nad.org/site retrieved 
5/7/2006.
119 Vermeire, K. et al. (2005) ‘Quality-of-Life Benefit from Cochlear Implantation in the Elderly’, in Otology 
& Neurotology, 26: 188.
120 Kaplan, D.M. et al. (2003) ‘Early-Deafened Adult Cochlear Implant Users: Assessment of Outcomes’, in 
The Journal o f  Otolaryngology, 32: 246.
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abnormal development of auditory pathways and the lack of auditory experience.121 It is 
for these reasons that the early disagnosis of deafness and the subsequent implantation of 
young children was and still is thought to be important.122
But recent studies indicate that prelingually deafened adults, contrary to 
expectations, are not only seeking implantation, but also receiving some measure of benefit. 
In a recent study of 44 prelingually deafened cochlear implant recipients researchers at the 
University of Toronto found that independent of variable audiologic outcomes— the actual 
benefit to hearing in terms of speech perception— the quality of life data from these
individuals approached that of the quality of life data from postlingually deafened implant
12^recipients from the same program.
In another study from the University of Toronto— the largest study of the subjective 
benefits of cochlear implantation in early-deafened adults— it was found that this 
improvement in quality of life is mainly due to more confidence in communication via lip 
reading ability, better environmental awareness and greater independence.124 Moreover, 
when participants were asked about their personal satisfaction with the implant 66.7% were 
‘very satisfied’ and when asked if they would go through the same process again 93.3% 
said they would.125
121 Ibid.
122 See the Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf and Hard o f Hearing at www.agbell.org to read 
about a campaign to diagnose and implant young children.
123 Kaplan, D.M. et al. (2003) ‘Early-Deafened Adult Cochlear Implant Users: Assessment of Outcomes’, in 
The Journal o f  Otolaryngology, 32: 249. This study’s conclusion is contrary to earlier findings which 
suggested that the longer one has been deaf the less one can expect improvement in quality o f life. See 
Maillet, C.J. et al. (1995) ‘Change in the Quality of Life o f Adult Cochlear Implant Patients’, in Annuals o f  
Otolaryngology Rhinology Laryngology Suppl., 165: 31-48.
124 Chee, G.H. (2004) ‘Benefits o f Cochlear Implantation in Early-Deafened Adults: The Toronto 
Experience’, in The Journal o f  Otolaryngology, 33: 29-8, 31.
125 Ibid, p. 27.
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That cochlear implants improve the quality of life of prelingually deafened adults 
was not one of the hypotheses with which auditory specialists or quality of life researchers 
began their inquiry. In fact researchers assumed that cochlear implants would not 
significantly increase their quality of life since it would not enable them to understand 
speech. As construct validity instructs us the Toronto team took their unexpected results as 
evidence that their original hypothesis was false and that the part of their theory regarding 
the relatively narrow importance of hearing was misguided.
But although the evidence from these studies suggested that part of their theory 
regarding the benefit acquired through cochlear implantation was false the researchers took 
this new information as evidence which further emphasized the significance of hearing to a 
good quality of life. The new evidence suggested to the researchers in Toronto yet another 
aspect of the importance of hearing to quality of life, an aspect that had been overlooked in 
the past. Hearing, it turns out, is important to quality of life not only because it allows for 
word discrimination and sentence recognition, but also when it simply enables one to hear 
indiscriminate sounds.
Although the working hypothesis from this study was not confirmed we might 
think, along with the Toronto team, that the outcomes from this study further validate a 
theory of quality of life which acknowledges the importance of certain biological 
prerequisites— the theory of the good life that, according to Amundson, standardized 
measures of quality of life embody. But in what follows I suggest that such a conclusion is 
too quick—the data from the Toronto study does not provide unequivocal support for this 
theory as the correct orientation to quality of life research. Rather even with these 
outcomes we are still left to grapple with the question of what makes for a good quality life.
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Historically members of the deaf community have rejected the notion that the 
inability to hear decreases quality of life. They have rejected it because it suggests that 
deaf people have an objectively lower quality of life without implants or hearing aids; that 
quality of life and the ability to hear are synonymous. Instead, they argue that, on the one 
hand, the deaf life, at least in principle, represents a life of unique quality; put differently, a 
deaf life represents an alternative and legitimate vision of the good. On the other hand, 
they argue that practically speaking discrimination against deafness and attempts to “cure” 
it have to a large extent undermined the conditions for the possibility of this kind of life. 
Thus the predominate factor in the improved quality of life scores following cochlear 
implantation is not the ability to hear, but the consequences of over a century of 
discrimination.
Thus from this perspective when standardized measures report that cochlear 
implants increase the quality of life of prelingually deafened adults these outcomes might 
be understood as indications of areas where discrimination makes full participation in 
society difficult. For instance, as Lane points out mainstreamed deaf schoolchildren 
lacking a deaf community and deaf role models, and taught oral skills that they only poorly 
acquire become adults who are isolated, are unconfident, and are insecure. On this view 
the findings from the quality of life studies from earlier represent a social critique: even 
given a relatively insignificant ability to hear prelingually deafened individuals find that life 
gets much better.
The idea that a deaf life represents a unique, but historically maligned vision of the 
good provides a competing interpretation of quality of life outcomes data than do quality of 
126 Lane, H. (1993) The Mask o f Benevolence, Vintage Books: New York , pp. 129-54.
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life researchers, the audist establishment or Brock. While for instance, these set of 
assumptions understand the outcomes from the cochlear implant study above as a social 
critique of equality, proponents who assume that the good life requires certain functionings 
which entail biological prerequisites understand the outcomes as evidence of the 
importance of these functionings. These two interpretations come from two different 
theoretical orientations to deafness: deafness as a pathology derived from the inability to 
hear; deafness as a biological difference that provides for a unique set of opportunities and 
challenges. From the former perspective prelingually deafened individuals receiving 
cochlear implants are liberated by their ability to hear and given a wider opportunity range 
from which to fashion the lives of their choice; from the latter perspective these individuals 
are the victims of discrimination and members of a paternalistic society which has insisted 
that a good quality of life is a hearing life.
But given these two different theoretical orientations how should we best 
understand the outcomes data from standardized quality of life studies? Although I won’t 
attempt to answer this question until the end of the next chapter it is a question of central 
importance because it affects in what we take quality of life to consist. The important point 
here is that construct validity cannot provide the answer to this question. To be sure, 
construct validity promises to build confidence in our theory as it validates our measures 
and thus provide us with an answer to the question, ‘What is quality of life?’ But while 
construct validity can provide us with an answer to this question it risks providing us with 
an ethnocentric answer to this question.
Ethnocentric conceptions of quality of life are what deaf advocates worry about 
when they warn deaf adults and parents about the historical bias that effects the medical
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profession and the media. It might be true that given certain resource distributions, for 
instance those that favor surgical interventions over increased funding for deaf schools, 
quality of life increases after a cochlear implant. But this state of affairs does not tell us 
what quality of life would be like if deaf schools were plentiful and American Sign 
Language was regularly offered as a foreign language in public schools; it does not tell us 
what quality of life would be like if hearing was not seen as a prerequisite to a good life.
The problem with the application of construct validity to standardized quality of life 
measures is that it does not always invite us to challenge these measures’ preconceptions—  
what I have been calling their vision of the good— that defines what counts as a life of 
quality. As the example of deaf culture shows this shortcoming of standardized measures 
tends to restrict not only our conversations about quality of life, but also the different kinds 
of quality lives we might lead. Thus, part of the significance of this problem is the way 
standardized measures might perpetuate, for instance through public policy 
recommendations, limitations on the choices and opportunities that individuals can 
appreciate as valuable. As I discussed earlier, Brock suggests self-determined choice is a 
part of a good quality life and that significant limitations on the opportunities individuals 
have make for a worse life. After my discussion we might think that at least in some cases 
the application of construct validity to standardized measures of quality of life can 
contribute to a decrease in valuable opportunities; a decrease in self-determination and 
quality of life.
The risk of perpetuating ethnocentric understandings of quality of life and thus 
potentially doing damage to individuals’ self-determination is the result, I suggest, o f a 
conservative bent to construct validity which encourages researchers to discontinue the
83
questioning of our theory and our measures when our outcomes confirm our hypotheses. 
We might, I suggest, go some way toward resolving this problem if we understood our 
outcomes as a point of departure for further questions— even when they confirm our 
hypotheses. For instance, with regard to the Toronto study we might learn to see how the 
confirmation of our hypothesis itself raises certain questions. For instance, what does the 
very confirmation of our hypothesis say about our understanding of quality of life in this 
context? We might ask what social, cultural, historical or economic factors contribute to 
the importance of hearing to quality of life?; Do these factors indicate a lack of social and 
political support for certain types of diversity?; If so, is this the kind of society we wish to 
cultivate?; Does a lack of support for diverse experiences contribute to our understanding 
of the good?
These questions illustrate the importance of questioning our outcomes for they 
begin to clarify the assumptions that our measures take for granted as well as suggesting a 
possible alternative to these assumptions. To be sure, merely learning to question our 
theory does not ensure that we will once and for all rid our quality of life measures from 
ethnocentric bias. Firstly, we can always ask further questions and thus we can always 
overlook areas of bias. Secondly, as I will discuss throughout this thesis there is no method 
of learning to ask questions, we simply learn to ask better questions as we attempt to 
understand the things around us; we learn to question different aspects of our outcomes as 
we learn to better understand quality of life. Nonetheless, questioning our outcomes is 
itself an essential part o f coming to understand quality of life. Eliminating the bias from 
our measures is a process and it is on-going, but even if questioning our outcomes does not 
guarantee our measures against ethnocentricity it is a place to begin.
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If we must question the outcomes from standardized quality of life measures, then 
what about individualized measures? Do they escape ethnocentricity? In what follows I 
discuss some of the problems with understanding quality of life as idiosyncratic.
IV
A Potential Bias in Individualized Measures o f Quality o f Life
One of the reoccurring themes in quality of life research is that people should be 
free to determine for themselves what counts as a good quality life. As we have seen both 
the standard needs and the individualized approaches profess to promote self- 
determination: the standard needs approach focuses on the conditions for the possibility of 
self-determination; the individualized approach focuses directly on the individual’s 
assessment of their experience. In this way both approaches take themselves to be liberal 
approaches, both recognize that individuals differ in their understanding of the good life 
and both aim to make room for these differences within their measurements.127
But as we saw in Chapter 1 the individualized approach criticizes the standard needs 
approach for not living up to the liberal ideal; it criticizes it for being paternalistic. 
Proponents of the individualized approach claim that the standard needs approach 
systematically affects what counts as a good quality of life insofar as it determines in 
advance which dimensions, or primary functionings to use Brock’s terminology, are most 
important and insofar as it pre-weights individual questions. In this chapter Amundson’s
127 Proponents o f the individualized approach have sometimes misunderstood the liberal intent o f the standard 
needs approach and criticized it for what at least one researcher has referred to as its ‘communitarian’ 
orientation, meaning that the standard needs approach promoted a substantial view o f the good life. See 
Browne, J. (1997) Individual Quality o f  Life in Older People, Conceptual and Methodological Challenges, 
PhD Thesis in Psychology, Dublin University pp.270-5.
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criticism of Brock was similar to the individualized approach’s claim that pre-determined 
dimensions unduly dictate what counts as a good life.
As you will recall from Chapter 1 the individualized approach takes quality of life 
to be whatever an individual says it is. Quality of life is individual and idiosyncratic; we 
can only measure someone’s quality of life by learning to see the world through their eyes 
and with their values. Measurements like the SEIQoL-DW provide individuals with the 
opportunity to choose the dimensions that are important to them , to determine how their 
current life fares in each of these areas and to weight themselves the relative contribution of 
each area to one’s overall quality of life. Each measure is thus uniquely tailored to an 
individual’s subjective experience; the judgment of a poor quality of life is only made when 
individuals rate their current lives as not living up to their own expectations.
Unlike standardized measures of quality of life the individualized approach does not 
nominate certain primary functionings as thresholds for good quality of life and thus 
individualized measures cannot be criticized for the kind of systematic bias for which 
Amundson criticizes certain standardized measures. Moreover, although individualized 
measures undergo a validation process, validation is recognized as having limited value. 
Nonetheless, I suggest that individualized measures suffer from a similar problem as do 
standardized measures: they do not encourage— indeed they discourage— researchers to 
question a measure’s outcomes. Given the nature of the theoretical orientation of the 
individualized approach confirmations of as well as deviations from researcher hypotheses 
are explained in terms of the idiosyncratic nature of quality of life. Thus, as the user’s
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manual for the SEIQoL states individualized measures are self-validating.128 This 
methodology is not seen as a problem for individualized measures, but as a virtue of its 
particular theory.
The self-validation of individualized measures is seen as a virtue because it 
emphasizes that quality of life is free from the paternalism that affects standardized 
measures: quality of life is whatever an individual says it is. In the words of one proponent 
of the individualized approach, ‘It seems clear that the method [of the SEIQoL] is culture- 
free.’129 But are the SEIQoL and other individualized measures ‘culture-free’? In closing I 
want to suggest that the individualized approach is not culture-free and perhaps it is even 
more deeply embedded in cultural bias than the standard needs approach.
To make my point about the bias inherent in individualized measures I turn to the 
practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). FGM is the practice of cutting or removing 
the clitoris and sometimes part of the labia minora. Although condemned by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, UNICEF and others it remains a common practice in 
Africa, and it can be found in smaller numbers in other countries like Australia, France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.130 It is preformed on young girls usually aged four 
to seven for reasons of beauty, purity and social continuity. FGM is linked to a variety of 
medical conditions some of which include decreased sexual functioning due to pain during
1 O I
intercourse; infertility; and insensitivity around the scar tissue.
128 See O’Boyle, C.A. et al., (1993) The Schedule fo r  the Evaluation o f Individual Quality o f  Life User 
Manual, Dublin: Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland.
129 Hickey, A. et al. (1999) ‘The Schedule for the Evaluation o f Individual Quality of Life’, in Individual 
Quality o f Life Approaches to Conceptualisation and Assessment, C. R. B. Joyce, Ciaran A. O’Boyle & 
Hannah McGee eds, Sidney: Harwood Academic Publishers, p. 128.
130 Nussbaum, M.C. (1999) Sex and Social Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 120.
131 Ibid.
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Imagine that we give the SEIQoL to a genitally mutilated woman. Because the 
intervention occurs when girls are quite young we would have to give it to her after the 
operation, let us say we give it to her at some point in her twenties. If FGM does affect 
quality of life, we would expect her to nominate at least some area o f life associated with 
sexual functioning and its status to reflect her disability. Now let us imagine that despite 
the areas of life she nominates— whether they include sexual functioning or not— her 
quality of life is quite high. Are we justified in concluding that for this woman, FGM is 
unproblematic?
The difficulty here is that human beings can get used to a huge variety of conditions 
and learn to live rich and meaningful lives within them. As Brock recognized our 
preferences are adaptive. This woman, for example, may have learned to understand FGM 
as an honor or a rite of passage. Perhaps she came to understand it as part of her body and 
the way it functions just as a man may come to understand his circumcised penis. But just 
because we can get used to a lot of things modem democracies tend to support certain 
thresholds below which no one should function. This idea is captured in Brock’s analysis 
of standardized measures of quality of life and it reflects the understanding that to be a self­
determining agent certain material conditions must be met. The United Nations’ 
condemnation of FGM suggests that the freedom to fashion a life for oneself presupposes 
the ability to participate in certain sexual functionings without undue pain or insensitivity.
To be sure the support for a ban on FGM does imply that this practice and the social 
values it expresses are not part of a good quality life just as the standard needs approach 
stipulates that a life without certain primary functionings is not a good quality life. But 
while in some circumstances we might find these thresholds paternalistic is individualism
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the appropriate response? As Martha Nussbaum notes in Sex and Social Justice, victims of 
FGM tend to live in communities which promulgate beliefs about female impurity and the 
second class status of women; as a result these women often lack education and basic 
literacy skills.132 Can conditions like these lead to self-determined choices about what is 
and is not a good quality life? Far from self-determination situations like these begin to 
look like manipulation; they look like a systematic bias in favor of internalized gender 
hierarchies.
The individualized approach is not culture-free. When individuals express their 
quality of life these expressions are always grounded in cultural norms, norms which we 
may well wish to challenge. The individualized approach tells us that quality of life is 
whatever an individual says it is, but we can be wrong in our assessment of our lives. After 
all our vision in these matters is always only partial and the orientation of the 
individualized approach, by insisting that our appraisal is always legitimate, limits our 
opportunities to expand that vision and create perhaps better lives for ourselves. But as we 
have also seen, to define the dimensions of quality of life in advance, to pre-determine the 
conditions for the possibility of self-determination with respect to a particular vision of the 
good also potentially limits our opportunities because it can blind us to the genuine quality 
of different lives.
We might say that while the individualized approach overemphasizes our 
differences, the standard needs approach under appreciates them. Nonetheless, my 
criticisms of these two approaches stem from a common problem: in neither case can we
132 Ibid, p. 127.
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adequately challenge the assumptions— the vision of the good— against which quality of 
life is measured.
In the next chapter I will turn from issues of ethnocentricity and how we understand 
respondent answers— our measure’s outcomes— to respondent bias and how we should 
understand questions. Respondent bias occurs when individuals answer questions 
inaccurately. These inaccuracies often occur when respondents understand the questions in 
a measure differently than researchers anticipated they would. In the next chapter, 
however, I suggest that alternative understandings of our questions often provide insight 
into our measures— not bias. Moreover, developing ways to incorporate this insight into 
the analysis of our measures might be one way to begin to challenge some of the 
assumptions that underpin our measures while at the same time laying the groundwork for 
quality of life research that honors its commitment to self-determination.
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Chapter 3
Construct Validity and Respondent Bias
Introduction
In Chapter Two I argued that both standardized and individualized quality of life 
measures tend to perpetuate ethnocentric understandings of quality of life. In the case of 
standardized measures I argued that this bias takes the shape of a partiality for functionings 
that require certain biological prerequisites; in the case of individualized measures I argued 
that this takes the shape of a bias in favor of atomistic individualism. Moreover, I argued 
that these assumptions can result in conclusions about quality of life that are at odds with 
the value of self-determination— a value that both proponents of the standard needs and 
individualized approaches take quality of life measures to promote.
In the previous chapter I was at pains to show that the bias that infects quality of life 
research is not in the specific construction of the measure— both standardized and 
individualized measures are subject to it. Nor does the problem lie in a particular theory of 
quality of life— neither standardized nor individualized measures can escape criticism. 
Rather I argued that the difficulty resides in our tendency to stop short of questioning or 
challenging our measures and our theory in certain cases. With regard to standardized 
measures we stop asking further questions when our hypotheses are confirmed in our 
outcomes; with regard to individualized measures we stop asking further questions once an 
individual has completed a measure. I suggested, however, that we ought to continue to 
question or challenge both our theoretical orientation and the construction o f our measures.
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Moreover, I argued that to do otherwise risks the promulgation of ethnocentric 
understandings of quality of life and policies which support them.
The worry over bias is not unknown in the quality of life literature. But in this 
literature bias typically refers to the situation where respondent answers are taken to be 
inaccurate. In standardized measures some of the factors that are understood to contribute 
to this problem include the following: the influence of social norms may tempt respondents 
to lie rather than admit to something in opposition to expectations; the particular wording 
of a question may mislead respondents; time constraints may result in the misunderstanding 
of questions or arbitrary answers; a question’s placement in a measure may suggest an 
understanding of it that researchers did not wish to convey; and a question’s response 
alternatives may not include the answer that respondents would like to make.133 
Individualized measures also face problems of respondent bias insofar as respondents may 
misrepresent their true feelings regarding their quality of life. For instance, respondents 
may answer the questions put to them out of habit, they may forget to consider something 
important to their answer or they may feel bound by outside influences to respond in certain 
ways.
These issues not only affect the accuracy of respondents’ answers to the questions 
in a quality of life measure, but they also affect the validity of that measure’s outcomes.
For instance, when respondents lie about their answers or when respondents understand the 
questions differently than researchers imagined they would then their answers can 
confound the measure’s outcomes. Instead of measuring, say, quality of life the instrument
133 Clark H. H. & Schober, M.F. (1992) ‘Asking questions and influencing answers’, in J. M. Tanur (ed.) 
Questions about Questions: Inquiries into the Cognitive Bases o f  Surveys, New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, pp. 25-6.
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in question may be assessing the population’s adherence to conventional norms, their risk 
aversion or their concern for consistency. To make matters more complicated respondent 
bias does not always show up in tests of construct validity. Instances of respondent bias 
can be detected by construct validity only when respondents answer contrary to established 
hypotheses. But respondent bias also occurs when respondents answer in line with 
established hypotheses, but for different reasons and sometimes in response to alternatively 
interpreted questions.
Sometimes respondent bias occurs because respondents understand the questions in 
a measure differently than researchers envisioned. Although respondent bias can occur for 
other reasons this is the case on which I will focus my attention in this chapter. In response 
to and in anticipation of this type of respondent bias researchers who design standardized 
measures attempt to create questions that are both as clear as possible in terms of the 
understanding that they want to convey to respondents and as uncontroversial as possible so 
that respondents will answer truthfully. Put differently, researchers attempt to limit the 
different ways that respondents will understand the questions posed in the measure. There 
are many strategies to achieve this goal. With regard to the importance for clarity 
sometimes the approach is as intuitive as keeping the measure short and simple.
With regard to certain socially sensitive topics researchers sometimes hide the 
purpose of a question. For example, a question asking you to rate your expected enjoyment 
in racing motorcycles may appear to be asking you about your preferences for spending 
your leisure time, but in fact it may be an index of risk-taking.134 Another tactic is to
134 Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G. R. (2003) Health Measurement Scales a Practical Guide to their 
Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 90.
93
change the scaling of a question. Instead of asking parents to rate on a linear scale whether 
they would spank, do nothing or cuddle their child when she won’t sleep measurement 
developers may use the paired-comparison technique in which parents are asked which of 
two behaviors they were more likely to do in a particular circumstance. The idea is that on 
a linear rating scale it is too obvious which end of the scale constitutes the “wrong” answer. 
Paired-comparisons are thought to hide their normativity better.135
The stress on the reduction of respondent bias is not surprisingly motivated by its 
connection to validity: valid measures are measures with relatively little scope for bias. 
Moreover, because construct validity cannot always recognize respondent bias, claims 
regarding construct validity presuppose that respondents in fact understand questions and 
answers as researchers imagined they would. Thus it would seem as though there is an 
added incentive to constraining how respondents understand and respond to the questions 
in a measure, namely the accuracy of our validity claims. But while it is true that valid 
measurement requires researchers and respondents to understand one another, in this 
chapter I will challenge the idea that validity requires us to narrow the margin for bias by 
limiting the ways that respondents understand questions to those that researchers imagine. 
Alternatively, I will suggest that the notion of validity compels us to acknowledge and 
indeed encourage different understandings of these questions.
The concept “respondent bias” as it is used in this literature presupposes that 
researchers generally know in advance how to understand the questions in a measure and 
the notion of validity in this context depends on the possibility of conveying this 
understanding to respondents. In the beginning o f this chapter, however, I look at some 
135 Ibid, p. 43.
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claims of respondent bias and argue that we need not understand these respondents’ 
answers as biased. Instead we might take their alternative understandings of certain 
questions as opening up new avenues in our conception of quality of life.
To make this argument I look at one theoretical attempt to articulate how 
respondents understand the questions in quality of life measures. I argue that understanding 
a question’s purpose is essential to our understanding a question and, moreover, when we 
misunderstand a question or a statement it is often because we misunderstand its purpose. 
Many instances of respondent bias are the result of difficulties understanding a question’s 
purpose. But I will argue that we—respondents and researchers— can only understand or 
misunderstand the purpose of a question insofar as we understand the question and we 
understand a question only insofar as we ask it. I suggest that quality of life researchers 
cannot know in advance how best to understand the questions they ask; rather they must 
simply ask their questions.
If we cannot know the best understanding of our questions in advance of asking 
them, then the validity of our measures cannot depend on the possibility of conveying this 
understanding to respondents. Nonetheless, if we do not know how to understand our 
questions in advance, then construct validity cannot determine the accuracy of our 
measures. I propose instead that to ensure the validity o f these measures we ought to 
situate them within a dialogic framework in order to utilize the different understandings of 
our questions and to better grasp the limitations and opportunities of the constructs that our 
measures embody. In the end I suggest that a measure’s validity is dynamic, that while we 
can incorporate the lessons from different studies into a particular measure, one measure
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can never substitute for the entire dialogic framework. While measures can be more or less 
valid the question of their validity if never finished.
I
The NHP and SF-36: Respondent Bias or Respondent Insight?
A. The Nottingham Health Profile
In 1993 Donovan et a l  published a paper entitled, ‘Assessing the Need for Health 
Status Measures’ which examines the propriety of using quality of life measures to 
determine the health needs of local populations. Donovan and her team query the validity 
of the Nottingham Health Profile (NHP) by pointing to instances o f respondent bias—  
instances that were not identified in the course of normal validity testing. At the same time, 
they are keen to emphasize that the issues they raise are not exclusive to the NHP ‘but
1 3Aapply to the genre’. Their study proceeds by comparing respondent answers to questions 
about health taken from interviews with the same respondents’ answers in the NHP. Their 
aim is to discover whether the participants’ answers in the measure were accurate given 
what they said in the interviews.137
In this study respondents are asked to fill in part of the General Household Survey, 
two measures of health and health care developed by the Rand Corporation and the NHP. 
They are then asked to participate in an audio-taped, semi-structured interview about both 
their health care and any issues that the standardized measures may have raised.138
136 Donovan, J. L. et al. (1993) ‘Assessing the need for health status measures’, in Journal o f Epidemiology 
and Community Health, 47: 159.
137 Ibid.
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Donovan et a l  focus on the NHP because at the time it was the leading generic,
standardized quality of life measure on the market. As they remark it replaced the Sickness
Impact Profile (SIP) as the leading generic measure because it was perceived to be better in
1 ^ 0terms of validity and more sensitive in terms of responsiveness to change. The NHP is
scaled with categorical judgments in the form o f “yes/no” responses to short statements and
it measures three dimensions: perceived physical, social and emotional health.
During the interview section of the study Donovan et a l  find three areas of
discrepancy between respondents’ answers on the NHP and their interview responses.
These discrepancies suggest to Donovan et a l  that the NHP scores are biased. In the first
instance, Donovan and her team propose that this bias is due the NHP’s categorical
response options: the yes/no alternatives are too limiting for respondent answers.140
Donovan et a l  offer the following examples to support their diagnosis:141
Things are getting me down: yes/no
I have pain at night: yes/no
I have unbearable pain: yes/no
I take tablets to help me sleep: yes/no
To the first question, one interviewed respondent answers, ‘I won’t let them if I can. Can I 
put sometimes?’142 Here the categorical scaling of the question does appear to be limiting. 
The respondent’s answer perhaps reflects the need to implement some kind of continuous 
judgment scale in the NHP which would allow for a larger range of response options.
139 Ibid, 161.
140 Ibid, p. 159.
141 Although the ‘questions’ on the NHP, and many other standardized questionnaires, are not explicitly in the 
form o f an interrogative I will refer to them as ‘questions’.
142 Donovan, J. L. et a l  (1993) ‘Assessing the need for health status measures’, in Journal o f Epidemiology
and Community Health, 47: 159.
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But changing the response scale will not solve all the NHP’s problems. In the other 
three questions from above respondents have rather different sorts of difficulties; 
difficulties which reflect more than a problem with the categorical response options. For 
instance, to the question about pain at night one respondent replies that she doesn’t so much 
have pain, but discomfort.143 Here her confusion seems to be whether discomfort counts as 
pain. Similarly, with respect to the question about unbearable pain one respondent replies 
that the pain is only unbearable when she has a backache.144 We might say that it is unclear 
to her if an occasional backache is sufficient to count as unbearable pain in general.
Finally, to the question about taking tablets to help with sleep, one respondent 
answers, ‘I take tablets at night for the cramp and they help me sleep. What do I put 
there?’145 In this case the respondent appears to be unsure what the question is asking her: 
is the question a causal one— does she take tablets because they help her sleep— or is it 
interested in whether she takes them, for whatever reason? In this situation we might say 
that the respondent does not understand the question’s purpose or meaning— why is she 
asked this question; what does the NHP want to know?
According to Donovan et ah
The statements [in the NHP] made people think about aspects of their health, 
but then constrained their responses...The forcing of responses into 
predefined categories negated people’s desires to negotiate the meanings of 
health and illness.146
Earlier they comment that although the yes/no dichotomy of the NHP allows for
straightforward analysis, it ‘does not allow people to express what they really feel’. Thus if
143 Ibid.
144 Tu : a
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respondents are forced to answer simply yes or no their answers may be inaccurate.147 I 
agree with Donovan and her team that categorical scaling constrains responses and I also 
agree that it does not allow respondents to negotiate what, for instance, pain might mean in 
certain contexts. Moreover, to the extent that respondents are typically left to answer these 
questions on their own and researchers analyze these answers on their own the NHP might 
not allow individuals to express what they really feel.
But I disagree with the conclusion that Donovan et al. draw from these difficulties, 
namely that the categorical scaling of the questions is at fault and, moreover, that a solution 
to these problems might just require an adjustment to the scaling options. I suggest that the 
problem in these examples is not solely with the yes/no answers. To be sure, scaling is an 
important aspect of measurement construction, but the primary problem in these cases is 
that respondents are unsure about what various terms or, in some cases, entire questions in 
the NHP mean. Once it is clear how we understand, say, unbearable pain, then the yes/no 
format of the NHP need not be a problem or at least not a major problem.
The more major problem that these examples illustrate is the problem that all 
standardized questions have, namely, confusion over how to understand the questions. To 
this end the respondents’ confusion regarding how they ought to understand the questions 
in the NHP may be instructive: in this context should discomfort count as pain?; should 
occasional pain count as unbearable pain?; is the sleeping pill question a causal question or 
a whether question?
The second difficulty with the NHP is what Donovan and her team refer to as a 
contradictory or arbitrary filling out of the questions. They provide two examples. In the
147 Ibid.
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first case, one respondent replies to the question, ‘I find it hard to bend’ by saying ‘1 do find 
it hard to bend, but I’m not ticking yes there.’ This response is interpreted by Donovan et 
al. as a contradictory answer— in other words, they think the respondent’s answer to the 
question is a lie. This result, they suggest, is due to the pressure that respondents feel to
14kgive socially acceptable responses. But while this respondent’s answer may represent a 
contradiction it does not necessarily do so. To see why not consider Donovan et al.’s 
second example in which they cite the following question and response: ‘Worry is keeping 
me awake at night’; ‘Well yes, but it’s only stupid things. I lie awake thinking. I ’ll put no 
because I’m just being stupid.’149 Unlike the bending example, this respondent explains 
why she has decided to mark ‘no’: yes she worries, but she only worries about stupid things 
because she’s ‘being stupid’.
Although Donovan and her team interpret this second example as yet another 
instance of contradiction we might understand it differently. We might take this respondent 
to understand her worry as different from the sort of worry in which the NHP is interested. 
The worry the respondent experiences is petty and ‘stupid’; the worry in which she 
understands the measure to be interested involves, say, existential doubt and acute torment. 
To be sure, the respondent could be wrong about what the NHP is after, but that is not the 
point. The point is rather that we could paraphrase this respondent’s answer in terms of 
Donovan et a l 's  bending example: ‘I do lie awake worrying at night, but I ’m not ticking 
yes.’ and nonetheless understand it as an appropriate response given a particular 
understanding of what she took the question to mean. In these cases the respondents’
148 Ibid.
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answers are contradictory only if we cannot imagine ways of understanding the questions 
other than our own. Conversely, we might assume that these answers are not contradictory 
and, indeed, we might learn something about quality of life if we try to figure out what 
questions the respondents take themselves to be answering.
The point in trying to imagine different ways of understanding questions is clear in 
the third area that Donovan et al. examine. Here they think respondents misunderstand the 
purpose or meaning of a question and thus respond according to their misunderstanding.
For instance, to the question, ‘I find it hard to reach for things’, one respondent answered, ‘I 
do find it hard to reach for things, yes, because I am short.’150 This question however, was 
not geared to eliciting facts about the respondent’s height; rather it was meant to elicit facts 
about her health. But, nonetheless, given this respondent’s answer we might ask where and 
when height does become a health issue?
Donovan make several important points. For instance, if respondents understand 
questions differently from the researchers who analyze them, then the conclusions of a 
study can suggest morbidity or a certain kind of morbidity that does not actually exist— as 
in the example of the respondent who answered positively to the statement about whether 
she found it hard to reach things. Conversely, a study can also underreport morbidity. For 
example, respondents might mistakenly take ‘unbearable pain’ to mean ‘unbearable pain all 
the time’ and tick no despite having it occasionally. Although I agree with Donovan et al. 
that the validity of the NHP is threatened when these kinds of misunderstandings are 
generalized in the population under study, I disagree over why it is threatened. I suggest 
that these examples do not illustrate instances of bias so much as they illustrate
150 Ibid.
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opportunities where we might learn more about quality of life in the context o f the NHP. 
The validity of the NHP is threatened, however, when we fail to recognize these 
opportunities.
Towards the end of their article Donovan and her team observe that just as the NHP 
replaced the Sickness Impact Profile (SIP) because of its supposed increase in validity, at 
the time of their study the Short Form-36 (SF-36) was beginning to replace the NHP for the 
same reason.151 But Donovan et al. suggest that the assumption of the SF-36’s increase in 
validity over the NHP is unwarranted.152 With this warning in mind I now turn to a study 
published in 2002 by Sara Mallinson entitled, ‘Listening to Respondents: A Qualitative 
Assessment of the Short-Form 36 Health Status Questionnaire’.
B. The Short-Form 36
Like Donovan and her team Mallinson is worried about the validity of the SF-36 in 
spite of its respectable showing according to classical validity testing. Specifically she is 
worried that people do not understand the questions posed to them in the manner that 
researchers anticipated. As a result she worries that their answers are misinterpreted by 
researchers analyzing the data.153 To make her point Mallinson conducted a study of the 
SF-36 with a very similar design to the study done by Donovan et al.
In Mallinson’s project the respondents are all 65 years of age or older and reside in 
the Northwest of England. Moreover, at the time of the interview they had all been recently
151 Ibid, p. 161.
152 Ibid.
153 Mallinson, S. (2002) ‘Listening to respondents: a Qualitative Assessment o f the Short-Form 36 Health 
Status Questionnaire’, in Social Science & Medicine, 54: 11.
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referred to a community physiotherapy or occupational rehabilitation program. All of the 
respondents in the study were asked questions that covered socio-demographic 
characteristics, self-reported health problems and expectations of treatment; they were also 
asked to complete the SF-36 and two global health evaluation questions. Mallinson 
conducted two audio-taped interviews with the respondents as they answered the questions 
from the SF-36 with the aim of better understanding the ways in which the respondents 
interpreted the measure’s questions. One interview was conducted before their 
physiotherapy began and one was conducted six months la ter.154
The SF-36 is a generic quality of life measure with 36 questions scored in eight 
dimensions. It is now the most widely used measure of its kind in the United Kingdom and 
it has been translated into 45 languages for use around the world. Moreover, there is an 
extensive literature that suggests it is one of the most reliable and valid short-form 
measures available.155 For this study Mallinson focuses on the responses from two of the 
eight dimensions: the ‘Physical Functioning Scale’ and ‘General Health Perceptions’.156 In 
the Physical Functioning dimension respondents are asked how their health limits them in a 
variety of everyday activities. They are asked to respond to each question with one of three 
answers: ‘Yes, limited a lot’; ‘Yes, limited a little’; ‘No, not limited at all’. In the General 
Health Perceptions dimension respondents are first asked to assess their general health as 
‘excellent’; ‘very good’; ‘good’; ‘fair’; or ‘poor’. They are then given four statements
154 Ibid, p. 13.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid, p. 14.
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about their general health and asked to rate them on a Likert scale as ‘definitely true’;
157‘mostly true’; ‘not sure’; ‘mostly false’; or ‘definitely false’.
As Mallinson makes clear in the beginning of this paper it is the problem of
understanding meaning— how researchers hope the question is understood and how the
respondents in fact understand it—that drives her research.158 In what follows I will
therefore focus on those findings that make this problem most clear. In the Physical
Functioning dimension Mallinson found what she calls ‘vague questions’. In these cases
when respondents were asked if they could walk half a mile they wanted to know whether
that half mile was up-hill or on the flat; whether it was at a fast or leisurely pace. Consider,
for example, what one respondent had to say:
I can walk down to the garden centre but there’s no way I could get back 
because it’s up-hill, and as soon as I, I can’t walk up that hill so it depends 
which, if you’re talking about on the flat, slowly, not talking or carrying 
anything...I can walk around the shopping precinct and round the 
supermarket because you’re going slowly and you’re stopping and looking 
at things and you’re not talking to anybody.159
We have seen this problem of ‘vague questions’ before in Donovan et a V s study. Recall
the questions about pain in which respondents, although familiar with pain were unsure
what counted as pain in that context. In the SF-36 Mallinson found this problem in
questions not only about walking, but also in questions about lifting and bathing.160
Turning now to the General Health Perceptions dimension the first question
respondents encounter is a question asking them to rate their general health. Mallinson
157 Ibid, p. 14. Likert scales are bipolar scales in which the neutral option is located in the middle and the 
extremes are at either end. See Streiner, D.L. & Norman, G.R. (2003) Health Measurement Scales a Practical 
Guide to their Development and Use, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 36.
158 Ibid, p. 12.
159 Ibid.
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discovered that respondents understood the meaning of health in a myriad of ways and 
attributes these differences to what she calls ‘comparative’ problems.161 For instance, with 
regard to the question, ‘In general would you say your health is: excellent; very good; good; 
fair; poor’, some respondents understood this question as asking ‘would you say your 
health as opposed to others in the population is . .. .’; some respondents understood it as 
asking ‘would you say your health now as opposed to other times in your life is. . and still 
others understood it as asking ‘would you say your health as opposed to others your age
1 f\0is ... ’ Typically, when respondents read questions they must decide for themselves what 
it means. Thus, asking a question like this one is tantamount to asking at least three 
different questions without any idea which one a particular respondent is answering.
Finally, Mallinson looks at problems involving what she calls ‘inclusions and
t z
exclusions’ in conceptualizing health. These problems resemble the problems found in 
some of the examples from Donovan et a l.'s study, namely the examples about bending, 
worrying and reaching things. Recall that in those examples I suggested that respondents’ 
interpretations of questions sometimes lead to surprising and at times confusing answers 
which only begin to make sense given the context of the respondents’ understanding. In 
Mallinson’s example, the SF-36 asks ‘In general how would you say your health is?’ and in 
response one individual answers, ‘My health is good. It’s the spinal atrophy that’s the 
problem’. As Mallinson notes, this man separated his chronic health problem from his 
sense of being a “healthy” person, which is what he thought the surveyor was interested
161 Ibid, p. 18.
162 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
163 Mallinson, S. (2002) ‘Listening to respondents: a qualitative assessment of the Short-Form 36 Health 
Status Questionnaire’, Social Science & Medicine, 54: 19
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in.164 Another way to put this is that he understood the purpose of the question differently
than perhaps the researcher imagined.
A similar problem occurs with another question from the SF-36 which asks
respondents whether they think they get ill more easily than other people. In response to
this question individuals in Mallinson’s study differed in how they interpreted the term
“ill”. For instance, many thought it referred to everyday problems and thus excluded
chronic health problems as the following two responses illustrate: ‘I ’m not bodily ill, its
mobility more than anything isn’t it?’; ‘I don’t think so—-apart from my diabetes and it
doesn’t bother me that, I ’ve got used to it.’165 These answers Mallinson suggests are not
the result of social desirability or denial, but rather logical responses to different
interpretations of the question. Mallinson sums up the problem well:
...they include and exclude problems in different ways and may 
unexpectedly weigh all kinds of information before answering. In effect, 
people are responding from different premises to each other and from the 
surveyor. This inevitably affects respondents’ intentions/meanings in 
selecting a particular response option and makes it difficult for the surveyor 
to interpret their answers.166
In many ways Mallinson’s observations of respondents’ answers to the SF-36 
resemble my interpretation of Donovan et al.’s observations of the NHP. In both cases we 
recognize the inherent difficulty respondents have in understanding what researchers might 
mean with particular terms in the questions. In an interview setting respondents tend to 
ask questions about the questions, but without an interlocutor they are left to guess. As I 
do, Mallinson also emphasize cases where respondents do not understand the purpose of a
question in the same way as the researchers do. In such cases respondents might ask for 
clarification or they might provide answers that at first do not make sense or seem unlikely. 
In these latter instances Mallinson suggests, and I agree, that we need to understand the 
context of the respondents’ answers before we dismiss them.
Unlike Donovan et al. Mallinson is more willingly to take account of the 
respondent’s point of view when judging the accuracy of their answers. Although she is 
worried about the validity of the SF-36 she often characterizes this problem as one where 
researchers misinterpret respondent answers as opposed to Donovan et al. who tend to 
suggest that the problem with validity resides in respondents’ interpretation of the 
measure’s questions. Perhaps as a result of her sensitivity to the way respondents interpret 
questions Mallinson is also more willing to learn from respondents and we might even say 
that she recognizes— as Donovan et al. do not— some of the opportunities that respondents 
present for the improvement of our measures.
But what lessons or opportunities does Mallinson draw from her work with 
respondents and the SF-36? At the end of her article Mallinson concludes that the issue of 
understanding meaning is ‘absolutely central to understanding subjective views’ and that 
without further research into how respondents’ understand survey questions it will be 
difficult to establish the validity of subjective assessment.167 We might say that what 
Mallinson takes from her work on the SF-36 is that our current claims regarding the 
validity of subjective assessments are premature: respondents often understand questions 
differently than researchers imagined they would. Unless we have a better grasp of how 
respondents do understand the questions in our measures we cannot confirm the measures’ 
167 Ibid, p. 20.
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validity— and perhaps when we do better understand this process we will find that our 
understanding of these measures and our expectations regarding their validity will have 
changed. In any case it would appear that we need a better account of how respondents 
interpret questions.168 In the next section I turn to one theoretical attempt within the quality 
of life literature that tries to provide one.
II
Understanding Questions and the Principles of Discourse
In J. Tanur’s book Questions about Questions Herbert Clark & Michael Schober try 
to explain how respondents understand questions in a chapter entitled ‘Asking Questions 
and Influencing Answers’. Their task is to outline some of the ways we typically come to 
understand our interlocutors in normal discourse and to show how the lack of these normal 
conversational cues affects the answers respondents give in standardized measures.
Clark & Schober begin their discussion with the principle of ‘common ground’.169 
Here they discuss how words become meaningful against a shared context; change the 
context and you often change what we understand a word to mean. Making a similar claim, 
Larry Wright asks us to consider the sentence, ‘The cat is on the mat.’ Typically we 
conjure ideas of an animal on a rug. The context that provides this interpretation is perhaps 
a domestic setting. But we can also imagine a different context in which this statement
168 Although it is difficult to know how often the kind o f misunderstanding illustrated in the above studies
occurs, the frequency with which it occurred in these cases indicates that it may happen often enough to affect 
the overall results o f a measure. Certainly the authors o f these studies believe the problem to be widespread 
and significant.
169 Ibid, pp. 17-18.
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might arise—for instance, a construction site. In this new context the sentence above takes
170on a new meaning, namely that a piece of machinery is parked on a blasting mat.
It is the awareness of the common ground that we share with others that allows us to 
use ambiguous language unconsciously, but with meanings we expect our interlocutors to 
grasp. Perhaps this is most obvious in the frequent use of indexicals like “here” and “now”. 
Common ground, Clark & Schober write, ‘...is essential in interpreting everything people 
say’.171 In some of the examples of questions and answers from the previous section we 
can see the consequences of an absence of common ground. For instance, when 
respondents were unsure about the context of a question they often registered confusion 
over what a term in the question meant. Is unbearable pain constant pain or occasional 
pain? Is the mile uphill or on the flat?
Clark & Schober associate two further principles with common ground: the 
‘accumulation of common ground’ and ‘grounding’.172 As Clark & Schober suggest some 
kind of common ground is necessary for every conversation, but as a conversation 
progresses conversation partners typically accumulate more common ground through what 
Clark & Schober call the process of grounding. Grounding occurs as we assure one another 
that we understand what has been said. For instance, a speaker is encouraged that she has 
been understood when her interlocutor nods her head, displays positive facial expressions,
170 Wright, L. (2001) Critical Thinking an Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 5.
171 Clark, H. H. & Schober, M. F. (1992) ‘Asking questions and influencing answers’, in J. M. Tanur (ed.) 
Questions about questions: Inquiries into the cognitive bases o f  surveys, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
p. 18. This is the case not only where “common ground” leads us to unconsciously expect that our meaning is 
understood, but also in cases where we recognize that a “common ground” is missing. This recognition often 
explains what may seem to others who share our “common ground” as unnecessary or lengthy description.
172 Ibid, pp. 19-20 &24-5.
109
17^paraphrases what was said or shows her understanding in what she says next. Insofar as 
interlocutors understand one another they establish new common ground— an 
inter subjective ground
Because standardized measures lack the mechanisms interlocutors use to ground 
new information respondents must make assumptions about the meaning of the questions in 
the measure without the give and take of normal conversation. Clark & Schober write that 
respondents assume that the researcher chose her wording so that the meaning would be 
obvious and as a result respondents impute whatever understanding seems right to them.174 
Respondents, however, can differ from one another and from researchers in their 
understanding of questions. Such a difference was illustrated nicely in the example from 
earlier when the respondent understood, ‘I find it hard to reach things’ as ‘I find it hard to 
reach things with respect to my height’. In everyday dialogue the respondent’s answer 
‘yes, because I am short’ would have been met with a clarification perhaps something like, 
‘No, I meant do you find it even harder to reach things after your by-pass surgery’.
In addition to clarifying questions for respondents the process of grounding might 
also illuminate areas of ambiguity or vagueness in places that the researcher did not 
anticipate. For instance, recall that in the SF-36 Mallinson finds that the question on 
general health gives rise to at least three different interpretations depending on the contrast 
respondents use to understand it. It may be the case that the measure’s developers did not 
recognize the ambiguity of “health” in this question. Nonetheless, the respondents’ 
different understandings of “health” might not only fruitfully help to bring this ambiguity to
173 Ibid, p. 25.
174 Ibid, p. 23.
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light, but also help researchers learn new ways of understanding health. Particularly 
suggestive in this regard, is the respondent’s answer, ‘My health is good. It’s the spinal 
atrophy that’s the problem’.
In normal conversation different contexts or points of view can enrich a discussion. 
These differences are capable of enhancing a conversation in part because the process of 
grounding helps to prevent interlocutors from talking at cross-purposes. When individuals 
are at cross-purposes they misunderstand each other because the aim or motivation of their 
respective discourse is opaque to their interlocutor(s). To be sure, even the most careful 
and well grounded of discussions are subject to what we might call the problem of purpose. 
Nonetheless, this problem is exacerbated when individuals are not able to confirm their 
understanding with a nod or a paraphrase; when they are left to understand and then answer 
questions on their own and others determine the meaning of these answers on their own. In 
fact I suggest that the problem of purpose is the general difficulty with the NHP and the SF- 
36’s validity: both researchers and respondents are at cross-purposes in their understanding 
of the questions and answers in the measures.
We might say that in normal conversation the process of grounding helps us to 
avoid the difficulties associated with cross-purposes by aiding in the establishment of a 
common purpose. Indeed in their attempt to make more precise what is involved in their 
understanding of common ground Clark and Schober stress the importance of a ‘common 
purpose’.175 They maintain that common purposes are important to understanding because 
purposes shape the direction of a conversation as well as what people mean by what they
175 Clark, H. H. & Schober, M. F. (1992) ‘Asking questions and influencing answers’, in J. M. Tanur (ed.) 
Questions about questions: Inquiries into the cognitive bases o f surveys, New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
p. 22.
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say. Clark & Schober write that the evidence suggests that common purpose is essential in
17figuring out a speaker’s meaning. We might say that without understanding the purpose 
of a statement or a question an individual cannot understand what a speaker means. If this 
is the case, then the general task for respondents to is to determine the purpose of the 
questions in our measures.
To make clearer what exactly is involved in the idea of common purpose, recall 
W right’s example: ‘The cat is on the mat.’ Here, as I discussed earlier, the context helps to 
determine whether the sentence refers to an animal or a machine or something else. But the 
context should also give us insight into the aim someone has in uttering this sentence— 
otherwise the sentence is still ambiguous. For example, if you’re in the kitchen and your 
partner walks in and suddenly says ‘the cat is on the mat’ you may know that he’s referring 
to your pet Cooper, but you may not understand the point of what he’s saying. Was he 
looking for the cat? Is the mat off-limits and he is expressing frustration? Is his statement 
code for, ‘now’s a good time to give Cooper his meds’?
Wright puts the importance of purpose a bit differently than Clark & Schober when 
he writes that, ‘. . .the main thing a context supplies to help us understand each other is 
motivation' } ni Moreover, Wright suggests that we understand the motivation or purpose of 
a conversation when we understand the question to which the discussion is the answer.m  
Thus we understand the significance of ‘the cat is on the mat’ when we understand it as the 
answer to one of the following questions: ‘Where is the cat?’; ‘What is Cooper doing?’;
176 Ibid, p. 22.
177 Wright, L. (2001) Critical Thinking an Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 142.
178 Ibid. Although here Wright is specifically referring to how we understand the motivation o f an argument, 
the idea applies generally. For a discussion o f its more general application see, Gadamer, H. (2003) [1975] 
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‘When should we give him his meds? Depending orn the implicit question posed your 
reaction will be different. If Cooper was lost and now  he’s been found, you might express 
relief; if he’s lying on your Persian rug, you might run off with the squirt bottle; or if he’s 
half asleep and now is a good time for the meds, you might take them from the kitchen 
counter and walk to the mat.
But Wright’s suggestion that we understand motivation when we understand the 
question to which a sentence or discussion is the answer is misleading if we then think that 
the question which articulates the motivation (Where is the cat? What is Cooper doing? 
Should we give him his meds?) can stand alone; that we can understand this question 
without further contextual support. We need look no further than one of the examples from 
Donovan et a l 's study to see that this is not the case. Recall the example in which the 
woman is unsure whether the question about taking tablets to sleep is interested in why she 
takes the tablets or simply whether she takes them. Ira this example and others like it the 
yes/no answers are not made clear even in light of their respective questions. For these 
answers to make sense I suggested earlier that respondents need to better understand the 
question itself. If we apply Wright’s question/answer structure to this example, then in 
order to understand what the yes/no answers signify the respondent needs to understand the 
question about taking tablets to sleep as the answer to a further question. But what might 
this question be?
The idea that we understand the purpose of individual questions only when we 
understand these questions as answers to another question follows the cascading design of 
standardized measures nicely. Recall from Chapter 1 that we begin the construction of 
standardized measures with an idea o f what we want to  measure—the research construct.
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For instance, say we want to measure depression and its relation to quality of life. This 
construct represents the broad question that the measure aims to answer: ‘What is the 
quality of life of those suffering from depression?’ In order to design a measure that will 
answer this question researchers generally use factor analysis or some other method to 
determine the relevant dimensions of a construct. For example, in the case of quality of life 
and depression we might find that social and emotional functioning are two of the relevant 
dimensions. Each one of these dimensions is then broken down into further questions 
which are then posed to respondents, for example the question from earlier about taking 
tablets to sleep
I suggest that it is the question that the research construct implies that provides the 
purpose with respect to which the individual questions in a measure ought to be understood. 
If understanding a question’s purpose is essential to understanding questions and validity 
requires that researchers and respondents understand these questions in the same way, then 
we—researchers and respondents— need to understand the research construct and we need 
to understand it in the same way.
To be sure, recognizing the point of a question is something we do often and do 
with ease. But standardized health assessments present at least two obstacles which make 
the recognition of a question’s purpose more difficult. First the quality of life literature 
acknowledges that constructs such as quality of life and well-being are contentious and 
difficult to define.179 Hence, not only may researchers and respondents not share a 
common ground; they may also have trouble establishing one. Second, as I discussed in the
179 Mallinson, S. (2002) ‘Listening to respondents: a qualitative assessment o f the Short-Form 36 Health 
Status Questionnaire’, Social Science & Medicine, 54: 18.
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introduction of this chapter, measurement developers sometimes try to hide or neutralize
the purpose of their questions in order to deal with the confounding that comes from social
norms. Hence, researchers may not want respondents to connect, for instance, the question
of disturbances in sleep to the possibility of depression in part because they wish to assess
psychotic disturbance. Moreover, sometimes researchers conceal the purpose of a question
because they want to use the data from one measure for purposes other than those for which
it was designed. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Audit of Nasal Polyposis
and Rhinosinusitis was originally designed to distinguish between the levels of
performance among different hospitals, but once the data was collected it was also used for
prognostic modeling.180
Thus it is sometimes the case that researchers have good reasons to discourage
respondents from making the connection between a particular question and its relation to
the measure’s construct. But if Clark & Schober are right and understanding the purpose of
a question is essential to understanding its meaning and if understanding meaning is
essential to validity, then we need to find a way to overcome these difficulties.
Clark & Schober end their discussion with the following remark,
To understand surveys and the data they produce, we must see survey 
interviews as a type of discourse...Only then will we resolve many of the 
puzzles of survey design.181
But Clark & Schober do not tell us how understanding the content of a measure as a type of
discourse will lead us to these resolutions. In their discussion they are clear that the
180 Personnel correspondence with John Browne, 28 November 2005.
181 Clark, H. H. & Schober, M. F. (1992) ‘Asking questions and influencing answers’, in J. M. Tanur (ed.) 
Questions about questions: Inquiries into the cognitive bases o f  surveys, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
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principles people use in ordinary language do not get left behind when answering the 
questions in a quality of life measure and they illustrate how an understanding of these 
principles can lead us to explain and in some cases predict the kinds of respondent bias that 
typically plague researchers. Still they do not tell us how this knowledge should help us to 
improve our measures.
Toward the end of this chapter I will begin to suggest my own way of thinking 
about how we might best understand the outcomes data from quality of life measures. But 
in order to help make a case for it I now turn to develop further one of the obstacles we face 
when we attempt to understand questions in our measures: the contentious nature of quality 
of life constructs. In this next section I look at a recent quality of life study on cataract 
patients to highlight one of the consequences that a contentious research construct has for 
the validity of quality of life measures.
Ill
VF-14 an d  the P roblem  o f  P urpose
In the June 2005 issue of the Canadian Journal o f  Ophthalmology Lome Bellan 
attempts to answer the following question, ‘Why are patients with no visual symptoms on 
cataract waiting lists?’ This question is motivated by a case in Winnipeg, Canada where 
30% of patients placed on waiting lists for cataract surgery had a score on the Visual 
Function Index (VF-14) of 9 lo r more out of 100. A score of 100 on the VF-14 indicates no 
visual complaints. Moreover, there are multiple studies that indicate that measures of 
functional impairment are the best indicators of the degree of impairment and the potential
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gain from surgery. But if the VF-14 is a powerful indicator of impairment and potential 
gain from surgery, then why do 30% of the patients placed on cataract waiting lists in 
Winnipeg have scores from this measure which indicate that they do not need the
183surgery? This is the question that the Winnipeg media posed to tax payers and Bellan’s
I 84study tried to provide an answer to their question.
The VF-14 is required of all individuals scheduled to undergo cataract surgery in 
Winnipeg. It comprises a series of questions asking respondents about the degree o f 
difficulty they have performing common visual tasks such as watching TV or driving a car. 
Respondents answer the questions on a continuous scale with four responses ranging from 
no difficulty to unable to perform. Between January and May 2002 prospective cataract 
patients who completed the VF-14 and whose scores reported no functional impairment 
were asked to participate in Bellan’s study. 149 individuals agreed and were then asked 
three questions: 1) Are there any other problems with your vision that you are experiencing 
that I haven’t asked you about?; 2) Please tell me the reason, as you understand it, why you 
have been scheduled to have cataract surgery?; 3) What activities do you think will be 
easier for you after your surgery? Of the 149 patients, 108 were having surgery because of 
symptoms not specified on the questionnaire, 28 were doing it purely based on the doctor’s
I Of
advice and 13 were asymptomatic.
In January 2003 the same patients were contacted again to assess their satisfaction 
with their surgery. They were asked four questions: 1) How satisfied were they with their
182 Bellan, L. (2005) ‘Why are patients with no visual symptoms on cataract waiting lists?’, Canadian Journal 
o f  Ophthalmology, 40: 434.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid, p. 434.
185 Ibid, pp. 434-5.
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vision in the eye that had undergone surgery? 2) Had they found that their vision had been 
more impaired than they thought before surgery? 3) Did they feel that their vision had 
improved after cataract surgery?; 4) Would they be willing to repeat this type of surgery 
again?186 Out of the 149 original participants 105 had completed their surgery at the time 
o f this second round of questions. Of these 105 participants 85% were very or extremely 
satisfied with their surgery; 75% felt that their vision had markedly improved; and 94% 
were willing to repeat the procedure. Only 9% reported being unsatisfied or said their 
vision had not improved or that they would not repeat the surgery.187
Bellan concludes from these results that most of the patients who had no functional 
impairment according to the VF-14 did in fact have a large enough a degree o f impairment 
that surgical correction created significant benefit. Thus the VF-14— a measure of 
subjective assessment— underreports morbidity; we might say that the VF-14 gives us false 
negatives when it comes to determining an individual’s need for cataract surgery. In fact 
Bellan concludes that, ‘the VF-14 cannot reliably and accurately identify all patients who 
are likely to benefit from cataract surgery’.188
But notably he goes on to say that this conclusion regarding the VF-14’s deficiency 
with respect to cataract surgery is consistent with the findings of the original study in which 
the VF-14 was developed and validated: no one ever suggested that the VF-14 should be 
the only measure used to determine the need for cataract surgery.189 Thus, the VF-14's 
inability to identify all patients in Winnipeg likely to benefit from cataract surgery is not
186 Ibid, p. 435.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid, p. 437.
189 tu:^ i
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evidence of its invalidity. Rather the measure underreports morbidity because it was not 
designed to arbitrate in these kinds of situations. In this example we see another way in 
which quality of life measures can provide invalid results, namely when the measure is 
applied to the wrong context. The problem in the Winnipeg case is not with the VF-14 
itself, but with the decision to use it to determine benefit from cataract surgery.
Bellan, however, does more than suggest that the sole use of the VF-14 in the 
Winnipeg study was inappropriate. In addition, he suggests that anyone familiar with the 
original design of the VF-14 should have known in advance of the media story that the VF- 
14 would not accurately discriminate among cataract patients. But how could they have 
known? Before Bellan’s study we did not know that this cohort’s disease state would 
significantly affect our assessment of functional impairment. I suggest that the contentious 
and difficult nature of quality of life constructs stems not only from disagreement about 
what a particular construct entails— does a good quality of life entail certain biological 
prerequisites? — but also from the fact that before we apply them to a particular situation 
these constructs are inherently vague.
Here we might draw an analogy between quality of life constructs and moral 
concepts such as courage. Such moral notions are traditionally difficult to define in part 
because the actions that constitute instances of courage differ depending on the practical 
situation in which one finds oneself: sometimes the measure of one’s courage involves 
standing and fighting; sometimes it involves walking away. Indeed, we might say that the 
more ways we learn to measure courage correctly the more nuanced and sophisticated our 
understanding of it becomes. But, we cannot always determine in advance the features o f a
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situation that might affect that measure; it is only in a concrete context that “courage” takes 
on a definite meaning and only through multiple measures that its meaning is refined.
Likewise, we understand what constitutes quality of life constructs differently 
depending on the concrete situation to which they are applied. ‘Functional impairment’ 
like ‘quality of life’ and courage is a multidimensional construct. Moreover, we learn more 
about it by learning to measure it in different ways. The proliferation of disease and culture 
specific measures in the quality of life literature attests to some of the different ways we 
have learned to understand some of these constructs.
In deciding to use the VF-14 in the Winnipeg study a charitable interpretation 
would suggest that the best evidence at the time of the design suggested that as a measure 
of functional impairment the VF-14 was the best indicator of impairment and gain from 
cataract surgery. It was not unreasonable to suspect that it might be able to discriminate 
among those who would or would not benefit from cataract surgery. But in the course of its 
use and through Bellan's research some of the limitations of the VF-14 as a measure of 
functional impairment crystallized. Although these precise limitations are consistent with 
the developmental study of the VF-14 they were not prescribed by it. On this interpretation 
the study designers had no way of knowing in advance that the VF-14 would overlook 30% 
of the people with visual symptoms. They may have had reason to be cautious since they 
were using it in a slightly different context than it had been used before, but it seems that 
they were cautious in that the 30% of people who did not show any impairment in terms of 
the VF-14 still received surgery.
I suggest that what we ought to take from the study on the VF-14 is not that 
researchers made an obvious mistake in applying it to the Winnipeg situation, but that in
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applying it to this context not only did they learn more about the limitations of the VF-14, 
they also learned more about the features of functional impairment; put differently, they 
made our understanding of the construct more determinate. The vague nature of quality of 
life constructs suggests that we can always learn more about these constructs and we learn 
more about them by applying them to new situations. This is essentially the lesson of 
construct validity— a construct is never valid; we can always be surprised; we can always 
learn more about it and we leam more by applying or testing it in new contexts.
IV
Q uality o f  L ife M easu res an d  the H erm eneutic C ircle
The vague character of the research question or construct may not be particularly 
surprising. Much of the quality of life literature acknowledges the contentious and difficult 
nature of the constructs and the literature on construct validity appears to appreciate at least 
some of these difficulties. However, what is surprising is the notion that the questions in 
standardized measures of quality of life become clearer as we break them down into smaller 
chunks. In other words, even if it is not clear what functional impairment means, the 
questions in various dimensions of functional impairment are supposed to be clear. But as 
I discussed earlier an important aspect of understanding a question is our understanding of 
its purpose. When a question’s purpose is as contentious and vague as the constructs of 
quality of life, health and functional impairment then we cannot expect a measure’s 
questions to be completely clear— and by clear I mean we cannot expect everyone to
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understand them the same way and we cannot assume that alternative understandings of 
these questions are inaccurate.
We are now in a position to see that the validation of quality of life measures faces a 
challenge in regard to the understanding of their questions— a challenge with the structure 
of a circle. For as I have developed the problem, in order to provide valid information in a 
quality of life measure respondents and researchers must understand the questions in the 
same way, but to understand these questions we need to understand their purpose. I have 
suggested that the purpose of these questions is given by the research construct (functional 
impairment), and I argued that the research construct is understood only insofar as the 
measure (VF-14) is applied to various contexts— insofar as respondents in different 
contexts complete the measure and provide important information.
The question facing quality of life researchers regarding the validity of these 
measures is not only how we can ensure that everyone involved understands the questions 
in the same way— how we can avoid being at cross-purposes— but also how we should best 
understand these questions; how should we best understand their purpose? Put differently, 
What is quality of life?; What is functional impairment?
I suggest that the resolution of this dilemma first requires that we reconceptualize 
our measures. To this end I propose that we adopt one solution to the hermeneutic circle 
found within studies of textual analysis and apply it to quality of life research. This 
solution situates a text or text-analogue— in this case a measure— within a dialogic 
framework. Although I will discuss this framework at more length in the next chapter, in a 
dialogic framework a text is understood as a partner in a dialogue regarding how we ought 
to understand the text’s subject matter— in this case the subject matter is whatever construct
122
the measure is supposed to assess. In a dialogic context a text or in our case a particular 
kind of measure can be one of many partners in the dialogue regarding the subject matter. 
These partners can include other studies on quality of life as well as the researchers who 
analyze measurement outcomes. Different measures as well as different researchers 
illuminate different aspects of a construct and thus enhance our understanding of it. A 
dialogic framework aids in the validity of our measures because by better understanding a 
measure’s construct we in turn better understand the meaning of the questions and 
respondent answers in our measure.
Within a dialogic framework quantitative measures of quality of life are understood 
to provide information which contributes to our questions about, and our understanding of 
quality of life; they are not understood to provide unambiguous answers to questions about 
quality of life. One of the consequences of understanding quality of life measures within 
this larger context is that we can take other sources of information, for instance the studies I 
discussed by Donovan et al. and Mallinson, not as evidence that our quantitative quality of 
life measures are invalid and thus in need of methodological improvement, but as 
contributions to our continued understanding of the questions and answers in a measure and 
thus quality of life itself. Moreover, we can understand Bellan’s study of the VF-14 not as 
an anomalous exercise, which was required in order to defend spending on healthcare. But 
rather we can understand it as part of the essential dialogue needed in order to better 
understand our measures and thus the meaning of our constructs.
As with any progressive research agenda the results of a dialogue between a variety 
of studies and researchers should be incorporated into future research in quantitative 
measurement. For instance, certain questions within a measure may be expanded to include
123
a contrast class; other questions may be eliminated or redirected. Moreover, we may 
understand these revisions as improvements on the validity of the measures. But it is 
important to recognize that given the circle which the validation of quality of life measures 
presents a measure’s outcomes can never be properly understood outside the dialogic 
framework. The changes we make to the questions in a measure and our increasingly 
enhanced understanding of a particular construct are not steps towards an independent 
measure, but rather part of a better and always evolving understanding o f quality of life. 
This recognition means that although we may improve on the validity of our measures the 
process of validation is dynamic.
Furthermore, the fact that the validation of quality of life measures involves a circle 
means that construct validity is unable to judge the accuracy of our measures. As I 
discussed earlier claims of construct validity presuppose that respondents and researchers 
understand a measure’s questions and answers in the same way. Not only do respondents 
and researchers often not understand the questions and answers in the same way, but 
researchers cannot be sure how best to understand these questions or their constructs until 
respondents answer questions about a construct. This indeterminacy of our questions is 
also a problem for construct validity. For if we rely on construct validity in spite of our 
inability to determine the meaning of questions in advance, then answers which appear to 
bias a measure may in fact be the result of alternatively interpreted questions which shed 
light on our understanding of the construct; answers which appear to confirm our 
hypotheses may, however, be the result of questions understood in such a way as to 
undermine our them.
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Toward the end of the next chapter I explore further how a dialogic context can aid 
in the improvement of the validity of our measures and thus how we might evaluate 
different understandings of the questions and answers in a measure. To do this I turn to 
some of the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. But before my discussion of Gadamer’s 
contribution I will situate some of my concerns regarding quality of life research within 
well-known debates in the philosophy of science and social science. To this end I consider 
Bas van Frassen’s work on the pragmatics of explanation with a specific interest in his 
work on questions. Here I will defend van Fraassen against criticisms by Wesley Salmon 
& Phillip Kitcher in order to maintain and broaden one of my arguments in this chapter, 
namely that we should not attempt to limit in advance the questions we take to be 
legitimate.
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Chapter 4
An Argument in Favor o f a Dialogic Framework
Introduction
In the last three chapters I looked at how different understandings of questions and 
answers can affect the validity of quality of life measures. One of my questions has been 
how should we best understand the outcomes data from standardized quality of life 
measures? This question about outcomes has in turn led me to question our understanding 
of quality of life itself. Does the inability to communicate orally preclude good quality of 
life?; Do all unexpected interpretations of questions result in inaccurate answers? At the 
end of Chapter 3 I suggested that our quality of life measures are best understood in terms 
of a dialogic framework.
My suggestion that we understand quality of life measures as part of a dialogic 
framework is the result of my conclusion that the structure of these measures constitutes a 
circle: to understand the questions in a measure we must understand the measure’s 
construct, to understand the construct we must complete the questions in the measure. My 
point here is that quality of life researchers do not know in advance of asking their 
questions how best to understand them. But even if we do not know in advance how best to 
understand the questions and answers in a measure we are not without any orientation for if 
we situate our measures within a dialogic framework we can use information from other 
studies to begin to understand them.
Nonetheless, if we do not know in advance how to understand the questions and 
answers in a measure how can we evaluate different understandings of these questions and
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answers and remain critical of possible misunderstandings—both misunderstandings on 
behalf of respondents and on behalf of researchers? In this chapter I will discuss some of 
the opportunities that a dialogic approach offers for critical evaluation, but first I turn to the 
philosophical literature regarding what is involved in asking and understanding questions. I 
look at this literature so that we might better grasp some of the limitations all questions 
encounter, namely we cannot determine in advance the questions that will prove fruitful to 
an inquiry as opposed to those that will not; quality of life researchers are not alone in their 
inability to know in advance how to best understand their questions.
I begin my discussion of this literature with a defense of Bas van Fraassen’s theory 
of pragmatic explanation. I begin here not because I am necessarily interested in 
explanation, but because van Fraassen thinks that explanations are answers to why- 
questions and he thus develops a theory of questions, which is meant to help us recognize 
good explanations. In examining van Fraassen’s work I am not as interested in why- 
questions per se as I am in the lessons we can draw from them about questions and answers 
generally.190 My defense of van Fraassen will focus on his position that we cannot put 
limits on a question’s relevance relation— we cannot limit in advance the kinds of questions 
we might legitimately ask— and on Wesley Salmon & Philip Kitcher’s criticism of this 
position. Salmon & Kitcher are worried that without a priori limits on questions we are in 
danger o f adulterating our scientific knowledge with bad questions and thus misleading 
answers. I will argue, however, that in limiting the questions we ask we unduly limit what
190 Van Fraassen says that ‘why-questions introduce genuinely new elements into the theory of questions’ and 
also that some o f these elements are peculiar to why-questions. I will suggest that although some these 
elements may have been new to the theory o f questions they are not necessarily peculiar to why-questions.
For van Fraassen on the unique character of why-questions see van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, 
Clarendon Press: Oxford, pp. 141-6 & 151-3.
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we can discover and, moreover, that such limits are unnecessary. To make this latter 
argument I turn to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer.
At first van Fraassen and Gadamer may seem like an odd choice of interlocutors to 
help me make my point about the dialogic nature of quality of life, coming as they do from 
two different philosophical traditions. But what they share is an almost unique interest in 
questions; for with only a few exceptions the art of questioning has generally been ignored 
in philosophy in favor of what comes after: its answer. Moreover, although their points of 
departure are somewhat different both van Fraassen and Gadamer are interested in the 
contextual factors that allow certain questions to arise. Furthermore, both are at pains to 
illuminate these contextual factors and this process of illumination takes up much of their 
theoretical work in this area.
To be sure there are differences between these philosophers. For instance, in 
Gadamer’s work on questions the process of illuminating contextual factors or as he calls it 
giving “them full play”191 is primarily progressive— to evaluate the contextual factors 
which contribute towards our understanding— but for van Fraassen the process of 
illumination is mainly conservative. He is interested in contextual factors only because 
they determine the particular meaning of a question or as he puts it ‘which question a 
particular interrogative expresses’.192 Despite this difference, however, both agree that the 
context of a question is central to the meaning of the question and that we cannot put a 
priori restraints on that context in order to limit what questions we might legitimately ask.
191 Gadamer, H. (2003) (2nd ed) Truth and Method, trans Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, 
Continuum Press: NY, p. 299.
192 Van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 141.
128
Nevertheless, when designing their measures quality of life researchers do try to 
limit the questions we ask respondents. For quality of life researchers aim to create 
questions which are open— they allow for genuinely new information—but foreclose 
possibilities not relevant to the measure’s purpose— they discount information that comes 
from misunderstanding or other forms of bias. As we will see Salmon & Kitcher have a 
similar aim. On the one hand, they want to keep scientific questions sufficiently open so as 
to allow for new or unpredictable information. On the other hand, they want to foreclose 
the possibility of questions and answers antithetical to science. Their solution is to demand 
a priori limitations on van Fraassen’s relevance relation, or as I will suggest, a priori 
limitations on the purposes to which different questions can legitimately aim. I will argue, 
however, that this ambition is not only unnecessary to maintain the integrity of our 
questions, but it is also damaging to their integrity. Thus I suggest we have reason to 
rethink not only our conceptualization of quality of life research, but also what it is we do 
when we ask questions.
I
B as van F raassen  on U nderstanding Q uestions
A. Introduction
In chapter 5 of The Scientific Image van Fraassen explores what he calls ‘The 
Pragmatics of Explanation’. In what follows I want to look at the three contextual factors 
which he identifies as seminal to our understanding of why-questions: the topic, the
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contrast class and the relevance relation.193 In this section I will suggest a particular 
reading of the relationship among these contextual factors, viz. one which emphasizes the 
dependency of the topic on the contrast class and relevance relation for its meaning or, put 
differently, our understanding of it. I refer to this as a diachronic reading of van Fraassen’s 
contextual factors as opposed to a synchronic reading which would take our understanding 
of the topic to be independent of the contrast class and relevance relation.194 The 
significance of this reading is to emphasize just how dependent a question’s meaning is on 
the context in which it arises, as well as to make clearer a limitation in van Fraassen’s 
ability to evaluate questions.
For van Fraassen, if we want to understand the relationship between A and B that 
makes B an explanation of A, we need to take seriously the subordinating conjunction: A 
because B .195 For some time most philosophers have recognized that the explanatory 
‘because’ points to some nodes in the causal net rather than others and, moreover, those to 
which it directs our attention vary with the context of inquiry.196 Nonetheless, many 
attempts to clarify the explanatory relation between A and B have tried to develop a priori, 
context independent criteria that connect B to A. But for van Fraassen taking the 
subordinating conjunction seriously means recognizing that ‘because B ’ cannot be 
determined independently of the context ‘Why A?’ As a result he insists that we think of
l9J Ibid, pp. 141-3.
1941 would like the thank Josh Rush for helping me to name this distinction.
195 Wright, L. work in progress
196 Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 115.
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explanations as answers to why-questions.197 This means that the explanatory force of 
‘because B ’ is relative to its status as an answer to the question ‘Why A T
After my discussion in the previous chapter it should not be surprising that 
evaluating ‘because B ’ as an answer to ‘Why A T  requires that we understand just what 
question ‘Why A T  expresses. In fact it is the difficulty in determining just what question 
‘Why A ?’ expresses that leads van Fraassen to turn to the erotetic literature in search of a 
theory of questions. As Larry Wright notes, perhaps the most significant result of this 
endeavor is van Fraassen’s utilization of the role contextual factors— the topic; the contrast 
class; the relevance relation— play in both the asking and the understanding of questions.198 
In van Fraassen’s analysis these factors have three main roles to play in the determination 
of why-questions and I will discuss each in turn.
B. Contextual Factors: The Topic
The first point to notice is that when we ask a why-question we presuppose that the 
topic of the question is true.199 The topic of a question is a proposition which states that for 
which an answer is sought. For example, the question, ‘Why do cochlear implants improve 
quality of life?’ implies that cochlear implants do indeed improve quality of life. If they do 
not, then the appropriate response is to reject the question rather than answer it.200 For van 
Fraassen a question’s topic is true when the accepted background theory and factual
9ft 1information against which the question is asked implies that it is true. Thus depending
197 Ibid, p. 134.
198 Wright, L. work in progress
199 Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 143.
200 Ibid, p. 127.
201 Ibid p. 145.
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on the accepted background theory and factual information the same topic may, in one 
instance, be true and in another be false.
But despite, or perhaps because of the contextual sensitivity of van Fraassen’s view 
coming to an agreement on the truth or falsity of a question’s topic is not always 
straightforward— even when individuals share a common theoretical orientation and the 
same factual information. For example, say that a psychologist rejects the question ‘Why 
do cochlear implants improve quality of life?’ in the context of a guidelines development 
group designed to determine the conditions under which cochlear implants should be 
recommended. Cochlear implants, she argues, do not improve quality of life because they 
do not make it easier to learn; they do not make it easier to learn because the standardized 
test scores of those receiving cochlear implants are about the same as those not receiving 
them. Nonetheless, imagine that this question was first posed because the speaker— 
another psychologist from the same group— implicitly assumed that an improvement in 
learning should be measured in terms of self-reports and according to those results 
recipients indicated an easier time learning. The issue in these two interpretations is what 
counts as or measures an improvement in quality of life qua learning: test scores or self- 
reports?
In cases like the one above where the truth of the topic is at issue how do we decide 
which interpretation is the appropriate one? Van Fraassen is reticent about this particular 
matter and he chooses examples in which the truth or falsity of the topic is relatively 
uncontested. For instance, one of his examples is the question, ‘Why did the conductor 
become warped during the short circuit?’ He says that this question arises only if the 
conductor did indeed become warped during the short circuit; if it did not, then we would
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say that the speaker was under a false impression.202 Van Fraassen seems to assume in this 
example and others like it, that the appropriate understanding of the question’s topic is not 
an issue; that what counts as ‘warping’ and ‘short circuit’ is already sufficiently settled— at 
least for those asking and answering the question. This would seem to imply a 
conversational situation in which discussants already acknowledge the conditions that make 
the topic true. This observation leads Salmon & Kitcher to remark that van Fraassen 
assumes that interlocutors operate within “ ...a  common context with a common body of 
background knowledge...”203
But it is sometimes the case that although interlocutors operate within a common 
context and a common body of background knowledge they still may disagree about the 
appropriate understanding of a question’s topic. When this happens disputes can occur not 
only over whether the topic is or is not true, but also over different understandings that 
make the topic true. In cases of dispute it is unclear on van Fraassen’s account what 
decides the matter. We will have reason to come back to this difficulty later, for now I turn 
to van Fraassen’s second contextual presupposition: the contrast class.
C. Contextual Factors: The Contrast Class
For van Fraassen a contrast class is a set of contrasting propositions which includes 
the topic of the question where only the topic is true.204 For example, we might ask, ‘Why 
did the conductor become warped as opposed to melting during the short circuit?’ The 
contrast class would include: the conductor became warped during the short circuit; the
202 Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, pp. 126-7
203 Salmon, W. & Kitcher P. (1987) ‘Van Fraassen on Explanation’, in The Journal o f Philosophy, 87: 318.
204 Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 145.
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conductor melted during the short circuit. According to van Fraassen all why-questions 
require an implicit contrast and thus the underlying structure of why-questions is: Why (is 
it the case that) P in contrast to (other members of) X?205 Van Fraassen refers to the 
contrast class as the central presupposition of a why-question.206 Moreover, he says that the 
background theory and factual information of the context must imply the central
907presupposition if why-questions are to properly arise. Put differently, for van Fraassen a 
why-question arises only if the context implies that the topic is true and the contrast(s) is 
false.
But as Charles Cross has argued in his ‘Explanation and the Theory of Questions’ 
not all properly arising why-questions presuppose that their topic is the only true member 
of the contrast class. In fact some why-questions both arise and presuppose that their 
contrast class contains only true propositions.208 Cross provides the following example, ‘I 
know why chemicals A, B, and C dissolve the cell walls of amoebae, but why does 
chemical D  do that?’ 209 Presumably the members of the contrast class for this question are: 
A, B and C dissolve the cell walls of amoebae; D dissolves the cell walls of amoebae. But 
unlike the example of the conductor none of the members of this contrast class are false. In 
light of Cross’ argument, I will assume that a why-question properly arises just as long as 
its topic is true regardless of the truth-values of the other members of the contrast class.
When we ask questions we generally do so because there is a particular gap in our 
understanding. Following Larry W right’s work on van Fraassen we can say that it is the
205 Ibid, p. 127.
206 Ibid, p. 145.
207 Ibid.
208 See Cross, C.B (1991) ‘Explanation and the Theory o f Questions’, Erkenntnis, 34:253.
209 Ibid.
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job of the contrast class to locate wherein that gap lies. It does this by directing our
910attention to the relevant class of items from which the topic of the question departs.
Notice that this way of understanding the relationship between the topic of the question and 
other members of the contrast class avoids over-generalizations regarding the truth values 
of members of the contrast class with respect to the topic and instead focuses our attention 
on the particular way the topic differs from the other members of the contrast class; here the 
notion of the contrast class is primarily comparative. Notice also that this understanding of 
a contrast class is not limited to why-questions, but applies to all questions: we begin to 
locate just where the gap in our understanding lies when we understand with what the topic 
is contrasted.211 Put a bit differently we can say that the contrast class helps to locate the 
gap in our understanding by narrowing down what Wright calls the ‘infinitude of 
relevance’.212 This is the infinitude of potentially relevant answers one could give to any 
particular question depending on how we vary the contrast class.
To see how a contrast class limits the infinitude of relevance consider again the 
example from earlier, ‘Why do cochlear implants improve quality of life?’ Relevant 
answers to this question include, but are not limited to: because they amplify the nerve 
cells; because they allow deaf people to hear; because they make learning easier; because
2.0 Wright, L. work in progress.
2.1 Take an example similar to one given in Chapter 3: ‘How is your general health?’ Recall that in this 
question from the previous chapter respondents replied with a myriad o f answers because they weren’t sure 
what contrast class was implied. Indeed as Cross has also argued how-questions have a similar structure to 
van Fraassen’s why-questions in part because they require an implied contrast. See Cross, C. B. (1991) 
‘Explanation and the Theory o f Questions’, Erkenntnis, 34: 253. Other examples of questions include: Who 
called now as opposed earlier? Do you want breakfast as opposed to lunch? Can you as opposed to another 
group member carry the groceries? Did you go to the museum as opposed to the gallery1. What is justice as 
opposed to injustice? Moreover, for an account of the importance o f contrasts to the meaning o f assertions 
see Austin, J. L. (1980) (2nd ed.) How to do Things with Words, eds. J. O. Urmson & M. Sbisa, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
2.2 Ibid.
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now they can listen to music; because schools do not have the money to invest in special 
education programs; because recipients say they do; because hearing aids do not work as 
well; because people are less depressed; because hearing is important for language 
development...
Although this list could go on, if the context in which the question arises is rich 
enough, then it will limit these answers to those that address the specific gap in our 
understanding which the contrast class locates. For instance, to the question, ‘Why do 
cochlear implants improve quality of life?’ there are at least three different contrasts 
corresponding to three different places in the topic where a contrast could be implied213: 
‘Why do cochlear implants as opposed to non-surgical interventions which aim to aid 
language development improve quality of life?’; ‘Why do cochlear implants improve as 
opposed to decrease or maintain levels o f  quality of life?’; ‘Why do cochlear implants 
improve quality of life as opposed to physical functioning?’
Although each of these interrogatives represents a different question they each have 
the same topic: cochlear implants improve quality of life. Nonetheless the particular 
answers we might make in reply to these questions vary with the contrast. For example, to 
the question, ‘Why do cochlear implants improve quality of life as opposed to physical 
functioningT  we might reply, ‘because now those with them can hear sound’ or ‘because 
they are less depressed’. But we would not reply, ‘because they amplify the nerve cell’. 
This response does not answer the question ‘Why do cochlear implants improve quality o f
2,3 There are, however, other contrasts that we could make by varying the contrast class itself and not just 
where we place it in the topic. For instance cochlear implants as opposed to other surgical interventions 
which aim to aid language development, quality o f life as opposed to quantity o f  life .. .etc.
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lifeT  Rather it is a potential answer for the alternative question, ‘Why do cochlear 
implants improve quality of life?’
Notice in support of my diachronic interpretation of van Fraassen’s contextual 
factors that it is not only the answers that we give to the above questions that vary with the 
contrast class, but also that our understanding of the topic as a true assertion alters. For 
instance, when we ask the above question from the perspective of quality of life as opposed 
to physical functioning our answers reflect an understanding of the topic that emphasizes 
the qualitative aspects of our life at the expense of physical functioning— some non­
physical factor makes cochlear implants an improvement on quality of life. But when we 
look at the second question, which contrasts cochlear implants with, say non-surgical 
interventions, than our understanding of the topic emphasizes the fact that cochlear 
implants are surgical interventions— something about the fact that the intervention was 
invasive means it improves quality of life.
D . Contextual Factors: The R elevance Relation
The contrast class helps us to limit the infinitude of relevant answers we might give 
in reply by clarifying just where the gap in our understanding lies, both in terms of 
directing our attention to a particular part of the question’s topic and, on my diachronic 
reading of van Fraassen, in terms of providing us with a contrast against which to begin to 
understand what the topic means. Nonetheless, notice that although a contrast class gives 
us a class of items against which to compare the topic of the question, it does not tell us 
how  to make that comparison; it doesn’t tell us what counts as a significant difference 
between the topic and its contrast. For instance, take one of the examples from above,
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‘Why do cochlear implants as opposed to non-surgical interventions which aim to aid 
language development improve quality of life?’ In this question we are asked to provide an 
answer that names an important difference between cochlear implants and non-surgical 
interventions that aim to aid in language development. We know that the relevant answer 
has to be one way in which implants positively differ from non-surgical interventions, but 
what counts as an important and positive difference?
The difficulty here is that there is an infinity of differences between cochlear 
implants and non-surgical interventions and each difference is potentially important. Some 
of these differences include: cochlear implants can allow for speech recognition if 
implanted early in a deaf person’s life— non-surgical interventions very rarely allow for 
speech recognition no matter when they are implemented; the implant procedure is 
physically invasive; there is a chance of infection with surgeries; implants are cheaper than 
creating more effective special education programs; implantation requires a stay at the 
hospital; implants stimulates the auditory nerve’; implants are more effective than hearing 
aids; implantation is a faster procedure than learning sign language; implants work via a 
prosthetic replacement; the list could go on.
The main point here is that with a little imagination any one of these differences, 
and any number of others, could answer the question, ‘Why do cochlear implants as 
opposed to non-surgical interventions which aim to aid language development improve 
quality of life?’ For example, ‘because cochlear implants can allow for speech recognition’ 
may answer the question in a context where the ability to understand speech is synonymous 
with quality of life. And ‘because it stimulates the auditory nerve’ makes perfect sense in a 
situation where the relevant concern is the mechanism by which cochlear implants work.
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Furthermore, ‘because there’s a chance of infection’ may conceivably answer the question 
in a context where perceived risk only makes an intervention more valuable.
For van Fraassen none of these answers contradict one another because they are all 
answers to different questions214— questions which differ in terms of what sort of thing is 
being requested as an answer.215 Moreover, notice that once again in favor o f my 
diachronic reading of van Fraassen each of these answers further differentiates our 
understanding of the question’s topic— even though the questions have the same contrast 
class. For instance, the reply ‘because cochlear implants can allow for speech recognition’ 
construes cochlear implants as a tool for oral communication; ‘because it amplifies the 
nerve cell of the inner ear’ emphasizes the biomechanical functioning of implants; and 
finally ‘because there’s a chance of infection’ makes implants a risky operation. The 
different understandings of the topic that these replies provide are due to various interests 
and concerns that in light of the contrast class further limit the relevant answers we might 
give. Van Fraassen calls this third contextual presupposition the relevance relation: the 
respect with which an answer is given.216
For van Fraassen a reply to a question can only be considered an answer properly
7 1 7speaking insofar as it bears the right relevance relation to the topic and the contrast class. 
Since we are dealing with why-questions the relevance relations in which van Fraassen is 
interested are relations of explanatory relevance, namely relations that request a reason or
2.4 Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 117 & 125-6.
2.5 Ibid, p. 144.
216 Ibid, p. 142.
2,7 Ibid, p. 143.
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cause as an answer.218 But requests for reasons or causes are not the only kinds of 
interesting requests we can make when asking questions. Indeed as Charles Cross argues
910they are not even the only kind of explanatory requests we can make. As I hope to make 
clearer in the next section I take all questions to require some kind of relevance relation 
whether they are explanatory requests or not. Thus I do not think there is anything unique 
about why-questions in their need for a relevance relation.
In light of the discussion so far the question, ‘Why do cochlear implants as opposed 
to non-surgical interventions which aim to aid language development improve quality of 
life?’ can be further specified as ‘Why do cochlear implants as opposed to non-surgical 
interventions which aim to aid language development improve quality of life with respect 
to oral communication skills?; or with respect to the factors that make cochlear implants 
work?; or with respect to the risk involved in different interventions? Moreover, the 
addition of a relevance relation helps us to further understand the topic of a question by 
telling us what might count as an important difference when the topic is compared to its 
contrast.
E. A Neglected Contextual Factor: The Relevance of the Relevance Relation
Before moving on to the next section I want to look at some of the consequences 
that occur when different relevance relations affect our understanding of the topic. To 
begin, recall my earlier discussion of the topic. At the time I gave an example that
2,8 Ibid, p. 142.
219 Cross, C. B. (1991) ‘Explanation and the Theory o f Questions’, in Erkenntnis, 34: 257. Cross suggests 
that how-questions can be explanatory and that when they are they request an answer that specifies a way (as 
opposed to a reason or cause) for the topic to be the case.
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illuminated two different ways we might understand the topic ‘cochlear implants improve 
quality of life’ within the same context of inquiry. After my discussion of relevance 
relations we are in a position to see how  these different understandings create a legitimate 
dispute over whether or not the question arises.
Return once again to the interrogative: ‘Why do cochlear implants improve quality 
of life?’ Suppose that our interlocutors from earlier understand the question as implying 
the same contrast namely, ‘Why do cochlear implants improve as opposed to decrease or 
maintain levels o f  quality of life? In my earlier example, one interlocutor rejects this 
question because as she understands the topic there are no significant differences between 
individuals with or without cochlear implants. Her understanding of the topic is with 
respect to standardized test scores and it is because there is no difference in scores between 
the two cohorts that she rejects the question; the topic is false. Recall, however, that the 
second interlocutor’s interests were with respect to the data from self-reports. With respect 
to this concern there is a difference between quality of life before and after the intervention. 
Thus in this latter case, but not in the former, the topic is accepted as true and the question 
arises.
Van Fraassen’s sensitivity to contextual factors in determining just what a question 
is requesting for explanation is a significant improvement on much of the earlier 
explanation literature, which tended to overlook how contextual subtleties can sometimes 
change the meaning of why-questions and thus increase the variety of acceptable answers. 
But because a relevance relation affects how we understand the topic of the question it is 
possible to question the ‘relevance’ of the relevance relation. In other words, as in the 
example above regarding what counts as an ‘improvement’, sometimes we question or
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challenge whether the respect for which a question is asked correctly articulates the topic of 
the question.
Van Fraassen’s interest in contextual presuppositions such as the contrast class and 
the relevance relation is not to debate which combination best articulates the understanding 
of a topic, but rather to differentiate the question a particular interrogative expresses from 
all the other questions it might express. Nonetheless he does give us criteria with which to 
evaluate whether a question properly arises in a particular context—whether we ought to 
accept or reject a question. In fact I have already discussed these criteria. Recall from my 
earlier discussion that rejected questions have false topics; questions which arise have true 
topics.220
Within a highly shared context, by which I mean a context in which the 
interlocutors generally understand key concepts and mechanisms in the same way, 
background information can work to illustrate misplaced questions in the form of false 
topics. But these mistakes or misunderstandings must always be somewhat superficial if a 
shared background is enough to reveal them. Consider again the example of the warped 
conductor: ‘Why did the conductor become warped during the short circuit?’ Van Fraassen 
writes that this question only arises if the conductor did actually become warped otherwise 
the interlocutor is under ‘a false impression’. In the case of a highly shared context what 
counts as ‘warped’ or ‘conductor’ is not at issue thus the interlocutors agree at least in 
principle about what constitutes a warped conductor. If an interlocutor thinks that the
220 It is important to note that van Fraassen also allows us to reject questions with true topics if  the 
background theory and factual information o f the context imply that all answers to the question is false, but 
my focus in this chapter will not be on these questions. See Van Fraassen, B (1980) The Scientific Image, 
Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 145-6.
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conductor is warped, then she might ask the question why it is so. But if she is wrong— say 
she is looking at the conductor upside-down— then reference to the shared context should 
correct her mistake, for instance, we might flip the conductor around.
But deeper disagreements occur in the absence of such a highly shared context. By 
this I do not mean the absence of a shared context, but rather the absence of sufficiently 
shared understanding of the shared context. This is the problem in the cochlear implant 
example where the tension is over what counts as an ‘improvement’. In this example the 
disagreement is over the appropriate employment of a particular relevance relation.
Note in this example reference to a topic’s truth-value as a criterion for accepting or 
rejecting a question will only deepen the disagreement and not, as in the case of the 
conductor, illuminate error since here the interlocutors approach the question with different 
interests, interests which in turn suggest different understandings of the presiding context. 
But if van Fraassen cannot rely on the truth or falsity of the topic to decide whether a 
question properly arises, neither can he merely fall back on his understanding of context- 
sensitivity and simply notice how all the relevance relations are legitimate given their 
respective interests and background theory. The tension in this case is that the interlocutors 
take themselves to share a context of inquiry— they are questioning the same thing— but 
they disagree over its appropriate understanding.
For van Fraassen when we are confronted with a why-question it arises when its 
topic is true and otherwise we reject the question. But the dichotomy of merely accepting 
or rejecting a question based on its truth-value conceals a further contextual factor: the 
relevance of the relevance relation. Although van Fraassen’s recognition of the importance 
of contextual factors when asking questions is important his process for determining when
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we accept or reject a question is insufficient because he does not allow for disagreement 
over the understanding of a topic among individuals who share a context. As I will discuss 
in the next section, this oversight deprives van Fraassen of the appropriate counterbalance 
to his insistence that relevance relations remain unlimited.
II
W esley Salm on & P hillip  K itcher: A n O bjection  to  van F raassen
A question’s relevance relation— the respect with which we ask a question— affects 
how we understand a question’s topic. That a question’s relevance relation plays such an 
important role in making clear just what question an interrogative expresses should not 
surprise us. The relevance relation, understood as the interests or motivations that prompt a 
question, is very similar to what I referred to as the purpose of a question in the previous 
chapter. There we saw how essential the purpose of both assertions and questions was to 
understanding what they meant.
One of the issues in the last chapter concerned how we ought to understand of the 
questions in the measures. Outcomes researchers, concerned about misunderstanding and 
other forms of respondent bias, attempt to design measures in such a way that the 
interrogative answered by the respondent corresponds in some way to the question that the 
researchers had in mind. Inevitably, however, respondents sometimes understand questions 
differently. I argued in Chapter 3 that these differences are, in the first instance, often the 
result of a different understanding of a question’s purpose and secondly that it is not
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necessarily a misunderstanding since it is not clear in advance what the question’s purpose 
ought to be.
I now want to rephrase and strengthen the second part of this argument in the 
following way: we cannot determine in advance the sort of relevance relation or purpose 
that will make a question fruitful and penetrating as opposed to those that will result in 
misunderstanding or futility. This claim applies equally to scientific questions and to 
questions about quality of life.
Wesley Salmon & Phillip Kitcher deny this claim in ‘Van Fraassen on Explanation’. 
They argue that if we do not put a priori limits on which relevance relations can count as 
legitimate, then ‘almost anything can explain almost anything’.221 If almost anything can 
explain almost anything, then they conclude that we will not have any criteria for which to 
distinguish scientific questions and explanations from nonscientific ones. Put slightly
999differently, we will have an “anything goes” theory of explanation. If Salmon & Kitcher 
are right and if we extend van Fraassen’s account further afield, then we also will not be 
able to distinguish good from bad questions and answers in other disciplines like quality of 
life.
In the rest of this chapter I shall argue that Salmon & Kitcher are mistaken. We do 
not need a set of a priori relevance relations in order to distinguish between fruitful 
unfruitful questions. Nonetheless they are right to think that on van Fraassen’s account 
‘almost anything can explain almost anything’. This consequence however, is the virtue, 
not the downfall, of van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of explanation.
221 Salmon, W & Kitcher, P. (1987) ‘Van Fraassen on Explanation’, in The Journal o f  Philosophy, 87: 322.
222 Ibid, p. 329.
145
In a variety of places in his chapter ‘The Pragmatics of Explanation’ van Fraassen 
more or less argues that we cannot limit the scope of appropriate relevance relations. He 
does so by first recognizing, as I demonstrated in the previous section, how an almost 
infinite variety of responses can properly answer a single interrogative. In the car crash 
example he takes from Norwood Russell Hanson there are as many answers to the question, 
‘Why did he die?’ as there are interests and orientations to the question.223
Thus depending on the circumstances we could say he died from a brain 
hemorrhage or from the overgrown shrub in the road or from bad brakes. But if we say that 
he died from the hemorrhage it is not that we think the overgrown shrub was actually quite 
trim or that the brakes were in good order, rather we accept that the tree might have been 
overgrown and the brakes bad, but nonetheless keep these factors fixed— ceteris paribus—  
and only allow physical factors to compete as the answer.
Van Fraassen writes that there is nothing objectively right or wrong about keeping 
one sort of thing fixed as opposed to another.224 That is, there is nothing in principle right 
or wrong about asking a question with respect to one sort of interest or relevance relation as 
opposed to another. We cannot reject a question merely on the basis of the interests or 
motivations it seeks to satisfy because there is nothing in our picture of the natural world 
that limits the sort of questions that can count as valid. Gaps in our understanding occur in 
all sorts of places depending on our background, our training and the current context.
As we have already seen it is true that on van Fraassen’s account just about any 
reply can count as an answer to just about any question given the right context. In the
223 Van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 125.
224 Ibid, p. 116.
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example I used in the last section, ‘Why do cochlear implants as opposed to non-surgical 
interventions which aim to aid language development improve quality o f life?’ some of the 
seemingly irrelevant differences such as, ‘it requires a stay at the hospital’ may be relevant 
if in asking this question we are interested in cochlear implants with respect to quality of 
care and we have reason to think that a short stay in the hospital and the required follow-up 
visits provides us with that. If we consider the variety of contrasting cases and interests 
with which we can ask the question, ‘Why do cochlear implants improve quality of life?’ 
we begin to see how almost anything could explain it.
Moreover, just as almost any reply can be the right answer to a particular question, 
as we saw in the last chapter any declarative sentence can be the answer to many different 
questions. Recall the assertion, ‘the cat is on the mat’. This could be the answer to any of 
the following questions: Where is the cat? W hat’s the password? Why didn’t you hoover 
the carpet? Can we make a fire? W here’s the bulldozer? Who took my yoga mat? What 
are you laughing about? And so on. Here we see how something can explain almost 
anything.
My point here is that it is part of our explanatory practice that almost anything can 
explain almost anything. In other words it is a valuable aspect of van Fraassen’s theory of 
explanation that it allows for this flexibility. Van Fraassen is right that gaps in our 
understanding can occur in any number of unlikely places and the variety of interests with 
respect to which a question arises can mean that seemingly bizarre questions are sometimes 
met with understanding and acceptance.
The problem with van Fraassen’s account is not that an almost infinite variety of 
questions and answers can be legitimate given enough imagination or the right context. The
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problem is how do we know when a question is legitimate given a particular context?
How do we know when we have asked a good question— a question with a relevance 
relation, which is itself relevant to the context at hand? How do we know if  our question is 
valid? This issue is over whether van Fraassen gives us an ‘anything goes’ theory of 
explanation.
Salmon & Kitcher argue that van Fraassen does give us an ‘anything goes’ theory of 
explanation. To illustrate this they provide the following example: ‘Why John F. Kennedy 
died on Nov. 22, 1963 as opposed to other dates, with respect to astral influence?’ They 
suggest that astral influence is not an appropriate relevance relation and in the context of 
twentieth-century science we ought to reject the question.225 If van Fraassen’s theory does 
not provide the tools to reject this question, then they argue that the answer will serve to 
adulterate the integrity of scientific knowledge.
Although there is general agreement in the literature that the JFK question ought to 
be rejected there is controversy over whether it would properly arise on van Fraassen’s 
account. Salmon & Kitcher argue that it would arise since, on their reading, it fulfills van 
Fraassen’s criteria for when we ought to accept questions as properly arising. Firstly, it is 
true with respect to scientific theory and the factual information of the case that JFK did 
indeed die on Nov. 22, 1963 and secondly, they argue that there is nothing inconsistent 
with an answer to this question— a certain configuration of the planets and stars— and 
current scientific knowledge. In fact the configuration of the planets and stars would be an
99 f \application of scientific knowledge.
225 Salmon, W & Kitcher, P. (1987) “Van Fraassen on Explanation” in The Journal o f  Philosophy, 87: 322.
226 Ibid, p. 324.
148
On the other hand, Elisabeth Lloyd & Carl Anderson along with Allen Richardson 
argue that the question would not arise. They rely on an often quoted passage in ‘The 
Pragmatics of Explanation’ where van Fraassen appears to limit the possible relevance 
relations with which one can request explanations to just those that are scientifically 
relevant.227 They argue that our scientific background knowledge serves to limit what
counts as scientifically relevant and thus on van Fraassen’s account we can, ‘reject the JFK
22»question on the grounds that astrology is not an accepted scientific theory ...’
We might reinterpret Lloyd & Anderson’s point in light of my diachronic reading of 
how we understand a question’s topic. This reading would suggest that the JFK question 
should be rejected because its topic, when understood in light of its relevance relation, is 
false with respect to current scientific theory. The reasoning would go something like this: 
it is not true given our background information and current scientific theory that JFK died 
on Nov. 22, 1963 due to the alignment of the planets and stars on this day. But even if we 
accept this interpretation of the topic as the correct one are Lloyd & Anderson right to 
reject this question tout court? In other words, is it the case that there is not any current 
scientific context in which the date of JFK’s death is due to the alignment of the planets and 
stars?
In suggesting that we reject the JFK question both Salmon & Kitcher and Lloyd & 
Anderson tacitly appeal to a scientific context in which we are interested in the causal 
features of JFK’s assassination. But this is not the only scientific context in which the 
question could arise. For example, perhaps one of the assassins was a devout follower of
227 Van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press: Oxford, p. 126.
228 Lloyd, E. A. & Anderson, C. G. (1993) ‘Empiricism, Objectivity, and Explanation’, in Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, XVIII: 124.
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astrology and the advantageous planetary alignment on Nov 22, 1963 caused him to pick 
this particular day for the assassination. We can even imagine the coroner incredulously 
asking Salmon & Kitcher’s question to an investigator.
My point is that “astral influence” is not always an unscientific relevance relation. 
Moreover, the fact that “astral influence” is not always unscientific is similar to an example 
I discussed in the previous chapter. Recall the example from the NHP that asked ‘I find it 
hard to reach for things’. In this example the respondent answered ‘yes, because I am 
short’. The respondent interpreted the question with respect to her height rather than with 
respect to her health. But “height” like “astral influence” is not always a bad relevance 
relation. For instance, in certain circumstances we might think that not being able to reach 
things due to one’s height is relevant to depression. Moreover, I suggested in Chapter 3 
that “height”, even in the context of the NHP, may help us to better understand this 
measure’s construct by having us reflect on when height does become a health issue.
That these relevance relations are sometimes, but not always inappropriate even 
within their respective disciplines is an important point. First, it is important because it 
emphasizes van Fraassen’s position that anything can explain anything given the right 
circumstances. Second, it is important because if we eliminate “astral influence” from a 
whole field of interest, then we also potentially limit our arsenal of scientific knowledge in 
our attempt to preserve it.
But if Lloyd & Anderson’s suggestion fails, if we cannot simply reference the 
current context of science in order to limit relevance relations and thus reject certain 
questions out of hand, then on what grounds can we criticize questions? Notice that this 
problem is very similar to the problem in the previous chapter where I argued that quality
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of life constructs themselves cannot fruitfully limit in advance the purposes with which 
questions are posed in quality of life measures. The problem is that in both situations 
unexpected purposes or relevance relations can sometimes expand our understanding of 
scientific subjects or quality of life constructs in novel and fruitful ways.
My analysis of the JFK examples is a reminder that in science, like quality of life 
research, we cannot solve disputes regarding the validity of certain questions from the top 
down; we cannot take the context of science or the research construct in quality of life as 
our limiting factor because van Fraassen is essentially right— anything can explain anything 
and limiting what might count as explanatory limits what we might come to know.
In the next and final section I will argue that although Salmon & Kitcher are right to 
recognize the need for a critique of relevance relations, they are nonetheless wrong to 
suggest that such a critique must manifest itself as an a priori delimitation of relevance 
relations. I will put forward an alternative solution and in doing so I turn to Hans-Georg 
Gadamer.
Ill
H an s-G eorg  G adam er: Textual U nderstanding a n d  C ritica l Evaluation
Salmon & Kitcher argue in their article, ‘Van Fraassen on Explanation’ that if 
anything can explain anything, then it follows that we have an “anything goes” theory of 
explanation. Since an “anything goes” theory of explanation is unacceptable they deduce 
that the antecedent is false: anything cannot explain anything. Instead, they argue that we
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need to put limits on our requests for information— we have to limit what counts as a
scientific relevance relation.
To make this point about scientific inquiry they provide the following analogy with
literary interpretation:
Just as pluralists about literary works will insist that there are many 
interpretations of Hamlet while denying that any reader’s fancy counts as an 
interpretation, so too, relativists should concede that there are some relations 
that are not genuine relevance relations at any historical stage of any
2 2 9science.
I agree with Salmon & Kitcher that “relativists”—by whom they mean van Fraassen— and 
literary pluralists should concede that not just any interest will provide us with a valid 
understanding of nature or a text. But I disagree that in order to be critical about our 
understanding of nature, we must concede in advance that some interests or relevance 
relations are inappropriate ‘...a t any historical stage of any science’.
Recall from the last section my point that although “astral influence” is certainly a 
dubious relevance relation in some scientific contexts, it need not be problematic in all 
scientific contexts. In fact, as I noted at the time, if we eliminate “astral influence” as a 
legitimate interest in scientific inquiry, then we may also unduly limit scientific knowledge. 
Salmon & Kitcher’s mistake is to think that the way to deal with the threat that certain 
questions pose is to limit in advance what counts as a scientific interest. This solution, 
however, goes too far and ignores van Fraassen’s positive contribution, namely, that there 
is nothing in principle right or wrong about asking a question with respect to one sort of 
interest or relevance relation as opposed to another.
229 Salmon, W & Kitcher, P. (1987) ‘Van Fraassen on Explanation’ in The Journal o f  Philosophy, 87: 326.
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To avoid Salmon & Kitcher’s mistake and preserve van Fraassen’s insight I suggest 
a third way. This “third way” takes its point of departure from the very literary pluralists 
that Salmon & Kitcher draw on for support in their analogy. For literary pluralists need 
not determine in advance what interests count as ‘literary’ in order to maintain a critical 
stance and neither do scientists. To help make this argument I turn to part of Gadamer’s 
claim in Truth and Method.
When we approach a text, or text-analogue we come to it with certain implicit and 
explicit assumptions regarding what it might say about the subject matter that it addresses. 
These assumptions in turn affect how we understand what a text says about its subject 
matter. The same holds for text-analogues. For instance, in Chapter 2 I discussed how 
researchers and deaf advocates might understand the same set of outcomes differently given 
their different orientations to deafness. If one assumes that deafness is a pathology derived 
from the inability to hear, then one understands the increase in quality of life that cochlear 
implant recipients receive in one way. If one takes deafness to be a biological difference 
that provides for a unique set of opportunities and challenges, then one understands the 
reported increase in quality of life a different way.
Likewise, Gadamer recognizes that our interests or assumptions about a subject 
matter guide our understanding of a text. Moreover, he thinks that these assumptions pose 
the danger of appropriating a text in terms of these interests and assumptions and thus being 
unable to distinguish between, ‘our customary usage and that of the text’. We might then 
wonder how it is possible to avoid misunderstanding a text from the very start as I suggest
230 Gadamer, H. G. (2003) (2nd ed) Truth and Method, trans revised by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall, Continuum Press: New York, p. 268.
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outcomes researchers or even deaf advocates are in danger of doing when they interpret 
outcomes data.231 To solve this problem Gadamer introduces two criteria for understanding 
texts and text-analogues, which act as a counterbalance to these kinds of misunderstanding. 
First, we must assume that texts and their analogues are coherent and second, as we do in 
communicative speech232, we must assume that what is presented to us for consideration is 
at least possibly true.233
Both of these criteria are meant to provide a standard that can separate valid from 
invalid interpretations. For instance, valid interpretations must find a way to unify the parts 
of a text into a coherent whole; conversely invalid interpretations cannot make the various 
parts of the text cohere. But notice that this criterion alone is not enough to guard against 
misunderstanding: it is possible to make a text coherent in light of certain assumptions and
2^ 4
yet also potentially misunderstand it. In fact this is the situation we find with respect to 
the outcomes data, for researchers or deaf advocates understand the data as forming a 
coherent whole in light of their assumptions about what makes for a good quality life and 
yet I argue that they still potentially misunderstand it. It is Gadamer’s second criterion—  
that we assume a text or its analogue is possibly true— which helps to overcome these kinds 
of misunderstanding.
In assuming that what a text says is true we presume that we might learn from a 
text; that our understanding of its subject matter is potentially incomplete and might be
231 Ibid.
232 Herman, B (2006) “Ends Justifying Means” University of California, Riverside 16th Annual Conference 
Normativity & Universality from a Kantian Perspective, 24 February.
233 By possibly ‘true’ Gadamer does not mean that we must assume that the events in the text actually 
happened nor must we agree with what the text expresses. Rather for Gadamer assuming that the contents o f  
a text are possibly true involves recognizing the text as an experience from which we might learn something.
234 See Wamke, G. (1987) Gadamer Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, p. 84.
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enhanced or altered by our interaction with the text. In assuming that a text is true we take 
any differences between the expectations that arise from our assumptions and what we find 
in a text as potential challenges to those assumptions; we neither take the anomalies as 
instances to be explained in terms of our assumptions nor as views to which we must 
acquiesce.235 On the other hand, when a text meets our expectations, then Gadamer enjoins 
us to relate the text back to ourselves; to ask what significance this fact might have for us; 
what does it say about us and our assumptions that the text plays into our hands? The job 
of the interpreter then is not to appropriate a text as mine or yours, but rather to become 
clearer about the subject matter at hand and doing so is a matter of trying to see the 
significance of the text’s truth claim in relation to our previous assumptions about that 
subject matter.236
It is through the process of applying our own assumptions to a text and considering 
what the text has to say about them that Gadamer, as I said in the introduction to this 
chapter, illuminates our contextual presuppositions about a subject matter or as he says, 
gives them ‘full play’ 237. At the same time, however, he puts them ‘at risk’238 for although 
we may end up maintaining our presuppositions and disagreeing with a text about its 
subject matter we also might alter our presuppositions or sometimes replace them. Thus in 
trying to understand the meaning of a text we sometimes come to understand its subject
235 Notice that what we take to be discrepancies between what we expect and what we find in the text is 
necessarily predicated on our initial assumptions, nonetheless in trying to give a valid interpretation we do not 
merely explain away these discrepancies in terms o f our assumptions, but rather allow the discrepancies to act 
as interruptions which both highlight some o f our assumptions and put them into question.
236 See Wamke, G. (1987) Gadamer Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, p. 104.
237 Gadamer, H. (2003) (2nd ed) Truth and Method, trans Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall,
Continuum Press: New York, p. 299.
238 Ibid, p. 388.
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matter differently. Moreover, even if we do not change our presuppositions a coherent and 
truth-sensitive interpretation of a text can nonetheless serve to educate us about a subject 
matter not only by making our own presuppositions about it more transparent, but also by 
making them better—that is less reliant on unexamined and inappropriate interests. It is in 
this sense that Gadamer’s interest in understanding is primarily progressive for on his 
account by interpreting a text we also evaluate our assumptions about a subject matter and 
come to understand it better.
In contrast to Salmon & Kitcher, Gadamer does not require literary pluralists to 
determine in advance which interests in or assumptions about a subject might give a valid 
as opposed to an invalid reading of a text. Valid interpretations of a text are coherent and 
truth-sensitive. Conversely, when our interests and assumptions do not allow us an 
interpretation that can make sense of a text or see its point then they may be invalid. In 
other words, if we are to understand a text, then we might need to shift our perspective on it 
and hence the framework from which we perceive it. Yet we do not do so prior to putting 
our assumptions in play and at risk and in this sense Gadamer mirrors van Fraassen’s claim 
that anything can “explain” anything given the right context. To follow the connection 
between Gadamer and van Fraassen further I want to look at Gadamer’s account of
2 3 9interpretations as answers to questions.
For Gadamer we understand what a text says about its subject matter when we see 
the text as an answer to a question. This process of understanding begins, as we have seen, 
when we approach a text with certain implicit and explicit interests, concerns and 
assumptions regarding a particular subject. If we assume that a text has something to tell us
239 Ibid. pp. 369-70.
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about the subject, then we characterize any differences between the text and our 
expectations as potential challenges to our assumptions. But notice that these differences 
first present themselves to us as questions. For instance, ‘Why do John M cGahem’s books 
lack a plot?’; ‘Is Shakespeare a racist?’; ‘Was Anne Boleyn really so ruthless?’ The text 
properly challenges our assumptions when in answering these questions we start to 
reconsider what we mean by “plot” and what might count as being a “racist” or “ruthless”. 
As this dialogue between the text and the interpreter continues we build up an 
understanding of a text in terms of answers to our questions and in doing so we enrich and 
clarify our understanding of the subject matter.240
Our particular experiences, history, culture, knowledge and training all shape our 
prevailing interests in a subject matter. These interests in turn affect the kinds of questions 
we find in a text and the answers we eventually give these questions ultimately affect not 
only how we understand the text, but also how we understand its subject matter. But 
because our experiences, history, culture, knowledge and training change over time and 
among individuals so will the questions we ask a text and thus the understanding we glean 
from it. For instance, the assumptions 21st century readers bring to Shakespearean plays 
are vastly different from those with which a 16th century audience would have approached 
it. Today we might ask if Shakespeare was a racist, but in the 16th century this was not a 
relevant category of interest.
The upshot of both the fact that experiences, history, culture, knowledge and 
training affect our individual interests, concerns and assumptions about a subject, and the
240 This dialogue between a text and an interlocutor may also be a dialogue among different texts and an 
interlocutor. Some of the questions we raise may be due to other things we have read; some o f the answers 
we give to these questions may be the result o f other texts.
157
fact that we need an orientation with which to begin to understand a text is that we cannot 
determine in advance the sorts of interpretations that make for valid readings of a text. We 
cannot provide these criteria because we cannot anticipate all the different ways that a text 
might be fruitfully understood. If we did want to say in advance what sorts of 
interpretations were valid we would have to know in advance the limits of what the 
particular text could say, but this is a problem since what a text can say in part depends on 
the interests we bring to it and the questions we ask it.
The idea from the last section that anything can explain anything becomes for 
Gadamer the fact that any set of interests, concerns and assumptions can potentially 
illuminate any text. But as we have seen, for Gadamer, this fact does not translate into 
Salmon & Kitcher’s worry in science that we then have an “anything goes” theory of 
explanation. For Gadamer just because any interest can illuminate any text does not mean 
that just any interest does illuminate a particular text: some interests will not be able to get 
various parts of the text to cohere and some interests will not be able to make the truth 
claim of the text significant. Indeed, as we have seen it is in trying to understand what the 
text means that we may recognize the inadequacy of some of our interests and assumptions 
and thus alter or replace them.
If we look at Salmon & Kitcher’s JKF example in light of Gadamer’s work on valid
<r
and invalid interpretations, then we see that they are partially right: under certain conditions 
we should reject this question. For example, if the text-analogue in their example is the 
causal features of JFK’s assassination, then an individual is going to have a very difficult, if 
not impossible job showing the efficacy of astral causation. Yet, rather than eliminating the 
interest in advance, we would expect its irrelevance to come out in the wash, as it were.
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We would expect our interlocutor to question the relevance of astral influence by actually 
pursuing the inquiry and in doing so perhaps learn more about western science.
With respect to quality of life measures our critical evaluation of different 
understandings of questions also depends on whether or not a particular understanding 
succeeds in making a text-analogue— a measure— coherent and whether or not it respects a 
measure as possibly true. In quality of life measurement problems understanding questions 
apply both to researchers and respondents. Although respondents can misunderstand 
questions and thus their understandings can be criticized— for instance, they can fail to 
understand how individual questions in the measure cohere with the whole; they can fail to 
see the significance of the text’s truth claim in relation to their previous assumptions about 
the subject matter—this fact does not take away from the researchers’ responsibility to try 
to understand how respondent answers render a measure coherent and possibly true.
We improve on the validity of our measures when we take respondents’ answers 
seriously and often this means learning to see the subject matter—the measure’s 
construct— differently. We also improve on the validity of our measures when we strive to 
construct them so that respondents can make sense of them and can treat them as possibly 
true and sometimes this means altering our measures in light of information from other 
studies. But doing these things does not mean that we merely acquiesce to respondents’ 
understanding about quality of life. For Gadamer a dialogic framework allows us to engage 
with our interlocutors—different measures, studies, researchers— about the subject matter 
at hand and while this process requires us to give our assumptions ‘full play’ and put them 
‘at risk’ it does not require us to agree with our interlocutors about the subject matter.
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Questions like Salmon & Kitcher’s JFK example are similar to questions we might 
ask today about the morality of slavery: at one time they were questions we took very 
seriously— Do the plants and stars cause events on earth? Are black people inferior?— 
although we no longer take them seriously. This is mainly because after extended debate 
we settled on answers to these questions and the answers so changed the way we 
understand science or, with respect to the slavery question, how we understand humanity, 
that the questions now seem unscientific or racist.241 One difference between these kind o f 
questions and questions about quality of life is that the latter questions are, for the most 
part, unsettled. Much less is built into the assumption that a quality of life measure is 
true— especially for respondents who have multiple answers with which to understand it—  
than is built into the assumption of the causal features of JFK’s assassination. Thus there is 
greater leeway in the kinds of questions it makes sense to ask in regard to these measures.
The fact that the JFK question can now be used as an obviously unscientific 
question is educational because it shows how the answers we give to questions can 
transform our understanding of things. The fact that the configuration of the planets and 
stars do not cause events on earth helped us to distinguish science from mysticism, the fact 
that slavery is wrong helped us to distinguish humans from animals. But dead questions 
like those about astral influence and slavery should not confuse us into thinking that they 
were always uninteresting. A long history of debate surrounds both of these questions in 
which women and men vied to give ever more complete interpretations of the data and in
241 See Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self the Making o f the M odem Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 64-5 for a short discussion on the historical similarities between the evolution o f human 
equality and scientific progress.
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242doing so they transformed our scientific and social/political practices respectively. In 
time we might expect the same transformation in certain areas of quality of life research 
and in fact we might take the debates around Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as 
following in the footsteps of astrology and slavery questions.
The fact that we do not take the configuration of the planets and stars to impinge on 
events on earth contributes to the kinds of questions which properly arise: questions about 
the assassin’s motivation can arise, but questions about the planets’ causal effect on the 
date of the assassination do not. But the answers we give to the questions that do arise in 
turn affect how we understand the text or text-analogue in question and thus its subject 
matter. These changes to our understanding further affect the kinds of questions which it 
makes sense to ask. Moreover, sometimes it happens that previously ‘dead’ questions are 
reconceptualized and take on a new life. My point here is that although a question like 
Salmon & Kitcher’s appears to be dead it was not always dead and it may live again. We 
cannot determine in advance the kinds of questions which will illuminate a text or a text- 
analogue, but we have the ability to be critical of those that do not.
Gadamer’s criteria for valid and invalid understandings give us a solution to Salmon 
& Kitcher’s worry that without objective limits on relevance relations or the purpose with 
which we ask questions we shall end up with bad questions and misleading answers. It also 
provides a solution for my own worry that if we do objectively limit relevance relations, 
then we seriously limit what we might come to know about our subject of inquiry. But 
Gadamer’s solution comes at a price and that price is that we can only test our assumptions 
and try out a particular understanding of a subject matter through the process of questioning
242 1 am grateful to Georgia Wamke for her help with this argument.
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a text or its analogue. And as Gadamer quite explicitly says, ‘There is no such thing as a 
method of learning to ask questions, of learning to see what is questionable’.243 We cannot 
know in advance what might be a fruitful question and we cannot teach someone to 
recognize what might be a valuable interest in a subject.
Scientific practice is in fact rife with the very kind of questioning that Gadamer 
promotes. We see the evidence for this not only in the historical debate over astral 
influence, but also in the broad literature in Science Studies that has accumulated since 
Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions.244 Yet, in the area in which this thesis is 
concerned the price that Salmon & Kitcher exact in the limiting of questions is a steep one. 
In quality of life research researchers strive to limit in advance just what question an 
interrogative can express in order to create valid measures. However, when we attempt to 
put a priori limits on how the questions in quality of life measures should be understood we 
limit the answers we might give to the question, ‘What is quality of life?’ But the limits put 
on questions and indeed the assumptions about quality of life are often premature: when we 
examine medical histories, such as the interventions aimed to ‘cure’ deafness, as well as 
qualitative and other complimentary studies of quality of life we find that researchers may 
have an incomplete understanding of quality of life and that respondents and others can 
help us to understand it better.
If we want a valid and sufficiently broad understanding of quality of life, then we 
need to participate in something like a dialogue on the subject matter, i.e. a measure’s
243 Ibid, p. 365.
244 See Kuhn, T. S. (1996) (3rd ed) The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press. And for another example see Harding, S. (1998) Is Science Multi-Cultural?, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
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construct. In this dialogue respondents are given a voice through the different kinds of 
measure’s and histories that target subjective experience. The researchers who analyze this 
data are like interpreters who question a text in order to understand it. Researchers question 
the outcomes from different studies with an eye to better understanding quality of life and 
constructing better, more accurate measures. This process does not mean that we need to 
turn quantitative research into a series of interviews; this is certainly not a call for the 
elimination of measurement. But it is a call to understand quality of life measurement 
somewhat differently; it is call to think of them not as determinate assessments of quality of 
life, but rather tools for enhancing communication about quality of life.
In the next and final chapter I return once again to the topic of construct validity. 
Having argued in the previous chapters that it is flawed, I now turn to examine what might 
encourage its use. Drawing on the work of Charles Taylor I offer two different pictures of 
the human subject: the weak and strong evaluator. I argue that construct validity 
presupposes that respondents are weak evaluators and I suggest that such a picture of 
persons might promote the use of construct validity. Nonetheless, I argue that this picture 
is an inadequate portrayal of persons. The notion of the strong evaluator provides a better 
conception of the human subject and allows me to introduce an ethical dimension to our 
questions about quality of life. If Gadamer supports the view that our investigations into 
quality of life are dialogic, then Taylor shows us that these investigations are ethical 
dialogues.
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Chapter 5
The Ethics o f Quality o f Life and the Logic o f Construct Validity
Introduction
In the previous two chapters I have argued that the continued improvement and 
indeed validity of quality of life measures rests on our ability to reconceptualize these 
measures as elements within a larger dialogic framework of inquiry. In other words, we 
ought to use quality of life measures as tools to enhance communication between patients, 
doctors, health service researchers and other health care professionals and care-givers about 
quality of life. Understood as tools to enhance communication about quality of life neither 
the questions nor the outcomes from these measures are taken at face value, but rather they 
are understood as a point of departure for further inquiry.
Part of the reason for the connection between a dialogic framework and the validity 
of our measures lies in the way it allows us to take respondents’ answers seriously, by 
which I mean that we need neither acquiesce to their responses nor fall into an 
opportunistic interpretation of their answers. Taking respondent answers seriously is 
important to the inquiry into quality of life in part because the development of quality of 
life research is grounded to a significant degree in the promotion of self-determination and 
an antipatemalistic ethos. Valuing self-determination requires something more from our 
measures than the opportunism as sometimes embodied by standardized measures when we 
dismiss respondent answers as biased or the quick acquiescence of both standardized and 
individualized measures when we take a measure’s outcomes to confirm our hypotheses.
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But besides being grounded in the promotion of self-determination, quality of life 
research is also grounded in psychometric methodology where construct validity 
prominently figures. Construct validity, however, is itself is one of the obstacles we face 
when we attempt to take respondent’s answers seriously for as I discussed in Chapter 3 it 
presupposes that we know in advance how best to understand the questions in our measures 
and as I discussed in Chapter 2 it is too quick to assume that we know the significance of 
respondent answers. For instance, assumptions built into our use of construct validity 
regarding how to understand the questions in a measure can unduly affect our 
understanding of the outcomes— we may incorrectly understand certain answers to be the 
result of social pressure or misunderstanding. On the other hand, even if respondents 
understand our questions and their answers as indeed we understand them construct validity 
can sometimes encourage us to overlook their significance.
The use to which construct validity is often put in quality of life research suggests 
the assumption that questions and answers are much less open to interpretation than I 
suggest. For it is in part the indeterminate nature of our questions and answers that makes 
construct validity ineffective, for instance, answers may be taken to confirm an assumption 
when in fact they might also be understood as undermining it; alternatively interpreted 
questions may yield answers that appear to bias our measure when in fact they might 
deepen our understanding of it. In this final chapter I draw on Andrew Edgar’s work on 
quality of life measures to propose— and reject— a picture of the human subject that 
conceptualizes our responses to many questions as resistant to further interpretation and 
thus might motivate the current use of construct validity.
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Much o f Edgar’s work relies on Charles Taylor’s distinction between weak and 
strong evaluations to argue that quality of life researchers mistakenly assume that 
respondents are simple weighers of weak evaluations. As I will discuss in the next section 
weak and strong evaluations mark a difference in how desires or outcomes are appraised: 
when we weakly evaluate we judge something to be good simply on the basis that it is 
desired; when we strongly evaluate we judge something to be good on the basis that our 
desire itself is worthy.
For Taylor the assumption of the simple weigher marks a particular, and ultimately 
untenable, understanding of the human subject. I will suggest that it is this conception of 
the human subject which lends support to the use of construct validity in quality of life 
research and in light of the previous chapters I suggest that it is an untenable account of 
respondents. If quality of life research is to take respondent answers seriously, then it must 
relinquish the notion of the subject as a simple weigher of alternatives and embrace them as 
equal partners in ethical discourse.
In what follows I begin with Taylor’s distinction between strong and weak 
evaluations in order to lay the groundwork for Edgar’s claim that quality of life measures 
assume that respondents are simple weighers of alternatives. I then end with the suggestion 
that the conceptualization of respondents as simple weighers makes the use of construct 
validity appear natural.
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ICharles Taylor on Strong and Weak Evaluations
Taylor begins his essay ‘What is Human Agency?’ in agreement with Harry 
Frankfurt that the capacity to evaluate our desires is bound up with our capacity for self- 
evaluation which in turn is essential to human agency.245 For Frankfurt it is our ability to 
form second-order desires that is responsible for our particularly human form of self- 
evaluation. Taylor, on the other hand, argues that we come closer to understanding human 
self-evaluation if we focus not on desires themselves, but rather on two analytically distinct 
categories of evaluation, namely weak and strong evaluation.246
Taylor’s distinction between these two types of evaluation turns on whether or not 
desires or outcomes— motivations or choices— are distinguished as to their qualitative 
worth.247 Weak evaluations deem that something is good just insofar as it is desired— it is 
an evaluation of objects; strong evaluations determine that something is good insofar as the 
desire itself is worthy— it is an evaluation of desires.248 For the latter type of evaluation our 
motivations or choices are deemed worthy in terms of the quality of life they express 
relative to the life I want to lead. For instance, I may consider a desire for philanthropy to 
be worthy because I take it to express a life of selflessness and compassion, a life to which I 
aspire. Some further examples will help to make the distinction between strong and weak 
evaluations clearer as well as to bring out some further implications.
245 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘What is Human Agency’, in Human Agency and Language Philosophical Papers 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid, p. 18.
248 Ibid.
167
(1) I get ready to go for a run and I face the choice of turning left for the 6 mile version 
or turning right for the 4 mile one. I decide on the long run, my legs feel fresh and I 
had a big dinner the night before so the extra miles would do me good.
(2) I am offered a job in a hospital to do applied ethics. I have the choice of accepting 
the position or declining it. I am inclined to accept the position because it’s a job 
and I need a job to pay my bills and this allows me to feel like an adult— a welcome 
change after my long years of student-induced poverty. But I worry that simply 
needing a job is not a good enough reason to take one. This position would include 
work in organizational ethics and the standardization of ethical care, which I worry, 
would violate some of my deepest beliefs about patient autonomy and ethical care. 
In both of these examples I face a choice, but in the second example my desire to
have a job and pay my bills— to be an adult— is not enough to make taking the job a good 
decision. In fact given a certain understanding of integrity and authenticity I may 
understand the desire to take the job as a disturbing weakness, an indication perhaps that I 
am too concerned with material interests and thus susceptible to inauthenticity and 
alienation. In this example and in strong evaluations more generally I evaluate my 
motivations and choices in terms of what they say about me given my understanding of 
their place in the good life. Notice that when I evaluate my motivations and choices in 
terms of what they mean given my particular ethical framework I distinguish them based on 
their qualitative worth. The desire to accept the job is a threat to my integrity; it is 
unworthy of the kind of person I am or wish to become.
In contrast to strong evaluation the motivations and choices involved in weak 
evaluation are not distinguished as to their qualitative worth. As I have construed the
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running example above my choice to run 6 miles instead of 4 was not based on my 
estimation that it was a more worthy choice. Rather I ran the longer route because it was 
the best course of action given my circumstances and goals. Moreover, my decision to run 
6 miles does not reflect negatively on the 4 mile run. My decision to run 6 miles is 
contingent on the twin facts that my legs feel good and I had eaten a lot of food the night 
before. If I had not eaten a big dinner or my legs were feeling heavy, than I could just as 
easily have turned in the other direction for the shorter run.
In my running example the important difference between the two runs is their length 
and so we might be tempted to say that weak evaluation deals with quantitative assessment 
whereas strong evaluation has dominion over qualitative assessment, but this would be 
wrong. For Taylor the distinction between strong and weak evaluation does not turn on 
quantity vs. quality, but rather whether or not our motivations and choices are distinguished 
by their qualitative worth. Consider another example of weak evaluation. I am flipping 
through the cookbook trying to decide what to make for dinner. I narrow it down to lentil 
loaf with mash or couscous salad with carrot and ginger soup. I opt for the lentil loaf 
because I like the way if feels in my mouth and I’m “in the mood for it”. While there is a 
qualitative difference between lentil loaf and couscous salad and indeed it is this qualitative 
difference that helps to make up my mind about dinner there is not a qualitative difference 
as to the worth of my desire for lentil loaf or couscous salad. Similarly in my example there
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is not a qualitative difference between the worth of the desire for a 6 mile or 4 mile run.249 
As Taylor says, there is ‘nothing to choose’ between the different desires.250
This lack of difference in the qualitative worth of competing motivations means that 
for weak evaluations my contingent circumstances, such as the state of my legs or what I 
am hungry for, settle which of my competing desires or outcomes, on reflection, is 
preferred; there is nothing about my motivations that give me pause for reflection. It is for 
this reason that Taylor claims that for weak evaluation it is enough that something is 
desired for it to be judged good; weak evaluation as I said in the beginning of this section is 
an evaluation of objects. I want the lentil loaf because I am hungry for it, so I think it is 
good if we have it for dinner; I want to run the 6 miles because I ate too much lentil loaf, so 
I consider it a good thing to do.
A further consequence of this lack of a difference in the qualitative worth of my 
motivations is that with respect to my weak evaluations I cannot articulate within the 
framework of considerations offered why one of my motivations or choices— why one of 
my desires and their outcome— is more worth having. For example, I cannot say why the 
choice to run 6 miles is inherently superior to the choice to run 4 miles. This fact should 
not be surprising since I have already said that when we make weak evaluations our 
considerations do not include those that imply that the alternative is inferior to our 
selection. Nonetheless, for Taylor this inability to express why one motivation is more 
worth having than another is an important limitation on weak evaluations.
249 Although given a different context it is possible to construe the desire to run 6 miles as opposed to 4 miles 
as more worthy. I will discuss this possibility towards the end o f this section.
250 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘What is Human Agency’, in Human Agency and Language Philosophical Papers 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
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To see how we might consider the inability to discuss the qualitative worth of our 
desires as a limitation, compare the situation of the weak evaluator with that of the strong 
evaluator. In making weak evaluations I am, as Taylor says, a simple weigher of 
alternatives.251 As a simple weigher I understand my options according to my goals and 
circumstances. For instance, given that I want to go for a run, the state of my fitness, the 
time I have available and the terrain at my disposal I decide on two options: the 4 mile run 
or the 6 mile run. As a simple weigher I reflect on these choices by looking for the 
circumstantial evidence which will support one option over the other. I might consider the 
state of my legs and how much I’ve been eating before I decide on the longer run. But 
notice that as a person or a self I am removed from my decision. In other words, there is a 
space between my evaluation or choice and the kind of person I am or aspire to become.
As a weak evaluator I understand my ends independent from my identity and seek the best 
means to achieve those ends. In an importance sense the simple weigher is herself 
impassive between her choices.
But in the context of strong evaluation a person’s identity is necessarily bound up 
with her choices. For instance, in my earlier example I articulate the qualitative worth of 
declining the job as an expression of integrity as opposed to inauthenticity. As we saw I 
come to this understanding of what it means to decline the job when I reflect on the sort of 
life I take it to express. But the sort of life I take it to express will be a function of my 
vision of the good life and the sorts of fundamental evaluations I take to be central to the 
kind of person I am or to which I aspire. If I hold myself to the standards of integrity and 
authenticity and if I understand them to include a certain fidelity to principles, one of which 
251 Ibid, p. 23.
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includes a kind of transparency between my working life and my contemplative self—and I 
understand taking this job to be a violation of this principle— then I cannot but see 
declining the position as an expression of integrity and authenticity. Unlike the weak 
evaluator the decision to decline the job intimately reflects how I understand myself: I am 
someone with this kind of integrity or I am not.
Because strong evaluations allow for expressions of qualitative worth which are 
bound up with one’s identity, Taylor argues that they give us depth in the articulation of our 
motivation, a depth which is lacking in weak evaluation.252 When we make weak 
evaluations we can sometimes evaluate our motivations and choices as good or bad in terms 
of their success at achieving certain goals and ambitions. But in other cases the simple 
weigher cannot even say this much, for instance, consider my lentil loaf example. In this 
case my desire for lentil loaf can only be further expressed in terms of what tastes good and 
what I “feel more like eating”— in terms of my desire for it. Unlike weak evaluations the 
vocabulary of strong evaluations need not end with a performance criterion or a reiteration 
of one’s desire. Because strong evaluations entail a vocabulary of qualitative worth they 
can give us insight into why certain motivations are worth having and why certain choices 
are worth making, which in turn gives us insight into individual visions of the good.
Although Taylor is right to point out this difference between weak and strong 
evaluations, it is important not to overstate his point. The mere use of strong evaluations 
does not of itself make the user more articulate in our normal use of the term. While we 
often have strong views regarding the ethical import of various desires and choices, these 
positions are compatible with a limited ability to articulate them. For example, we may 
252 Ibid, p. 26.
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judge Marc Quinn’s sculpture ‘Alison Lapper Pregnant’ in Trafalgar Square to be indecent. 
Thus the sculpture’s presence may be taken to reflect not only a poor decision by the public 
works committee, but also Quinn’s dubious character. At the same time, however, we may 
be unable to articulate the vision of the good which motivates this view about Quinn and 
the sculpture. On the other hand, an individual who only describes her motivations and 
choices in terms of weak evaluations— if we can imagine such a person— may be able to 
discuss clearly, within the confines of weak evaluation, exactly why she does what she 
does. Taylor’s point in emphasizing the depth of articulation available to strong 
evaluations is to comment on the possibilities for articulation that strong evaluations open 
up, not the actual abilities we possess.253
In fact articulating the strong evaluations we have, or put differently, describing 
their qualitative worth is very difficult. For many of us the reasons why we take a 
motivation to be honorable or a choice ignoble is obscure and hard to say— and that is if we 
can even say this much about them. But strong evaluations need not, and very often do not 
end with whatever is espoused by a particular individual—however inarticulate. We can 
become clearer and more articulate about the ethical import of our motivations and choices 
as they are further challenged or further developed by others. For instance, if we turn back 
to my earlier example we can easily imagine a whole host of competing interpretations of 
what it means for me to decline my job offer. My parents might say that it is an expression 
of my naivety; my partner might say I’m afraid of success; I myself might wonder if I ’m 
not taking the whole thing far too seriously.
253 This point was brought to my attention by Jeremy Wisnewski.
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The different articulations of my choice to decline the job do more than just 
challenge how I understand my predicament, for recall that the description of the qualitative 
worth of my motivations and choices is a result of their place within a larger ethical 
framework in terms of which I understand my life. In offering to augment or challenge my 
understanding of what it means to decline this job these alternative articulations also 
challenge my vision of the good and ultimately my own self-understanding.254 For each 
articulation not only describes my situation differently— as one of inauthenticity vs. 
integrity, naivety vs. maturity, fear of success vs. confidence, over-thinking vs. action— but 
in describing the situation differently each articulation also paints a different portrait of the 
person I am in declining this job.
Moreover, each of these articulations aim to challenge and develop the way I 
understand my predicament by imagining my decision in the service of different 
purposes.255 For instance, my parents might see my decision as serving no purpose other 
than that of maintaining my poverty; my partner might see my decision as providing an 
unconscious defense mechanism; at times I may wonder if my decision does not just serve 
the purpose of complicating my life. As I discussed in Chapter 3 our understanding of 
questions and assertions in part depends on their purpose and here I suggest that how we 
understand our motivations and choices also depends on what we take their purpose or goal 
to be. Part of the difficulty of understanding the questions in quality of life measures is that 
the purpose of these questions is often vague and contentious and only in asking the 
questions in a particular situation did we learn to understand them better. Likewise part of
254 Ibid.
255 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘What is Human Agency’ in Human Agency and Language Philosophical Papers 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26-7.
174
the difficulty in understanding our motivations and choices is that their purposes are vague 
and contentious and only in applying our motivations and choices to concrete situations that 
we learn to understand them better. Nonetheless, just as with quality of life measures, even 
in a concrete situation individuals will understand things differently.
Coming to a conclusion about the best way to characterize both my desire for this 
job and my decision to refuse it is not unlike determining how best to understand the 
questions in quality of life measures. The best way to understand the questions in a 
measure depends in part on how we understand the construct and how we understand the 
construct depends in part on how we understand the questions. Likewise the best way to 
characterize my desire for the job and my decision to reject it depends in part on how we 
understand what makes for a good life and how we understand what makes for a good life 
depends in part on how we characterize my desire and my decision. Both our 
understanding of the questions in a quality of life measure and our understanding of the 
ethical import of our motivations and choices exhibits the structure of a circle.
Thus, as with my suggestion in regard to quality of life measures we might situate 
my desire to take the job and my decision to refuse it within a dialogic framework. Recall 
that in a dialogic framework texts or text-analogues act as our interlocutors regarding how 
best to understand the subject matter. In this example we might take my decision to decline 
the job as a partner in a dialogue regarding what makes for a good life. This framework 
will also include other texts or text-analogues that speak to the subject matter at hand.
These other texts or analogues and the individuals who interpret them provide insight into 
what makes for a good life and thus a starting point for our understanding of my decision.
In attempting to understand my decision we will question it and in answering these
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questions some of our assumptions about what makes for a good life may be altered or 
replaced. In the end we will come to understand better not only my desire and my decision, 
but also what makes for a good life.
Unlike a quality of life measure which exists independent from me and my 
interpretation of it, the self-interpretations that I accept as a result of this dialogic process 
are partially constitutive of my experiences. For instance, if I come to accept my desire for 
this job as, say an expression of independence and maturity, then no longer will I feel 
ashamed to accept the position. Nor will I understand myself in the exact terms that I did 
before. I will understand myself in terms of an ethical framework of maturity and 
responsibility rather than authenticity and this understanding will then give weight to other 
mature and responsible choices I might make.256
Strong evaluations support a conception of the self whereby people can enter into a 
dialogue with others to give voice to their understanding of their motivations and choices, 
and also have their understanding of these motivations and choices— as well as their 
understanding of what makes for a good life— deepened or transformed. Part of Taylor’s 
point in emphasizing this dialogic aspect of persons is not unlike my point about quality of 
life measures: we cannot determine in advance of the dialogue how we might best 
understand our motivations and choices or how to understand our questions. For Taylor the 
self is dialogic— we only come to know ourselves and our position with respect to the good 
in a dialogue with ourselves and others. Put differently, we cannot avoid deliberation on
256 To be sure the frameworks in which we understand our motivations and choices do not change readily or 
absolutely and single decisions are rarely framework altering. Our motivations and choices are understood 
within frameworks and only over time do these frameworks evolve.
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these matters unless we want to limit the kinds of people we might become or with regard 
to quality of life measures what we might come to know.
Nonetheless, the model of the self that weak evaluations promote suggests that this 
element of deliberation and in fact the whole possibility of interpretation as an essential 
element of evaluation and self-understanding is unnecessary. As we saw earlier weak 
evaluations make this suggestion by first disengaging our motivations and choices from the 
purpose with regard to which they have their meaning: wanting to run off last night’s 
dinner does not affect how I understand the meaning of my motivation to run 6 miles 
although it will affect the length of run that I choose; being in the mood for lentil loaf does 
not affect how I understand the meaning of my desire for it though it does explain my 
choice to eat it.
Secondly, weak evaluations disregard the importance of interpretation to evaluation 
and self-understanding by disengaging our purposes from deliberative and interpretive 
dialogue: what it means to want to run off one’s dinner or to be in the mood to eat lentil 
loaf is inconsequential to understanding my choice. Once disengaged in these ways the 
meaning of one’s motivations and choices with respect to one’s goals reduces to, at best, 
the degree to which the motivations and choices meet these goals.257 Put differently, if we 
want to understand a motivation or choice resulting from a weak evaluation we need not 
enter into a conversation with the agent to deliberate over the motivation or choice’s 
expressive purpose, rather we merely look to the purpose, conceived of as static and assess 
the extent to which the motivation or choice fulfills it.
257 At worst, as we saw with the lentil loaf example, motivations and choices just become a reiteration of 
one’s initial desire.
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In contrast to the model of a person that strong evaluations support in which an 
understanding of our motivations and choices requires insight into our understanding of 
what is meaningful in light of our ethical stance, the simple weigher’s motivations and 
choices are described in objective and absolute terms; weak evaluations attempt to describe 
our motivations and choices in terms independent of the variable meaning they can have for 
us, for example, as subjects coming from different experiences, histories, cultures, and 
having different expertise and training. Weak evaluations instead strive to describe our 
situations objectively and absolutely by expressing them in terms that have but one 
meaning. Ordinarily, doing this requires using terms which are independent of what Taylor 
calls ‘anthropocentric properties’.258 Here Taylor takes advantage of the second dictionary 
definition of “anthropocentric”— interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human 
values and experiences259— to emphasize that weak evaluations in their endeavor to 
objectify our motivations and choices attempt to eschew terms that rely on variable human 
experience and values for their meaning.
In many ways this attempt to limit the descriptions of a situation to those that can be 
given in objective terms mirrors Salmon and Kitcher’s, as well as many quality of life 
researcher’s desire to limit the purpose or relevance relations of the questions we ask to just 
those which are properly scientific. As we have seen Salmon and Kitcher and many quality 
of life researchers attempt to limit the scope of legitimate relevance relations or purposes in 
the hopes of limiting the possible ways we understand questions and answers. In limiting
258 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘The Concept o f a Person’, in Human Agency and Language Philosophical Papers /, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 108.
259 Mish, F. C. et al. (eds) (1999) (10th ed) Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Springfield: Merriam- 
Webster Inc., p. 49.
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the description of a particular situation to those that involve non-anthropocentric properties 
weak evaluations too strive to limit the questions we can ask and the answers we can give 
regarding the characterization of our motivations and choices.
To be sure, we often make weak evaluations and the motivations and choices 
involved are, more often than not, clearly understood. But this ease of understanding 
should not give the false impression that these evaluations find absolute descriptions with 
which to describe our desires or outcomes. Rather this ease of understanding is best 
understood to exist within a framework in which the meaning of certain purposes like 
running off one’s dinner or being in the mood to eat a certain meal is already established 
and unproblematic. Only when we act outside of our familiar frameworks of reference do 
we fully recognize the implicit understandings that make weak evaluations— weak. For 
instance, the desire to run off one’s dinner in some parts of the world is taken as a comment 
on one’s character; it may indicate arrogance, strangeness and perhaps an unnatural 
obsession. Here the once weak evaluation turns into a strong evaluation given a different 
context or framework.
Taylor writes that one who only weakly evaluated or indeed was characterized as 
only weakly evaluating would be a rather shallow character— we might say a sociopathic 
character.260 It would be someone who was not engaging with others in the expression of 
motivations and choices which offer unique insight into our lives as subjects qua subjects— 
insight into what is distinctively human. For instance, an individual who was nothing
260 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘What is Human Agency’, in Human Agency and Language Philosophical Papers 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 26.
261 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘Self-Interpreting Animals’, in Human Agency and Language Philosophical Papers 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 59-60.
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but a simple weigher would be utterly insensitive, qua simple weigher, to the genuine 
horror that my partner’s mother expresses at the thought that someone in the village might 
recognize me as I run past.
In the next section I return to my study of quality of life measures and take a look at 
Andrew Edgar’s arguments which conclude that quality of life measures characterize 
respondents as weak evaluators. Following Taylor Edgar takes this assumption to be a 
criticism of these measures as well as a limit on their ability to provide respondents with 
reasonable self-determination in decisions about their health care.
II
T reating R espon den ts as S im ple W eighers
A. Weighting Health States
Andrew Edgar’s point of departure for his criticisms of quality of life measures 
differs from mine in that he focuses primarily on the processes by which health researchers 
weight health states and I have focused on the validation process of these measures. But 
these two approaches are related in at least two ways. First many of the most popular 
weighting techniques involve asking people questions in order to elicit the relative 
importance of certain health states compared to other health states. Because they use 
questions to determine the appropriate weightings these techniques potentially run into the 
same sorts of problems that I have discussed throughout these chapters.
Secondly, the weighting of questions and the validation of quality of life measures 
are interrelated since the weightings of different health states translate into part of the
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meaning that respondents’ answers have for the researchers that analyze them. For 
example, recall from Chapter 1 that in the NHP the question, ‘I’m tired all the time’ carries 
a weight of 39.2, if the question receives a yes answer. Put differently, researchers 
understand a yes answer to this question as negatively affecting quality of life to the extent 
that the weight indicates.
Although Edgar’s interest in quality of life measures is not unrelated to my own, as 
I have already indicated, he takes a different tack: he argues that the weightings themselves 
are dubious. He suggests that the weighting methods employed in standardized quality of 
life measures treat individuals as weak evaluators and in treating individuals as such the 
weightings may be biased. This bias is a problem for Edgar because, as he sees it, 
weighting questions is one of the ways that standardized quality of life measures express 
their antipatemalistic roots and thus give respondents a voice in their measurement 
outcomes.262 For Edgar effective weighting exercises allow respondents to challenge 
certain assumptions regarding the importance of biological prerequisites for a good quality 
life.
Thus Edgar, unlike proponents of individualized quality of life, takes standardized 
measures to be the appropriate kind of measure to provide individuals with reasonable self- 
determination. But unlike most proponents of standardized measures Edgar is critical of 
the current methodologies used to weight the items in these measures. In other words, 
Edgar challenges the notion that individual priorities truly are incorporated into the
262 Edgar, A. (1997) ‘A Discourse Ethics Approach to Quality o f Life Measurement’, in Annals New York 
Academy o f  Sciences, 809: 34-5. The other way quality o f life measures express their antipatemalism, 
according to Edgar, is through involving lay people in the process o f content validity, but this is not his focus.
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weightings of questions in the measures. In what follows I discuss some of the different 
methodologies typically employed to weight the questions in quality of life measures.
The methodology that researchers use to determine the weightings of questions 
often differs depending on the preferences and conceptual orientation o f the researchers 
working on a measure. As we saw in Chapter 1 when discussing the SEIQoL questions 
may be individually weighted such that each question in the measure is uniquely tailored to 
an individual’s sense of what is most important to her quality of life. On the other hand, 
the original Nottingham Health Profile (NHP), which I discussed in Chapter 3 and which 
Edgar also highlights, uses Thurstone-type rating scales to weight questions. This method 
requires members of the general public to consider a series of similar statements and 
determine which one of a pair expresses the more severe condition. For instance, 
individuals may be asked whether ‘Things are getting me down’ or ‘Worrying keeps me 
awake at night’ is the more punishing with respect to quality of life. A weight for each 
statement is then derived from the proportion of individuals who weight a certain statement 
as more severe than another.263
There are also other methods for weighting questions. For instance, as Edgar notes 
the original QALY matrix identified 6 marker health states which members of the public 
were asked to rank in order of severity. This weighting process includes not only a cardinal 
indication of severity among the health states, but also an ordinal indication of how much 
more severe one health state is with respect to another.264 Finally, many— and some might 
say most—quality of life measures have de facto  weightings. In this case researchers
263 Edgar, A. (1995) ‘Weighting Health States and Strong Evaluation’, in Bioethics, 9: 244-6.
264 Ibid, p. 245.
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assume that each question has the same relative importance to quality of life as the other 
questions do and thus all questions are given equal weighting. The SF-36 is an example o f 
a quality of life measure which uses de facto  weightings.
B. The NHP Weightings as Weak Evaluations
Despite the variety of techniques for obtaining weightings Edgar claims that ‘...the 
dominant approaches to health state measurement remain at the level of weak evaluation’ 
and thus presuppose the simple weigher as the model of human agency. To begin his 
argument Edgar turns his attention to the weightings of the questions in the NHP and draws 
similarities between Thurstone-type rating scales and Taylor’s treatment of weak 
evaluations. Recall from the previous section that because ‘there is nothing to choose’ 
between the qualitative worth in weak evaluations the reasons considered in contingent 
circumstances settle which of our competing desires is most preferred. If indeed ‘there is 
nothing to choose’ between the qualitative worth in weak evaluations and the weightings in 
the NHP are taken to be weak evaluations, then we would expect researchers to explain 
systematic differences among the rankings of health states in virtue of different contingent 
considerations.
In fact this is how those who developed the NHP understood the effects of cultural 
variation on the revision of the measure for countries outside the United Kingdom. For 
instance, Edgar notes that the revision of the NHP for use in France had small but important
265 See http; www.rand.org/health/survevs tools/mos/mos core 36item scoring.html The SF-36, however, 
does use a weighting system when deriving a ‘summary’ score of the measure. This ‘summary’ score 
involves just 2 o f the SF-36’s 8 dimensions, namely physical and mental dimensions.
266 Ibid, p. 244.
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differences in the weightings of questions like ‘I’m in pain when I am sitting’. In the 
United Kingdom this description was ranked as the fifth most severe statement about pain 
out of eight possibilities; in France it was ranked as the least severe out of eight.267 To 
explain the differences between the United Kingdom and French weightings researchers 
like Bucquet et al. turned to language barriers, environmental factors like the number of 
stairs encountered in daily life and habitat such as family structure and employment 
conditions.268
While Edgar recognizes that these factors may be important to the differences in the 
NHP weightings he is nonetheless skeptical that they are the only important factors.269 
Although Edgar is not particularly clear on this point his skepticism seems to stem from the 
fact that, as we saw in the previous section, weak evaluations divorce our motivations and 
choices from the purposes from which they have their meaning. As I discussed earlier, 
when weighting the NHP individuals are asked which statement in a series of paired 
statements is more undesirable with respect to quality of life. Consider the following pair: 
‘I’m in pain when I am sitting’ or ‘I have pain at night’. As individuals give their replies 
and the statements are subsequently weighted the implicit assumption is that respondents 
understand these statements in the same way— that is they are understood with respect to 
the same purpose. If they are understood in the same way, then it is possible to aggregate 
the preferences for certain health states over others, draw conclusions about which states 
are generally taken to be most and least desirable and make comparisons between different 
groups of people.
267 Ibid, p. 256.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid, pp. 246-7.
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Given that respondents understand these statements in the same way we can go 
about explaining differences in the rankings of health states— differences in weak 
evaluations—between different populations or people in terms of contingent circumstances. 
We can explain these differences as Bucquet et aL did in terms of environmental factors 
and habitat, but we could also explain these differences in terms of cultural and personal 
values. For instance, we might hypothesize that the French are unconcerned with sitting 
pain and so it is not as important to them as it is to those in the United Kingdom.
But what we generally do not do is explain the differences in rankings in terms of 
variable understandings of qualitative worth that the statements themselves might express 
to different people or groups; put differently we do not question what the statements might 
mean to different people or groups. We do not hypothesize that the French and the English 
understand sitting pain differently, as expressing, for example, legitimate pain in one case 
and mere squeamishness on the other. As Taylor argues, however, an individual’s 
environment is mediated by their vision of the good and if we want to fully comprehend 
why a certain experience of pain is relatively unimportant, then we may have to understand 
what that experience of pain means to those who participate in these weighting exercises. 
To emphasize this point in what follows I briefly discuss a case where understanding the 
different meanings of a particular health state is crucial to understanding its different 
ranking among different individuals.
In his article ‘A Discourse Ethics Approach to Quality of Life Measurement’ Edgar 
points to Segun Gbadegesin’s example of a Yoruba woman who refused a mastectomy—  
despite the fact that it was the only option to save her life—because she took the
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970intervention to result in a deformity which would make life worthless. In this example it 
is not the case that the Yoruba woman simply does not value a mastectomy and western 
women do and it is not merely differences in contingent circumstances between Yoruba 
women and westernized women that explain the difference in ranking. Rather the Yoruba 
woman has a different understanding of what it is to have dignity; what counts as 
humiliation; what gamers respect; what accounts for beauty and sexual attraction as well as 
the good life at large. Thus she understands what it means to have a mastectomy 
differently than perhaps western women do.
In this example we can only truly understand the Yorba woman’s decision when we 
come to see how a mastectomy might be worse than death; when we understand what this 
procedure would mean given her understanding of the good life. In this example we see 
how strong evaluations sometimes do figure in the explanations of health state rankings 
and, moreover, how strong evaluations allow us to consider different dimensions of what 
makes up a good quality life.
C. The Consequences of Weak Evaluations: Restricted Debate Regarding a Good Quality Life 
Edgar continues to build on his discussion of the NHP by examining some of the 
consequences of taking weightings to be the result of weak evaluations. Although Edgar 
does not provide the details for an example of these consequences we can begin to make his 
point. Take, for example, one of the questions in the NHP: ‘I find it hard to dress m yself. 
Within the logic of the Thurstone-type rating scale a health state’s ranking is taken to
270 Edgar, A. (1997) ‘A Discourse Ethics Approach to Quality o f Life Measurement’, in Annals New York 
Academy of Sciences, 809: 35-6.
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express the preferences— and perhaps the prejudices— of the general public. Although 
proponents of individualized quality of life argue that such an aggregation of preferences is 
incompatible with individual self-determination, as long as respondents understand the 
question in the same way it is methodologically possible to aggregate respondents’ answers 
and adjust the question’s weight accordingly.
But as Edgar suggests respondents do not understand these questions in the same 
way. Rather he argues that the discrepancies over the appropriate weighting of a health 
state— discrepancies which are both common and well-documented between healthy people
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and those living with disability or illness — are not merely due to differences in 
contingent circumstances, but also exist due to different assumptions about what counts as a 
dignified life; what makes for a humiliating experience and so on. Put differently, the 
discrepancies between, say, a doctor and a patient over the significance ‘dressing oneself 
has to quality of life has its roots in different understandings of what it means to be able or 
unable to dress oneself.
Moreover, Edgar suggests that different rankings of health states between 
individuals of varying degrees of health may also indicate how the very experience of 
illness changes a subject’s conception of the good life and this tallies with what we know 
about an individual’s adaptive capacities.273 To be sure, as I discussed in Chapter 2 with 
my example of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) just because individuals can and do adapt 
does not mean that they should have to adapt. Nonetheless when viewed as the result of
271 Ibid, p. 37.
272 Janse, A.J. et al., (2004) Quality o f Life: Patients and Doctor’s Don’t Always Agree: A Meta-Analysis’, in 
Journal o f Clinical Epidemiology, 57: 653-61.
273 Edgar, A. (1995) ‘Weighting Health States and Strong Evaluation’, Bioethics, 9: 248.
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strong evaluations our current uses of weightings do not merely promote certain people’s 
preferences at the expense of others, rather they overlook the different ways that we might 
understand the significance of the health states being weighted. Thus, the current use of 
weightings stymie certain efforts to consider what visions of the good life and what kinds 
of adaptations are legitimate and which ones ought to be guarded against.
Edgar’s point here is that the discrepancies between doctors and patients or 
caregivers and their charges may not just indicate contingent differences in environmental 
or physical conditions; it is not merely the addition of rheumatoid arthritis that might cause 
one to rank ‘I find it hard to dress m yself as insignificant with respect to quality of life. 
The point is that in acquiring rheumatoid arthritis one becomes someone who has 
rheumatoid arthritis. Following Taylor, this new aspect to one’s identity is not a mere 
addition to it, but rather encourages a certain amount of reflection regarding how I might 
incorporate it into my understanding of myself; how I understand the good life now that 
this has happened to me.
The situation in which one acquires rheumatoid arthritis is similar to my job 
example in the previous section. Suppose that I decide to take this job despite my 
reservations. If this is the case, then I have to understand my decision either as a betrayal 
of my ideals or I must come to understand these ideals differently in relation to my 
decision. Likewise the individual with rheumatoid arthritis might continue to see this 
disease as a “betrayal” of her dignity, as something that necessitates a life without dignity. 
But such an individual might also reinterpret their understanding of ideals like dignity in 
light of their new limitations just as I might reinterpret my understanding of integrity and 
authenticity in light of my decision about the job. This reinterpretation indicates a
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transformation about what matters, whai is significant, what provides meaning in one’s life; 
the discrepancies between those living with different health states perhaps point to a 
difference in the goals, expectations, standards or concerns that figure in the lives of people 
with different capacities.274 Insofar as our quality of life measures do not account for these 
differences in goals, expectations, standards or concerns they limit our ability to critically 
evaluate quality of life.
D. The Consequences of Weak Evaluations: Restricted Self-Determination
Current methods for deriving weightings not only restrict discussions regarding 
what is important in a good quality life, but they are also an obstacle to realizing the self- 
determination which partially motivates the use of these measures. For instance, consider 
again the case in which the general population consisting o f mostly healthy individuals is 
enlisted to determine the relative weightings of various health states. Imagine, as in the 
example above, that ‘I find it hard to dress m yself is ranked as a health state expressing 
low quality of life and weighted accordingly. This ranking becomes a problem if those 
whose quality of life the measure is meant to assess do not experience difficulty dressing as 
undignified or adversely affecting their quality of life. Individuals who answer yes to the 
question will have their quality of life score diminished despite their individual or even 
collective experience. If quality of life measurement is meant to give respondents a voice 
in their health care and as Edgar suggests weighting is one of the mechanisms that allows 
this to happen, then this discrepancy is a serious problem.
274 Edgar, A. (2003) T h e Ontological Status o f Quality o f Life’ at
http://www.iprs.it/ITAweb/progetti%20conclusi/documenti/ontolstatquallife.htm. 13/01/2003.
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This difficulty with self-determination is similar to the criticism made by 
proponents of individualized quality of life: individual understandings and rankings of 
health states may be neglected in favor of majority preferences. But as I argued in Chapter 
2 this problem cannot be solved by simply acquiescing to whatever each respondent does 
mean by their answer: we can be wrong about ourselves; we can and often do have an 
imperfect understanding of what is valuable and of most importance. Edgar makes this 
same point against individualism when he emphasizes that no expression of a health 
preference is self-evidently more worthy than another and also when he says that, ‘The 
antipaternalism inherent in quality of life measures cannot be so construed as to suppress
0 1  f tthe physician’s voice altogether’.
For Edgar the differences between the responses of different individuals to the 
evaluation of different health states like a mastectomy or finding it hard to dress oneself 
suggest the different places that health states may occupy in different visions of the good 
life— they are differences in strong evaluations. But because, as we saw in the previous 
section, strong evaluations allow for a level of articulation that weak evaluations do not, 
these differences in evaluating health states do not represent an impasse. Rather, strong 
evaluations provide an opportunity to articulate the place our preferences occupy in our 
ethical frameworks and expose the discrepancies in strong evaluations that exist between 
doctors and lay people as well as among the population at large. In doing this we enter 
into an ethical dialogue with one another in which we attempt to characterize our different
275 Edgar, A. (1995) ‘Weighting Health States and Strong Evaluation’, in Bioethics, 9: 250.
276 Edgar, A. (1997) ‘A Discourse Ethics Approach to Quality o f Life Measurement’, in Annals New York 
Academy o f  Sciences, 809: 36.
277 Ibid.
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preferences. As Edgar notes some characterizations may be indefensible; others may 
illuminate areas of significance which we had not taken seriously in the past and which
978may transform some of our preferences as they widen our scope of understanding.
E. Problems with an Emphasis on Weights
Edgar’s emphasis on the importance of understanding the meaning of answers to 
questions and thus the importance a dialogic solution to the evaluation of different health 
states is similar to my own conclusions in the previous chapters. But by focusing on the 
weighting process as both the mechanism where antipatemalism is expressed and where 
individuals are treated as simple weighers Edgar’s point has less force than it might. While 
I agree with Edgar that the weighting process is one place where quality of life measures 
treat individuals as simple weighers I disagree with his implicit suggestion that properly 
adjusted it might be an adequate mechanism for antipatemalistic interests.
First, even when weightings are accurate and thus do reflect individual experience 
they can still adversely influence the outcomes data from quality of life measures and as a 
result undermine respondent self-determination. Take, for instance, the Quality of Well- 
Being scale (QWB) which is used in a 1995 study to determine the quality of life of 
cochlear implant recipients. In the QWB respondents are given a series of statements and 
asked to mark those that apply to themselves. In this study researchers found that the most 
important factor in implant recipients’ increase in quality of life was that over time they 
exchanged more heavily weighted (more undesirable) descriptions of themselves for less
278 Ibid, p. 37.
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heavily weighted (less undesirable) ones.279 One of the substitutions they cite is the 
following heavily weighted description:
Trouble learning, remembering, or thinking clearly 
which, over time, is traded-up for one of the following less heavily weighted 
descriptions:
1. Pain or discomfort in one or both eyes
2. Overweight or underweight for age and height; skin defects such as scars, 
pimples, warts or bruises
3. Pain in ear, tooth, jaw, throat, lops, tongue; missing or crooked permanent 
false teeth; stuffy, runny nose; any trouble hearing— including wearing a 
hearing aid
In this example even i f  on Edgar’s criteria trouble learning really ought to be 
weighted more heavily than, for instance, pain in the eye and even (/‘there is a consensus 
regarding how we should understand the significance of trouble learning it is still not clear 
that this substitution is good evidence that cochlear implants improve quality of life. In 
other words, it is not clear what these substitutions in the QWB really mean.
Recall my discussion in Chapter 2 that the inability to hear can represent a different, 
but nonetheless legitimate quality of life. Even so being deaf can, practically speaking 
decrease one’s quality of life when social and environmental circumstances are such that 
the inability to hear limits forms of communication or community. Under these conditions 
deaf activists argue that while quality of life may not be good for deaf individuals, this 
assessment has nothing to do with hearing per se. Instead it reflects inequality of 
opportunity and a biased management of social resources. Returning to the QWB while it 
may be true that individuals have trouble learning without implants deaf advocates will
279 Harris, J.P., et al. (1995) ‘An Outcomes Study o f Cochlear implants in Deaf Patients’, in Archives o f  
Otolaryngology Head Neck Surgery, 121: 401.
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argue that this fact is unrelated to their inability to hear since the deaf life, at least in 
principle, represents a life of unique quality.
Moreover, if we accept that a deaf life represents a good quality life and that 
resources are biased toward helping people overcome deafness instead of living with it, 
then an improved ability to learn due to implants may be taken to reflect a loss of diversity 
for citizens at large and a loss of community for the deaf themselves. On this reading, 
cochlear implants could issue in a loss of a kind of quality of life— even though they reduce 
trouble learning. Put differently, just because we agree that trouble learning is very 
important with respect to quality of life does not mean that any intervention which reduces 
trouble learning automatically counts as an improvement in quality of life.
In arguing for the possibility of this conclusion I want to suggest that answers to 
questions in the weighting exercises and answers to questions in the quality of life 
measures ought to be treated as strong evaluations. Thus, if we really want to understand 
the significance of respondents’ answers in the measure above, then we need to understand, 
as Edgar recommends, why ‘trouble learning’ is so important, but we also need to 
understand the significance of having or not having ‘trouble learning’. Thus while Edgar is 
right to emphasize the importance of strong evaluations to weighting exercises he does not 
go far enough, answers to questions in our quality of life measures should also be 
understood on the model of strong evaluations.
The second problem with an emphasis on weights is that the majority of quality of 
life measures do not weight their questions. This is because a variety o f studies have 
shown that weighting questions does not affect the overall scores on quality of life 
measures. For instance, a now famous study found that the scores of the weighted version
193
of the NHP, which Edgar discusses, and the scores from the version which only used de
facto  weights correlated with one another almost perfectly.280 Similarly an unpublished
study of the SEIQoL found that weighted and unweighted versions of the measure also
1
correlated with one another to a high degree. The lack of effect that weighting seems to 
have on the scores of documented comparisons suggests that weighting questions may be 
irrelevant to antipatemalistic concerns.
Edgar’s argument assumes that weighting questions is important because it offers 
respondents one of the best opportunities to influence quality of life outcomes. I have 
suggested, however, that a focus on weightings is insufficient. Rather than focus on the 
weighting of questions I suggest that we refocus on the analysis of respondent answers to 
the questions in the quality of life measures— however they happen to be weighted. But in 
doing so we ought to take from Edgar the insight that respondents— whether they are 
weighting questions or answering them— are illegitimately treated as simple weighers.
Although Edgar and I focus on different aspects of quality of life measurement we 
both worry that an expressed preference or answer may be misunderstood. Moreover, we 
both attribute this potential misunderstanding, at least in part, to the inability of our current 
methods— weighting methods or validation methods— to appreciate or arbitrate among 
individual differences in purpose, goals, expectations, standards or concerns that in turn 
affect the meaning of questions and answers. Thus Edgar argues that our weighting 
methods mistakenly treat respondent answers as weak evaluations and in light of this claim
280 No correlation from this study was less than 0.98. See Jenkinson, C. (1991) ‘Why are we Weighting? A  
Critical Examination o f the Use of Item Weights in a Health Status Measure’, in Social Science Medicine, 32: 
1413-16.
281 Persona] communication with an author o f the study, 12 May 2006.
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we might understand my own work in the previous chapters as suggesting that construct 
validity erroneously treats answers to questions as weak evaluations. In what follows I 
want to deepen the suspicion that construct validity does treat answers as weak evaluations 
by exposing its philosophical foundation.
I ll
Making Quality o f Life Scientific
Construct validity— the process by which we test a measure and its theory by 
generating hypotheses regarding the measures outcomes— was not always accepted by 
psychologists as an appropriate psychometric tool. According to Benjamin Superfine, it 
was not until after 1955 that construct validity started to gain currency and not until after 
1989 with Samuel Messick’s work that it took its place as the dominant form of validation 
that we see today.282 The introduction of construct validity to the already established 
methods embodied in criterion and content validity was seen as quite radical. This is in 
part because construct validity implies that there are grades of validity according to the 
extent to which different hypotheses pertaining to the construct are supported with 
evidence. It thus replaces the unambiguous decisions of validity rendered through the use 
of criterion and content validity. Moreover, in addition to grades of validity construct 
validation implies that the validity of a particular construct is never complete.283 Because 
we are dealing with unobservable constructs, multiple instances of evidence are needed in
282 Superfine, B. M. (2004) ‘At the Intersection o f Law and Psychometrics: Explaining the Validity Clause o f  
No Child Left Behind’, Journal o f  Law and Education, 33: 479-80.
283 Rust, J. & Golombok, S. (1989) M odem Psychometrics The Science o f Psychological Assessment, London: 
Routledge Press, p. 81.
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order to give good arguments that a measure does what we think it does, but in line with 
Popper no hypothesis or theory— no construct— can ever be verified.284
The introduction of construct validity meant that the validation process was now not 
only more ambiguous, but also more complicated. As I discussed in Chapter 1 construct 
validity requires a theory from which we can draw hypotheses about the construct in 
question. Therefore the importance of theory-building came to the forefront of validity 
testing. But because psychometricians have to rely on theories, which can never be 
verified, they can no longer merely assume the existence of a construct as they had done 
when only using content and criterion validity. Now they have to define the construct and 
gather evidence to support it. Evidence in favor of a construct makes its existence more 
likely, but never verifies it and unfavorable evidence is ambiguous since it is not always 
clear what is to blame— the hypothesis/theory or the measure.
Although it was a radical departure from the relative simplicity o f criterion and 
content validity, construct validity was and still is seen as an advance because it does not 
blindly assume the existence of a construct, because it requires good evidence before we 
provisionally accept a construct and because it aids in theory building in as much as it relies 
on theory. Put differently, the introduction of construct validity into psychometric practice 
made that practice more scientific. More pointedly, as Rust and Golombok say, construct 
validity is, ‘a reflection of a particular view of the scientific process, and is integrated 
within the positivist and hypothetico-deductive view of science’.
284 Superfine, B. M. (2004) ‘At the Intersection o f Law and Psychometrics: Explaining the Validity Clause of 
No Child Left Behind’, Journal o f Law and Education, 33: 480.
285 Rust, J. & Golombok, S. (1992) M odem Psychometrics The Science o f Psychological Assessment, London: 
Routledge Press, p. 81.
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Thus construct validity is taken to embody tbe logic of the H-D method and 
scientific inference. The specific logic of the H-D method is that of an argument. The 
premises consist of a hypothesis from which observable consequences can be drawn— for 
instance we might hypothesize that cochlear implants improve quality of life— and the 
initial conditions of the test or measure— we might include the fact that all those in the 
study have been deaf for at least 10 years. The conclusion drawn from the premises is an 
observation prediction, for example we might predict that cochlear implant recipients will 
score higher on quality of life measures than those without implants. When we get the 
results of the measure or the test we look to see if the prediction is true. If the prediction 
is true, then we have reason to think our hypothesis and thus our theory is better supported; 
if the prediction is false then either our hypothesis and theory is flawed or the measure used 
to elicit the observable consequences is imperfect.
The H-D method, and thus construct validity, illustrates a type of epistemology, 
which Charles Taylor claims has been dominant in much of science since the 17th century 
and particularly dominant in experimental psychology today.287 The first principle of this 
epistemology is that all data must be intersubjectively univocal; ceteris paribus it is in 
principle possible for anyone to perform an experiment and achieve the same results as 
anyone else performing it.288 This principle refers to the fact that scientific experiments 
and scientific inferences are meant to be replicable; whatever differences there are between 
experiments they are not accounted for in terms of the anthropocentric qualities of the
286 Ibid, pp. 44-5.
287 Taylor, C. (1985) ‘Peaceful Coexistence in Psychology’, Human Agency and Language Philosophical 
Papers 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 117.
288 Ibid.
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individual researchers or the individual participants in the study. Instead, they are 
accounted for in terms of the contingent features of the experiment.
For our purposes this means that ceteris paribus the choice of a researcher to 
analyze the outcomes data will not affect the outcome. But it also means that the choice of 
respondents should not affect the outcome. If we do find a difference between different 
groupings of respondents, for instance in the revision of the NHP in which French people 
ranked ‘I’m in pain when I am sitting’ as the least severe option opposed to those in the 
United Kingdome who ranked it 5th out of 8, then we attribute this difference to contingent 
circumstances between the two measures or between the groups measured. If you recall, in 
this particular example the differences were attributed to language barriers, environmental 
factors and habitat.
The reluctance to rely on anthropocentric qualities to explain differences in quality 
of life assessment can be traced to one of the defining features of standardized quality of 
life measures, namely their understanding of ‘subjectivity’. Recall from Chapter 1 that in 
the context o f standardized measures ‘subjectivity’ is understood as what I call 
‘embodiment’. ‘Embodiment’ refers to the fact that we are all in similar bodies and as a 
result have certain similar unobservable experiences. If subjectivity is due to our 
embodiment, then quality of life as a measure o f subjective experience can be standardized, 
that is replicated. Thus quality of life measurement is purified from problems of 
understanding meaning because in virtue of being in similar bodies the kinds of experiences 
we have remain similar.289
289 To be sure individualized quality o f life measures understand subjectivity as idiosyncratic and on the face 
of it may seem to embrace anthropocentric qualities and thus may be thought to serve as the appropriate
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One of the consequences of intersubjective univocality and hence construct validity 
is that scientific data— the questions and answers of quality of life measures as well as the 
hypotheses about the outcomes— are taken as weak evaluations.290 They must be taken as 
weak evaluations, as requiring no further articulation or explanation in order to understand
2Q1
their meaning, because otherwise we allow for potentially unarbitrable disputes. As a 
result the experiments or the measures would not be replicable: the results and the 
experiment or measure itself would be understood differently depending on who is involved 
in the study.
This impediment to replication is indeed a problem for many areas of scientific 
research. But quality of life assessment relies on questions and their answers as the basic 
unit for gathering observable information about unobservable constructs and as I argued in 
the previous chapter we cannot limit our understanding of questions and answers to a single 
meaning. Valid quality of life measures cannot be treated as univocal pieces of research. 
How we understand the meaning of the data does depend on the researchers and 
respondents involved in the measure.
Respondents are not merely simple weighers, but when we use construct validity as 
our primary validation procedure we treat them as though they were and in so doing 
deprive them of the self-determination that quality of life measures were thought to 
provide. It is here in the validation of quality of life assessment and not in the weighting 
exercise that the notion of the simple weigher not only does its most damage, but is also at
alternative to traditional measures. But as I have already argued in Chapter 2 it is unclear that idiosyncrasy 
best expresses our anthropocentricity.
290 Ibid, p .l 18.
291 Ibid.
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its deepest in terms of conceptual orientation. Construct validity was thought to make 
psychological testing more scientific, but when it comes to quality of life measurement it 
serves better to conceal our understanding of different constructs than to help us discover 
new facets of them.
Taylor’s notion of weak evaluations and simple weighers as well has his insights 
into the H-D method help to highlight and unify much of my work throughout these 
chapters. Nonetheless, while I have argued for the indeterminate nature of our questions 
and answers on the grounds of what it is to ask and answer questions, Taylor argues that the 
descriptions of our motivations and choices cannot be absolute because this conception is 
inconsistent with our best understanding of what it is to be a person. To be sure, these two 
arguments are different, yet we might see them as two sides to the same coin. For if Taylor 
is right that strong evaluations represent our self-interpretations and I am right that valid 
interpretations require a dialogic solution, then to the extent that our identity consists of our 
self-interpretations we are both the source of these questions and their answers. If persons 
have the depth of character which Taylor attributes to them, then we are a kind of text- 
analogue and thus subject to the process of asking and answering questions in order to best 
understand ourselves— our desires, our motivations, our choices, our preferences.
It follows from what has been said so far that investigations into the quality of life 
that a set of answers expresses require some insight into a respondent’s vision of the good 
life. But we can only really achieve this insight insofar as we— quality of life researchers 
and respondents— are open to reevaluating what people might mean by their questions and 
answers by asking further questions. Building on that with which I ended in Chapter 4,
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investigations into quality of life are not just dialogic— they are also ethical dialogues;
992
quality of life is an essentially ethical or we might say broadly speaking moral question.
292 See Taylor, C. (1989) Sources o f the Self the Making o f the M odem Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 14-15, for a brief defense of expanding our normal use o f “moral” i.e. our respect for 
and our obligations to others, to include our understanding o f what makes for a full life as well as a range o f  
notions concerned with dignity.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have linked complications in understanding the meaning of questions 
and answers in quality of life measures with issues of validation. My claim has been that 
these complications render the validation standards of classical test theory inadequate. To 
be sure, our measures can be better or worse— more or less free from bias and prejudice—  
but they cannot be independent instruments whose outcomes, like the outcomes of a 
sphigmometer or stethoscope, are meant to be clear to anyone educated in how to read 
them. Throughout the pages of these chapters I have discussed my reasons for this claim 
and there is no reason to repeat them here. In what follows, however, I would like to point 
to two further topics that weave throughout this thesis and may not have received sufficient 
attention.
It is often said that quality of life lacks a gold standard. This statement is typically 
taken to mean that quality of life is unobservable and that we thus do not have evidence of 
the construct independent of the measures that assess it. We have no way of directly 
validating the measures we use, but we also do not know what a measure’s outcomes 
signify. The lack of a gold standard suggests both that we can only grasp quality of life 
through our measures and that understanding these measures is itself a problem. The 
typical solution to this difficulty appeals to construct validity: construct validity provides 
not only an account of a measure’s accuracy in lieu of a gold standard, but in doing so it 
also tells us what the questions and answers might mean.
When we say that quality of life lacks a gold standard we might be understood as 
saying that we do not know what quality of life is. Normally when we do not know what
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something is we ask questions about it and indeed quality of life measures ask respondents 
questions about their quality of life. But at the heart of genuine inquiry, unlike the 
questions in quality of life measures, is what Gadamer calls the ‘...questionability of what
'J Q ' l
is questioned.’ By this he means that in questioning a subject matter the answers we 
seek are not settled and thus our questions, too, are open to a certain amount of 
reinterpretation; when we ask a question we open up inquiry into a subject matter which we 
imperfectly understand and thus the questions we ask are also imperfectly understood. We 
come to a better understanding of the meaning of our questions and answers as we come to 
understand the subject matter.
But unlike genuine inquiry the use and validation of quality of life measures 
assumes— indeed requires— that the respondents understand the questions and answers in 
our measures in the same way as researchers imagined they would. Put differently, neither 
the questions nor answers in our measures are open to reinterpretation and as Gadamer 
writes, a question without this openness is ‘...basically no more than an apparent 
question’.294 Apparent questions do not reveal the indeterminacy or the “questionability” 
of a subject matter and instead suggest that the subject matter is already understood.
Quality of life, however, is not supposed to be understood independent our measures for 
this is just the difficulty that the lack of a gold standard underwrites.
My point here is to emphasize the discrepancy between certain claims made about 
quality of life and the reality of quality of life measurement. We might say that the lack of 
a gold standard directs us to a problem, a problem which is perhaps best understood in
293 Gadamer, H. (2003) (2nd ed) Truth and Method, trans Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, 
Continuum Press: New York, p. 363.
294 Ibid.
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terms of a circle— we cannot understand quality of life unless we understand the measures 
that asses it, but we cannot understand our measures unless we understand quality of life. 
Importantly, construct validity does not solve this dilemma, for construct validity implies 
that we already know how to understand our questions and answers. Rather than resolving 
the difficulty of how to understand quality of life, this response requires that we already 
understand it.
Thus, my claim in this thesis is two-fold. Not only do problems with understanding 
the definitive meaning of questions and answers in quality of life measures render the 
validation standards of classical test theory inadequate. In addition quality of life research 
often fails to grasp the significance of the fact that quality of life lacks a gold standard.
This lack asks that we face what I we might call the hermeneutic problem. This problem 
cannot be solved with a methodological slight of hand whereby we grant the lack of a gold 
standard at one moment only to treat quality of life research as though it had a gold 
standard at another.
Quality of life measures face another difficulty which weaves through this thesis, 
namely the difficulty of creating measures that allow for a reasonable amount of respondent 
self-determination. This difficulty is intimately connected to the lack of a gold standard 
because when we treat the questions and answers in our measures as though we know what 
they mean we open up the possibility of misunderstanding them. If at least one of the 
important motives for measuring quality of life is to give respondents a voice in their health 
care, then the standardization of the meaning of questions and answers is a problem. We do 
not give people self-determination when we determine a priori what our questions and their 
answers already mean. To do so is to ask only apparent questions and to do this is to be
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less than genuine in our inquiry into quality of life. Moreover, it is to treat people as 
something less than self-determining agents. Thus limiting how we understand the 
meaning of the questions and answers in our measures may not only be an epistemological 
loss, but also an ethical infringement on individuals’ capacity to express what they 
understand to be a good quality life.
Quality of life research attempts to standardize the meaning of the questions and 
answers in our measures in order to make quality of life a scientific enterprise. But what 
this thesis has tried to show is that questioning is more of an art than a science and that this 
art is part of the art of conversation in general. As Gadamer writes there is no \ . .method 
o f learning to ask questions.. . ’ We simply learn to ask good questions by taking part in 
inquiry and in attempting to understand the things around us. Moreover, we cannot 
understand these things— we cannot participate in inquiry— unless we ask questions. If we 
want to measure quality of life, then we must also understand it. But this undertaking does 
not require additional efforts to make quality of life measures independent and self- 
contained. Rather it requires that we incorporate these measures into a kind of dialogue 
that helps us to expand and critically to evaluate our conceptions of the good life.
In his discussion of the limitations of our methods in helping us to ask good 
questions Gadamer refers us to Socrates and his claim that the important thing in asking 
good questions is the knowledge that one does not know.296 For Gadamer it is the Socratic 
dialogue which creates the conditions for the possibility of good questions and thus the 
possibility of knowledge. Gadamer’s reference to Socrates indicates just how long the
295 Ibid, p. 365.
296 T. • .
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issue of questioning has been hovering around the edges of philosophy. In this thesis I 
have taken up the case study of quality of life measures— a modem phenomenon, which 
one might say is the result of modem technologies. But I have used this case study to 
highlight an old and often neglected topic, namely our understanding of questions. 
Questions are often overlooked in philosophy in favor o f answers— explanations, reasons, 
causes. But if Gadamer is correct when he writes that the priority of the question over the
9Q7answer is the basis of the concept of knowledge , then perhaps we would do well to pay 
them more attention.
297 Ibid.
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